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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

ACDA-A (M) (29 Mar 71) FOR OT UT 703037

5 April 1971

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1970 (U)**

**SEE DISTRIBUTION**

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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as

*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96266

14 AUG 1970

AVFBC-RE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (22) (U)

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command Group.

(1) During the reporting period there were four major changes in the Command Group:

(a) On 17 June 1970 Major General James W. Sutherland, Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV, departed.

(b) On 3 May 1970 Brigadier General Francis J. Roberts became Chief of staff II FFORCEV, replacing Brigadier General Leo D. Kinnard.

(c) On 24 May 1970 Colonel George K. Webb became Deputy Chief of Staff II FFORCEV, replacing Colonel Berkeley S. Gillespie.

(d) On 22 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Jerry D. Frydendall became Secretary of the General Staff, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Lambert.

(2) During the reporting period there were nineteen major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV:

(a) On 18 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel (P) James A. Fyock became Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, replacing Colonel Joseph E. Collins.

(b) On 1 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Winslow became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, replacing Lieutenant Colonel John R. Hook.

(c) On 21 May 1970 Lieutenant Colonel (P) John R. Black became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Lieutenant Colonel T. G. Smith.

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**SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS 007 - 65 (22) (U)**

(d) On 3 June 1970 Colonel David A. Beckner became Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, replacing Colonel Volney F. Warner.

(e) On 23 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Mullins became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Palm.

(f) On 15 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel (P) Edward C. Lytle became Adjutant General, replacing Colonel Eldridge Thomas.

(g) On 3 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Evans became Deputy Adjutant General, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Kirschner, Jr.

(h) On 27 June 1970 Colonel James E. Foster became Engineer, replacing Colonel John Perkins III.

(i) On 23 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel James A. Stichen became Deputy Engineer, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Warren S. O'Sullivan.

(j) On 6 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel (P) Paul K. Simon became Signal Officer, replacing Colonel Albert J. Geraci.

(k) On 7 June 1970 Major (i) Wilbur A. Parsons became Deputy Signal Officer replacing Major Leo M. Childs.

(l) On 17 May 1970 Lieutenant Colonel David A. Peace became Information Officer replacing Lieutenant Colonel Abbott R. Morgan.

(m) On 15 July 1970 Colonel Franklin T. Gosser became Staff Chaplain, replacing Colonel Ben S. Price.

(n) On 12 May 1970 Lieutenant Colonel John M. Stoebner became Staff Surgeon, replacing Colonel William R. Bunge.

(o) On 16 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Willie L. Jones became Deputy Provost Marshal, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. Vanderford.

(p) On 25 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Efraim S. Garcia became Headquarters Commandant, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Bernard B. Brown.

(q) On 26 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel William E. Taylor became Inspector General, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Ernest L. Phallan.

(r) On 15 May 1970 Colonel Robert M. Bartelt became Chief Liaison Officer, replacing Colonel Jack Mittelstadt.

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**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RC5 CSFGR - 65 (K2) (U)

(s) On 25 May 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Albert L. Henderson became Deputy Liaison Officer, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Hewell E. Vinson.

(3) During the reporting period there were twelve significant personnel changes in II FFGCW Artillery:

(a) On 15 June 1970 Colonel (P) Edward F. Gudge, Jr., assumed command of II FFGCW Artillery, replacing COL Joseph H. Hearin.

(b) On 30 June 1970 Colonel Ballard W. Scott, Jr., became Deputy Commander, replacing Colonel John E. Baker, who had become Deputy Commander on 6 June 1970.

(c) On 17 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel William E. Hollowell became S1, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Rodney G. Parrish.

(d) On 10 July 1970 Major Robert A. Thompson became S2, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Herbert C. Fieger.

(e) On 28 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel James L. Reagor became S3, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Russell E. Parsons.

(f) On 28 May 1970 Major (P) Thomas A. Apperson became S4, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Grover H. Lewis.

(g) On 8 June 1970 Colonel William L. Kemmitzer assumed command of the 23d Artillery Group, replacing Colonel John Baker.

(h) On 18 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Jesse B. Doss assumed command of the 5th Battalion, 12d Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Donald C. Milvanity.

(i) On 3 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Myron J. Longmore assumed command of the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Lemanski.

(j) On 15 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel George G. Mays assumed command of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Dan H. Ralls.

(k) On 17 July 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Rodney G. Parrish assumed command of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Locke.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(1) On 23 June 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Lambert assumed command of the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (AW) (SF), replacing Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Childress.

b. Personnel, Morale, Safety, Discipline, and Base Development.

(1) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued by this command are listed below:

<u>AWARDS</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Silver Star	50	45	26	121
Distinguished Flying Cross	10	26	10	46
Soldier's Medal	12	10	6	28
Bronze Star Medal "V"	203	106	121	430
Bronze Star Medal	519	557	591	1667
Air Medal "V"	15	15	18	48
Air Medal	404	268	394	1066
Army Commendation Medal "V"	158	90	97	345
Army Commendation Medal	991	1301	1670	3962
Purple Heart	57	18	3	78
<b>TOTAL AWARDS</b>	<b>2419</b>	<b>2436</b>	<b>2736</b>	<b>7791</b>

(3) The overall assigned and attached Officer and Warrant Officer strength of II FFORCEV decreased substantially and the Enlisted strength increased substantially during the last quarter. A comparison of the last four reporting periods follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
31 Oct 69	572	57	4839
31 Jan 70	487	53	4209

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## APPENDIX

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, HQ CCFV - 65 (H) (U)

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	WARRANT MEN
30 Apr 70	139	82	6145
31 Jul 70	555	77	5778

(4) During the 4th quarter of FY 70, period 1 May 1970 through 31 July 1970 the 14th ABU sold 12,536 more orders, an increase of almost 3,000 over the previous quarter, with a value of approximately \$125,000. Emphasis has continued to be placed on the detection of contraband. The amount of contraband entering COMUS has become very significant. Visual inspection is conducted by the Postal Officer on all parcels which are customs free due to PCS orders enclosed, and all other suspicious packages. In addition, all parcels are checked with a mine detector to determine metallic content where the customs tag does not indicate metallic content should be present. All packages that appear suspicious are opened prior to being forwarded from the post office. The clerks explain to every patron that the parcel will be checked either visually, or by electronic means and insure that each patron is aware of the provisions of MACV Poster 5.

(5) During the 4th quarter of FY 70, the military injury rate increased 34% over the 3d quarter, FY 70. This increase is directly associated with the Cambodian operation. The long hours of duty, constant maintaining of a high degree of vigilance, the sense of expediency brought on by the requirement of completing the mission within a specified time limit, the construction of fire bases and landing zones in a hostile environment contributed to accident producing situations. Of the 40 fatalities reported during this period, only seven involved the operation of Army motor vehicles and six were caused by the accidental discharge of weapons. The remaining 27 involved a variety of agencies, ranging from personnel being hit by falling trees to personnel being struck by lumber thrown by the blade wash of a helicopter operating on an improvised helipad. During the 4th quarter, FY 70, 346 military personnel were hospitalized as a result of accidents, 47 from accidental discharge of weapons, 38 from Army motor vehicle accidents and the remaining 261 from a variety of causes with none being repeated often enough to indicate trends. Falls from bunkers, being struck by tree limbs while riding track vehicles, bruised and amputated fingers caught by breech locks of artillery pieces are typical examples of the accident producing situations occurring during this period. In future operations such as Cambodia, commanders will continue to lose a substantial number of military personnel from accidents unless safety rules are incorporated into each task and enforced by strict supervision.

The accident rates for the 3d and 4th quarters, FY 70, are shown below

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, HNS OPR - 65 (22) (U)

for comparison purposes:

## II FORCEV, ASSIGNED, ATTACHED, AND OPCON UNITS

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>3d QTR, FY 70</u>	<u>4th QTR, FY 70</u>
Military Personnel Injury Rate (Injuries per 1,000,000 man-days)	52.4	70.3
Army Motor Vehicle Accident Rate (Accidents per 1,000,000 miles)	6.2	6.5

### (6) Health problems included:

(a) Malaria. A sharp upsurge in falciparum malaria rates in all US troop units participating in the Cambodian operation confirms previous observations of high incidence of this form of malaria in areas occupied by 17A troops. More notable increases occurred in units during stand-down indicating that while troops were in a more relaxed environment, they also became more lax in the preventive measures required to control malaria.

(b) Dysentery. Several outbreaks of dysentery also occurred in some units toward the end of the Cambodian operation. Causes of these outbreaks were attributed to consumption of non-potable water in the field and also at the fire support bases and unsatisfactory sanitary conditions at fire support bases. During the increased activity of the Cambodian operation, field mess sanitation apparently deteriorated to some extent. This was more notable at fire support bases which had frequent changes of occupant units. Had the operations continued much longer with the same deficient sanitation, the combat effectiveness of some units would have been substantially affected.

(7) Quarterly statistics for the 4th quarter FY 70 indicated that offense rates for II FORCEV assigned, attached, and OPCON units showed a leveling off and in some cases a decline from 3d quarter statistics. Crimes against persons and property decreased slightly from 3d quarter but the decline is not sufficient to indicate a trend. Miscellaneous offenses showed a moderate increase but again the increase was not sufficient to indicate a trend. Military Offenses showed a decrease from 3d quarter and can be attributed to the large troop movements brought on by the withdrawal from Cambodia. These movements kept troops busy and allowed very little leisure time. Traffic offenses showed an increase and can be attributed to increased police enforcement and additional MP patrols that have been established.

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AFV-83

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam War  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, BOS CSPCR - 65 (R2) (U)

**II FFOURCH ASSIGNED, ATTACHED AND OFFICE FY 70**  
**Offense Rates per Thousand Troops**

	<u>1st Qtr 70</u>	<u>2d Qtr 70</u>	<u>3d Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>
Crimes Against Persons and Property	2.13	2.07	4.22	3.94
Miscellaneous Offenses	6.00	6.66	9.45	10.24
Military Offenses	20.03	23.70	37.59	51.06
Traffic Offenses	17.53	15.04	20.04	25.14

(8) Improvements of the base camp continued. The construction of a new command bunker BNC, II FFOURCH, was completed during the reporting period.

**c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence:**

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFOURCH) Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

**(d) Intelligence Collection:**

(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued by the Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing was to inform the ACoS, G2 of enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength and intentions as reported by clandestine agents. The raw intelligence reported by agents was constantly evaluated by comparing reports with actual happenings throughout the MR 3. These comparisons enabled the agencies which employed the sources to determine their reliability and decide which warranted retention.

(b) The Collection Division was also responsible for insuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) were published and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, the Collection Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and informed subordinate units which SICRs were current by publishing a quarterly II FFOURCH Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry which indexed all SICRs by number and by collection agency. During the past quarter MACV SICRs were cancelled, while new MACV and one new II FFOURCH SICRs were levied. The semi-

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, EC5 CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

II FFORCEV ASSIGNED, ATTACHED AND CPOCH FY 70  
Offense Rates per Thousand Troops

	<u>1st Qtr 70</u>	<u>2d Qtr 70</u>	<u>3d Qtr 70</u>	<u>4th Qtr 70</u>
Crimes Against Persons and Property	2.13	2.87	4.25	3.94
Miscellaneous Offenses	6.00	6.66	9.15	10.21
Military Offenses	20.32	22.70	37.59	31.06
Traffic Offenses	17.55	15.04	20.04	25.14

(c) Improvements of the base camp continued. The construction of a new command bunker EC5, II FFORCEV, was completed during the reporting period.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of their headquarters.

(d) Intelligence Collection:

(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued by the Collection Division. The purpose of this briefing was to inform the ACOF, G1 of enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength and intentions as reported by clandestine agents. The raw intelligence reported by agents was constantly evaluated by comparing reports with actual happenings throughout the TAOI. These comparisons enabled the agencies which employed the sources to determine their reliability and decide which warranted retention.

(b) The Collection Division was also responsible for insuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) were published and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, the Collection Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific subjects and informed subordinate units which SICRs were current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCEV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements Registry which listed all SICRs by number and by collection agency. During the last quarter MAW SICRs were cancelled, while new MAW and one new II FFORCEV SICRs were levied. The semi-

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R2) (U)

annual update of the MACV intelligence collection plan for the Combined Campaign Plan was received and those requirements levied on II FFORCEV were disseminated to supporting collection assets. Headquarters, II FFORCEV also prepared an intelligence collection plan for wet season operations in which ESI, indicators and standing orders and requests were disseminated in support of II FFORCEV operations against the enemy's logistics system in the MR 3.

(c) During the period 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, the Collection Division continued analyzing agent reports and disseminating them for more complete exploitation. Specific areas of interest examined were enemy sanctuaries and base areas, movement of regimental and divisional forces, cache locations and intelligence which contributed to the identification and selection of targets by the G2 Targets Division.

## (3) Counterintelligence/Phoenix

(a) Pacification and Phoenix operations were stamped indelibly with mark of the Cambodian operations during the reporting period. Although the total impact of the operations has yet to be realized, a new confidence bred of successes in Cambodia permeates the GVN and the ARVN and has spread to the populace. A most impressive event in May was the outstanding manner in which more than 22,000 Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia were received and processed with little advisory assistance. Increased VCI neutralizations in Hau Nghia, Long An and Tay Ninh Provinces as a result of the Cambodian Campaign made May the most successful month to date for the Phung Hoang program. The numbers of VCI neutralized in June and July remained high, but did not equal the total for May. Substantial numbers of VCI were neutralized and, more important, the quality of VCI neutralized remained at a high level. Forty-one percent were cadre at district level or higher. The high level of neutralizations in Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh were primarily due to the large number of ralliers from Cambodian operations. Long An Province continues to do well with over 100 neutralizations for three consecutive months. An excellent example of specific targeting was a PLOCC operation conducted in Binh Duc Village, Ben Luc District, Long An Province where 10 to 15 specific targets were neutralized.

(b) The number of terrorist incidents reported in the MR 3 continued to vary widely from week to week throughout the reporting period; for example:

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	<u>High Week</u>	<u>Low Week</u>	<u>12 Week Average</u>
Incidents	71	39	58
Persons killed	43	9	20
Persons wounded	106	16	48
Persons abducted	38	3	17

The weekly average of 58 incidents for the MR 3 is not alarming when viewed in the light of the weekly averages of 47, 98 and 79 incidents for MR 1, 2, and 3 respectively.

(4) G2 Air:

(a) There was significant reduction in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the Military Region 2 and portions of Cambodia. This was due to a further reduction in assets: one Air Force squadron was redeployed and only one Mohawk company was retained to support both MR 2 and MR 4. Poor flying weather caused by the southwest monsoon season also reduced aerial reconnaissance effectiveness.

(b) During the period, a different method of area coverage employing Red Haze was attempted which proved to be successful. Utilizing the US Air Force sorties, the desired area covered was planned as a long strip 10 km by 100 km. The former area coverage had been a 20 km by 30 km target configuration. By flying strips and eliminating the excess maneuvering required by turning, the aircraft was able to save fuel and provide up to 400 more square kilometers of coverage per target. This method was used primarily for Red Haze flights into Cambodia during the allied cross-border operation.

(c) Special strips and pinpoint Red Haze coverage which were experimented with during the previous reporting period in the 25th US Infantry Division and 3d Bde, 9th US Infantry Division areas of operation were found to be unsuccessful in producing better resolution of the imagery. Photography of special target areas from an altitude of 1,000 ft produced no better resolution than from 2,500 ft.

(5) G2 Targets:

(a) The G2 Targets Division's primary function continued to be the development and evaluation of targets for B-57 strikes. During

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R2) (U)

this period, the division maintained and further developed an extensive data base of hard installations, including enemy bunkers, base camps, fighting positions, tunnels and trench works, all reproduced visually on acetate covered maps. G2 Targets Division used the data in developing and evaluating targets. These data were also used widely by friendly units during the reassignment of the AO's following the Cambodian Campaign. Units were provided with a hard installation data bank which could have been developed only after extensive operations in their new AO's.

(b) During this quarter, B-52 strikes were targeted against lucrative targets in the ARVN III Corps area of operation and tactical area of interest. Particular emphasis was placed on Cambodian targets which received 205 strikes or 24.7% of the strikes allocated to II Field Force by MACV. The remainder of the strikes went to targets within Vietnam: Tay Ninh, 18; Phuoc Long, 12; Bien Hoa, 1; Long Khanh, 4; and Quang Duc, 1.

(c) A brief account of the B-52 operations in Cambodia follows:

1 A total of 186 Arc Light strikes supported operations in Cambodia during the period 24 April through 30 June 1970. Although cross-border operations did not commence until 1 May, a series of 25 in-country strikes along the border were employed in preparation for the operation.

2 The initial strikes in Cambodia were targeted against suspected base camps, transshipment points and staging areas and were designed to assist penetration of the border areas and facilitate rapid advancement to internal objectives. A total of 36 strikes were employed in this role in the Fishhook and Base Areas 350, 351, and 353.

3 As consolidation of the initial objectives occurred, targeting emphasis was shifted to support of operations designed to destroy enemy troop concentrations, disrupt his command and control facilities, and destroy rice and munitions caches which could not be fully exploited or evacuated. This exploitation phase of the operations was supported with a total of 89 strikes.

4 The withdrawal from Cambodia was supported by 36 strikes concentrated in the Fishhook and north of Base Area 351. The overall objective of these strikes was to assist in the extraction of US and ARVN units by bombing known and suspected enemy troop concentrations.

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Midway through the withdrawal phase, troop extraction had successfully progressed to the extent that Air Light emphasis was shifted to known and suspected areas and rice caches. Particular emphasis was placed on the Fishhook area where increased enemy activity indicated attempts to defend cache sites which had not been fully exploited or had not been discovered.

(6) Radio Research: The 303d Radio Research Battalion provided timely and sustained support for the combat operations of II Field Force. A direct support unit provides radio research support to each US division and separate brigade or regiment and immediate tactical reports are provided down to brigade level. The 303d Radio Research Battalion was responsive to the tasks of this command and performed in an outstanding manner. Specifics on support furnished are provided in separate documentation due to classification.

(7) Weather Support for II FFOCEV: Weather support for II FFOCEV is provided by Detachment 32, 5th Weather Squadron. This support consists of a daily weather briefing to the Commanding General and his staff; special winds aloft forecasts to G5 PSYOPS; and enroute and terminal forecast for Army aircraft departing the Long Binh Plantation area. In addition, monthly climatic summaries for IR 3 and 4 are prepared and distributed to interested staff and operational agencies. Weather briefings are given at aviation unit monthly Flying Safety meetings on request. During the Cambodian operation in May and June, primary operational support was given by Detachment 32's operating locations 2 and 4 with the 1st Cav and the 25th Div at Phuoc Vinh and Cu Chi. The southwest monsoon started 28 May, 11 days after the average starting date. Rainfall in May, June and July was below monthly averages by 2-6 inches, depending on location. As a result, weather had less effect on operations during the quarter than had been anticipated.

(8) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remained the supreme political and military headquarters controlling all Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army activities in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in IR 3 were subordinate either directly to Headquarters, South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA) or to one of the six secondary level headquarters in IR 3. Documents captured during the Cambodian operations revealed the current strength of the COSVN political agencies to be 10,300 personnel. Other documents captured in Cambodia revealed that Headquarters, SVNLA existed as a separate entity subordinate to COSVN with a strength of 12,112 personnel. There

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (22) (U)

were no significant changes in the enemy's terrain organization during this quarter and the area of MR 3 continued to be divided into 13 major subdivisions. Enemy actions within Cambodia were characterized by evasion from allied forces, while units operating within the corps generally avoided contact in an attempt to conserve existing supplies.

## (b) Significant Order of Battle Developments

1 Changes in Effectiveness of Units: A few significant changes in the number and effectiveness of enemy units were noted in Military Region 3. The table below shows the combined effectiveness and separate battalions at the beginning and end of the period.

TABLE: COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY UNITS

	1 May 70				31 July 70			
	CE	MCE	NCE	TOTAL	CE	MCE	NCE	TOTAL
Inf Regt	1(1)	8	7	16(1)	4	10	2(1)	16(1)
Arty Regt	2	1	0	3	0	3	0	3
Inf Bn	0	18	4(1)	22(1)	0	12	9(1)	21(1)
Arty Bn	2	8	3	13	0	10	2	12
Sapper Regt	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Sapper Bn	4	7	3	14	1	13	0	14
Recon Bn	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1

FCE - Fully Combat Effective (none)

MCE - Marginally Combat Effective

CE - Combat Effective

NCE - Non Combat Effective

Units in parentheses are carried as possible by II FFORCEV OB.

2 New Units Organized Under 5 VC Divisions: Documents and PW's captured in May and June 1970 indicated a reorganization of the 5 VC Division. A PW captured in May revealed that a new regiment, designated 26, was subordinated to the 5 VC Division. Documents also stated what newly infiltrated personnel had been used to reorganize the 275

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Regiment into two regimental sized groups designated 2754 and 2758; however, this reorganization has not been confirmed. Documents captured in June, revealed that the 33 Regiment, 5 VC Division, which had been operating in Binh Tay (F), had been resubordinated to 12-7. Documents and PW's captured in May and June 70 also revealed the formation of the 27 Recon Battalion, 5 VC Division, which took place in Feb 70, and gave its mission as conducting reconnaissance for the 95 Copper Battalion, 5 VC Division and other 5 VC Division infantry units.

2 Identification of Three Recovery Regiments: In the summer of 1969, three regiments were activated to care for wounded personnel and newly infiltrated replacements. The 90, 92, and 94 Recovery and Replacement Regiments were organized under the direct control of the military, political and rear service staffs of HQ, SVN. Their mission was to collect stragglers and provide them with convalescent services and facilitate their delivery to their units operating in the interior of SVN. Wounded and sick personnel from the combat units, who had undergone treatment in the regiments' medical facilities and had recovered were sent back to their parent units, reassigned to rear echelon sections, or evacuated to NVN. The 90 Recovery Regiment was formed from personnel of the 90 Rear Service Group and the Convalescent Battalion of the 61 Rear Service Group. The regiment is responsible for all recruits, wounded and sick personnel, stragglers and VC/NVA deserters within the logistical area of the 61 Rear Service Group. It was also given control over personnel from the 71 and 81 Rear Service Groups. The 92 Recovery Regiment was given the responsibility of caring for patients previously handled by the 50 and 70 Rear Service Groups. The 94 Recovery Regiment has the mission of handling personnel from the 82 and 100 Rear Service Groups. The 90 Regiment has a cadre strength of 1700 and administers to the needs of approximately 1500 transient personnel per month. The unit provides services to VC/NVA units located in Phuoc Long Province in SVN and Mondul Kiri Province in Cambodia. The cadre strength of the 92 Recovery Regiment is listed at 1673; the unit provides convalescence services to approximately 1000 transients monthly. Its area of responsibility includes the Fishhook and Base Areas 350, 352, and 353. The 94 Recovery Regiment has a cadre of 1805, and administers 6500 transient personnel per month. The regiment's current area of responsibility includes the region to the west and north of Base Area 354.

4 J16 Copper Office Upgraded to Copper High Command: On 14 April 1970, Nguyen Ngoc Son, a lieutenant in command of the 155 Naval Copper Unit, rallied to the GVN and provided the following information concerning the Copper High Command. Prior to Nov 69, the Copper High Command,

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SVHIA, was the Sapper Section, Military Staff Dept, SVHIA. In Nov 69, it was upgraded to "high command" status, permitting the various military regions to elevate their sapper sections to office status. The change in status of the Sapper High Command to full command level reflects an increase in mission priority and indicates that the importance of the sapper's role in the latest communist strategy for victory in RVN has been greatly increased. Since Jan 70, a 9 Sapper Battalion has been formed and is now operating in the Ial Hhe area with a strength of 180 personnel. Documents dated April 1970, stated that a 10 Sapper Battalion had recently been formed; the battalion is held in a "possible" status.

5 Two Units Inactivated in SR-1: Due to financial corruption, the Vach Dang Sapper, Recon Battalion of SR-1 was inactivated in early June 70, and its equipment transferred to the Engineer Section of SR-1. Indications are that the 10 Artillery Battalion of SR-1 was also dissolved and that its units were probably absorbed by the Artillery Battalion, from which it was originally formed. During this period, the 2 Battalion, 269 Regiment returned to the Citadel from Ba Ba Tay, Cambodia.

6 VC Ba Bien (P) renamed VC Ba Long (1): The name Ba Bien originated in late 1966 and was the VC designation for the political unit comprising GVN Long Khanh, Bien Hoa and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. At the time, Ba Bien was subordinate to VC IR-1; however, prior to TET 1969, VC IR-1 and other military regions were reorganized into subregions. One effect of this reorganization was that command of these new subregions became the direct responsibility of COGVN and not the military regions. In May or June 1968, IR-7 was formed by COGVN to gain more effective control of the eastern and southeastern portion of IR 3. At this time Ba Bien was reorganized. GVN Bien Hoa Province, formerly a part of Ba Bien Province, was divided into VC U-1 Province and Subregion 4. Ba Bien was left with GVN Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces, which the VC call Ba Ria/Long Khanh Province. Beginning in June 1968, captured documents began appearing which used this designation and PH's have referred to the area as Ba Long. Thus, the outdated name of Ba Bien has been changed to the current VC designation of Ba Long.

## (a) Recapitulation:

1 The VC regions, provinces, and special zones in IR 3 controlled 25 local force companies and 34 local force platoons (Note: local force companies and platoons with a strength of 40 or less are considered platoons).

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2 The battalions and regimental sized units located within IR 3 were as follows (units in parentheses are carried as possible by II FFGVN CE):

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
275th VC Infantry Regiment	5th VC Division
174th NVA Infantry Regiment	5th VC Division
(36 Regiment)	5th VC Division
95th Sapper Battalion	5th VC Division
22d VC Artillery Battalion	5th VC Division
24th NVA AA Battalion	5th VC Division
27th Recon Battalion	5th VC Division
135th NVA Infantry Regiment	7th NVA Division
141st NVA Infantry Regiment	7th NVA Division
209th NVA Infantry Regiment	7th NVA Division
2nd NVA Artillery Battalion	7th NVA Division
24th NVA AA Battalion	7th NVA Division
95th Sapper Battalion	7th NVA Division
271st VC Infantry Regiment	9th VC Division
272 VC Infantry Regiment	9th VC Division
95C NVA Infantry Regiment	9th VC Division
22d VC Artillery Battalion	9th VC Division
24th VC AA Battalion	9th VC Division
5th VC Sapper Battalion	9th VC Division
190th Base Security Regiment	Security Section Current Affairs Comm, COSVN

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATE</u>
7d Guard Battalion	180th Base Security Regiment
7th VC Sapper Battalion	Sapper High Command
8th VC Sapper Battalion	Sapper High Command
9th VC Sapper Battalion	Sapper High Command
(10th VC Sapper Battalion)	Sapper High Command
56th VC AA Battalion	69th VC Artillery Command
96th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th VC Artillery Command
33d NVA Artillery Battalion	16th NVA Artillery Regiment
34th NVA Artillery Battalion	96th NVA Artillery Regiment
35th VC Artillery Battalion	96th NVA Artillery Regiment
208th NVA Artillery Regiment	69th VC Artillery Command
6th NVA Artillery Battalion	208th NVA Artillery Regiment
7th NVA Artillery Battalion	208th NVA Artillery Regiment
8th NVA Artillery Battalion	208th NVA Artillery Regiment
22d NVA AA Battalion	208th NVA Artillery Regiment
101st NVA Infantry Regiment	SR-1
7th NVA Infantry Battalion	101st NVA Infantry Regiment
6th NVA Infantry Battalion	101st NVA Infantry Regiment
5th NVA Infantry Battalion	101st NVA Infantry Regiment
268th VC IF Regiment	SR-1
1st VC Sapper Battalion	268th VC IF Regiment

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
2d VC Infantry Battalion	268th VC MF Regiment
3d VC Sapper Battalion	268th VC MF Regiment
Quyet Thang Regiment	SR-1
2d Quyet Thang Battalion	Quyet Thang Regiment
Gia Dinh 4th VC MF Sapper Battalion	Quyet Thang Regiment
8th VC Artillery Battalion	SR-1
9th VC Artillery Battalion	SR-1
Trang Binh LF Battalion	SR-1
6th VC MF Infantry Battalion	SR-2
6D NVA MF Infantry Battalion	SR-2
12th VC MF Sapper/Recon Battalion	SR-2
(16th NVA Battalion)	SR-2
126th NVA Artillery Battalion	SR-2
267th VC MF Infantry Battalion	SR-2
269th VC MF Infantry Battalion	SR-2
308th VC MF Infantry Battalion	SR-2
2642d NVA LF Infantry Battalion	SR-2
1st NVA Infantry Regiment	SR-3
4th NVA Infantry Battalion	1st NVA Infantry Regiment
5th NVA Infantry Battalion	1st NVA Infantry Regiment
6th NVA Infantry Battalion	1st NVA Infantry Regiment
211th NVA Sapper Battalion	SR-3

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## UNIT

## SYNOPSIS

265th VC LF Infantry Battalion	SR-3
306th VC LF Infantry Battalion	SR-3
520th VC LF Infantry Battalion	SR-3
Dong Phu NVA Infantry Battalion	SR-3
3d VC Artillery Battalion	SR-3
Dong Mai VC Infantry Regiment	SR-5
1st VC LF Infantry Battalion	Dong Mai VC Infantry Regiment
2d NVA Infantry Battalion	Dong Mai VC Infantry Regiment
4th VC LF Infantry Battalion	Dong Mai VC Infantry Regiment
F10 Sapper Battalion	SR-6
F12 Sapper Battalion	SR-6
11th VC LF Infantry Battalion	Tay Ninh (P)
14th VC LF Infantry Battalion	Tay Ninh (P)
2d VC MF Infantry Battalion	SR-4
4th VC MF Infantry Battalion	SR-4
6th VC RVV Weapons Battalion	SR-4
8th VC MF Water Sapper Battalion	SR-4
Doan 10 MF Sapper Battalion	SR-4
1 VC LF Sapper Battalion	U-1 (P)
2d VC LF Sapper Battalion	U-1 (P)
440th VC LF Infantry Battalion	Ba Long (P)
445th VC LF Infantry Battalion	Ba Long (P)

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UNIT

33d NVA Infantry Regiment  
1st NVA Infantry Battalion  
2d NVA Infantry Battalion  
3d NVA Infantry Battalion  
274th VC IF Infantry Regiment  
1st VC Infantry Battalion  
2d VC Infantry Battalion  
3d VC Infantry Battalion  
74th NVA Artillery Regiment  
1st NVA Artillery Battalion  
2d NVA Artillery Battalion  
3d NVA Artillery Battalion  
65th NVA Engineer Battalion  
6th Sapper Battalion  
368th VC LF Infantry Battalion

SUBORDINATION

MR-7  
33d NVA Infantry Regiment  
33d NVA Infantry Regiment  
33d NVA Infantry Regiment  
MR-7  
274th VC IF Infantry Regiment  
274th VC NF Infantry Regiment  
274th VC NF Infantry Regiment  
MR-7  
74th NVA Artillery Regiment  
74th NVA Artillery Regiment  
74th NVA Artillery Regiment  
MR-7  
MR-7  
Binh Long (P)

(d) Summary of Recent Activity:

1. Level of Enemy Activity: The level of enemy activity during the quarter was significantly less than that of last quarter, indicating the degree to which the enemy's command and control apparatus was disrupted by allied operations in Cambodia. Enemy activity rose during the first week of May as the enemy attempted a high point on the night of 2-3 May to initiate the second phase of this Campaign "X"; however, the attacks were primarily attacks by fire and the level of activity dropped off considerably during the rest of May as allied operations in Cambodia diverted the enemy's attention and preempted proposed plans for offensive activity. Enemy forces were apparently surprised by the speed of

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allied operations across the border, probably accounting for the fact that reaction to the border operation was minimal during the first weeks, and enemy activity throughout the subregions was light in intensity and low in volume. In the beginning of June, an upsurge of enemy activity throughout other areas of South Vietnam marked the initiation of the third phase of Campaign "X", but the pattern of enemy action in III Corps TACZ followed the same low profile noted during May, indicating the enemy's inability to mount a coordinated high point. Most enemy units appeared to be content with no more than light harassing actions and limited attacks by fire, and apparently were concentrating their efforts on relocating rear service facilities to more secure areas. This same pattern of low activity continued throughout July as the enemy increased his efforts to reorganize his forces in response to the allied withdrawal from Cambodia at the end of June.

2. Enemy Divisional Units: Prior to operations in Cambodia the three enemy divisions were deployed primarily around the northern and northwestern border of the corps area. The 5th VC Div area of operation extended from the Dog's Neck to the Angel's Wing, and included the western portion of Tay Ninh (P). The apparent mission of the division at that time was to conduct attacks against ARVN and US units operating near the border. It appeared also that some units of the division were targeted against Cambodian units to the west of the Angel's Wing. The 7th NVA Div had moved from its old area in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces westward to the Fishhook area, presumably to take over the mission of the 9th VC Div. This westward shift of the 7th NVA Div and 9th VC Div increased the area of operation of the 5th VC Div which then extended from the Binh Long/Phuoc Long boundary to the II Corps border. The mission of the 5th VC was to provide security for the 86th Rear Service Group and its base areas along the Cambodian border, and to attack allied installations in its area. The coup in Cambodia and allied cross-border operations greatly disrupted the enemy's plans as he withdrew his divisions deeper into Cambodia. The major units of the 9th VC Div left the IR 3 border area and deployed toward the Mekong River in Cambodia, probably to conduct operations against Cambodian forces in that vicinity. The major units of the 7th NVA Div generally remained in the Fishhook area after allied operations in Cambodia began, apparently with the mission of protecting cache sites and attacking allied FSBs in the area. However, one regiment of the division, the 141st Regiment, was operating as far north as the Snoul area; the regiment occupied that city during the first week of May. Allied operations into areas Base Areas 350 and 351 revealed the weakness of the 5th VC Division's elongated area of operation, as contact with the division's regiments during these operations was light. The division seemed primarily concerned with relocating its rear service facilities

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to more secure areas. Allied operations in Cambodia were primarily directed against the enemy's base areas rather than against the enemy's divisional units themselves. The total number of enemy killed was significant; however, since most main force enemy units avoided contact, a large portion of the losses were suffered by the rear service elements. The three enemy divisions were less affected; their rear areas were disrupted and they suffered many casualties, but their command and control and combat elements generally remained intact. The overall effect in the MR 3 area was a reduction in the enemy threat as the 9th VC Div withdrew to the west and the 5th VC Division divided its interest between the northern border area and western Cambodia. At the end of allied operations in Cambodia, only the 7th NVA Division and two regiments of the 5th VC Div still posed a threat to MR 3. These movements of major enemy units along with other activity in Cambodia indicate a change in Hanoi's immediate goals and reflect COSVN's strong concern for avoiding a potentially damaging two-front war. COSVN's recent interest in Cambodia is probably based on a recognition of the need for a strong communist position in that country to effectively conduct a winning campaign in South Vietnam. But the fact that the RVNAF are also operating in Cambodia will affect the enemy's plans and future operations within the corps area. The realization that their base areas are no longer safe havens will probably have a far reaching effect on future enemy logistics organization and it is unlikely that the enemy will reestablish logistics depots of the density or to the extent seen before allied operations in Cambodia. The fact that the RVNAF can operate in Cambodia base areas and will probably return will greatly affect the enemy's planning and future methods of operation.

3 Enemy Units Within MR 3: Activity was generally light throughout the corps area during the quarter. In SR-1, the 101st Regiment moved south across the Saigon River into the Boi Loi Woods area where it was contacted in mid-June west of Ben Suc. In late June and early July, however, the regiment began to move in the direction of its traditional area of operation in the Trapezoid, where documents indicated it would take part in the summer campaign by interdicting traffic on the Saigon River between Ben Suc and Bung Cong. The 268th Regt and the Quyet Thang Regt remained largely inactive due to lack of supplies and replacements, and generally avoided contact. Allied operations in Cambodia seriously disrupted enemy activity in SR-2, SR-3, and SR-6. The loss of key personnel and the dispersal of rear service and headquarters elements in eastern Cambodia seriously hampered the subregion's command and control capabilities. By the end of May tactical and rear elements of SR-2, SR-3, and SR-6 in Svay Rieng (P) had suffered heavy

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losses and were fragmented and dispersed by RVN elements operating in the area. In SR-2, there were also indications of serious morale problems caused by allied cross-border operations. It was reported that SR-2 HQ had submitted a report to CCGVH HQ in April stating that some 700 men, including six battalion commanders, had refused to fight. At CCGVH's request, these men were sent back to the rear in late April. The 1st NV Regt also suffered heavy losses in the allied cross-border operation, and it was reported that the unit had dispersed into small cells pending the withdrawal of allied forces from its base area. Activity in SR-3 remained light with the Dong Hoi Regt dispersed from Lam The to Phuoc Vinh. Lack of supplies and reinforcements kept the enemy action at a low level in the subregion during the quarter, with the exception of a combined ground attack and attack by fire on FSB Normandy on 1 June. SR-4 was characterized by light activity, with the 274th Regt dispersed in the Binh Dong area. A report that the regiment was engaging in resupply operations near the Viet Suong Plantation south of Blackhorse, suggested an eastward movement in early July to exploit new sources of resupply. A significant change in the organization of SR-7 occurred when the 33d NV Regt was transferred from the operational control of the 5th VC Div to SR-7. In attack on FSB Sun in late May by elements of the 33d Regt and its movements south of Tanh Lanh suggested increased enemy interest in the population centers of Tanh Linh and Vo Dat. The 74th Arty Regt remained targeted against Saigon, Vung Tay, Long Binh Post and Bien Hoa Air Base. The lack of significant enemy activity in SR 3 during the quarter indicated that allied cross-border operations had severely disrupted the enemy's plans and organization. CCGVH's preoccupation with Cambodia and the allies' capture of great amounts of war material in the enemy base areas had combined to reduce enemy presence and effectiveness within SR 3, particularly in the western subregions. In open and populous areas like SR-2 and SR-3, the enemy must have outside support simply to survive and it is difficult to see how the enemy can succeed in holding the population of the subregions when his sources of outside supply have been cut off for such a long period of time.

4 Conclusion: Allied cross-border operations disrupted CCGVH's plan to build series of interlocking bases along the eastern and northern SR 3 border. The enemy seems to have shifted his plan to one of gaining control of Cambodia by seizing district and province capitals as stepping stones to Phnom Penh. The use of the upper Mekong River to ship his supplies and personnel to the Vietnamese border would greatly aid his war effort in the south. Since his strategic goals of defeating pacification and preventing improvement of the RVN have not changed, allied Cambodian operations seem to have had a severe effect on the enemy's goals within the corps.

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(10)

(a) Overall personnel and material losses inflicted by allied  
forces (includes Cambodian operations):

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>HC</u>	<u>VCI</u>	<u>S/A</u>	<u>C/S</u>	<u>RICE (T)</u>
May	7012	1012	488	11	9329	1516	4311.2
June	2393	237	57	11	2156	332	1560.5
July	1156	100	439	7	1202	93	16.9
Total	10601	1349	984	29	12687	1941	5908.6

(b) VC/NVA Personnel and Logistical Losses Resulting from Cambodian  
Operations: The following table show enemy personnel and material  
losses resulting from allied operations in Cambodia during the period  
1 May to 31 July 1970:

	<u>US</u> <u>Totals</u>	<u>GVN</u> <u>Totals</u>	<u>Grand</u> <u>Totals</u>
En K	3,649	4,646	8,295
PW	85	842	927
HC	39	96	135
HC*		1,417*	1,417*
Individual Weapons	6,794	3,678	10,472
Crew-Served Weapons	1,005	809	1,814
Rice (tons)	3,780.0	2,093.0	5,873.0
Salt (tons)	45.6	68.5	114.1
Medical Supplies (tons)	28.3	28.6	56.9
Foodstuffs (tons)	68.0	9.8	77.8
840/41 Rounds	13,407	23,024	36,421
240mm rockets	2	47	49
122mm rockets	835	660	1,515
107mm rockets	81	110	191

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	<u>US</u> <u>Totals</u>	<u>GVT</u> <u>Totals</u>	<u>Grand</u> <u>Totals</u>
120mm mortar rds	2,276	607	3,163
82mm mortar rds	12,455	20,335	32,790
61mm mortar rds	110	2,342	2,450
60mm mortar rds	9,410	10,676	20,086
75mm RR rds	2,352	2,304	5,162
57mm RR rds	14,091	5,316	19,407
11.5mm rds	202,407	0	202,407
HMG rds	2,927,556	1,128,110	4,055,746
SA rds	8,006,011	3,005,452	11,091,663
Grenades	47,175	13,033	60,212
Mines	1,728	1,725	3,453
Bangalore	655	34	889
Misc			
85mm rds	1,567	0	1,567
40mm rds	130	0	130
37mm rds	9,642	0	9,642
20mm rds	2	0	2
120 rds	6	0	6
4.2" mortar rds	104	0	104
3.5" rockets	36	105	143
Unk RR rds	2,500	0	2,500
Unk rockets	1	0	1
2.36" rockets	13	0	13

\* Figure represents the number of individuals turned into Chicou Hoi Centers  
in Binh Long, Hau Nghia, Phuoc Long and Tay Ninh Provinces 010001H May -  
020100H June 1970.

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(11) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Possible Courses of Action:

(a) The enemy is capable of:

1 Launching sapper attacks at a limited number of selected points throughout IR 3, especially in the northern tier. This capability is particularly limited in SR-2 and SR-3.

2 Conducting coordinated battalion-sized attacks on installations in Binh Tuy Province, SR-7 and against RVNAF forces operating in Cambodia, as well as against Cambodian installations and units.

3 Conducting small scale ground attacks against the periphery of CND and against limited number of selected points throughout IR 3.

4 Conducting attacks by rocket, mortar and direct fire heavy weapons at a limited number of selected targets in IR 3 and Cambodia. To a limited degree, the enemy can increase the intensity and frequency of his attacks against major population centers.

5 Intensifying LOC interdictions and ambushes throughout IR 3 for limited periods of time.

6 Continuing the present level of terrorist, sabotage and assassination activities in the CND and populated areas of IR 3.

7 Avoiding contact for limited periods of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

8 Conducting propaganda, subversion, espionage and political efforts throughout IR 3.

9 Positioning main force units in SR-1, SR-4, and SR-5 well forward toward the periphery of the CND to support local force efforts to subvert the population.

10 Detecting changes in the dispositions of allied forces and developing limited knowledge of allied intentions through a sophisticated intelligence organization.

(b) Vulnerabilities: The nature of the enemy's activities requires that, in populated areas, he live among the people and depend upon them for financial support, concealment and food. This dependence makes the

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enemy force vulnerable to any psychological operations which would result in the removal of the support of the population. The extended supply system which the enemy uses in the upper delta area and the base areas which feed these supply lines have been badly disrupted by allied operations. Efforts to re-establish these bases and lines of supply should be especially vulnerable to detection and interdiction. Enemy offensive operations are characterized by extensive planning, reconnaissance, route selection and rehearsal. These activities tend to make his offensive operations inflexible and subject to allied preemptive operations, such as vigorous reconnaissance and surveillance.

(c) Assessment:

1 Interrogation of Nguyen Van Kang, former Deputy Commanding Officer of SR-2 revealed that COSVN was forced to forego a major summer offensive, as a result of the Cambodian coup d'etat. According to the guidance proposed in Directive 136, a revision of COSVN Resolution 9, all preparations for a major attack within IR 3 were to have been completed by 30 April. Special action elements were to engage in sabotage within Saigon, while the 9th VC Division attacked Tan Son Nhut Airbase. The 5th and 7th Divisions were to attack key allied positions in the Dau Tieng/Tay Ninh area, while SR-2 elements were to overrun Tup Hoa and Ban Luc.

2 Shortly after the overthrow of Sihanouk, COSVN directed enemy units to redirect the general offensive against Cambodia in order to overthrow the Lon Nol government and return Sihanouk to power. The allied response to the Cambodian situation forced COSVN into a defensive attitude and generally disrupted the enemy's plans for a counter-revolution within Cambodia. As a result of allied operations within the enemy's base areas, divisional elements will be required to relocate and restore their logistical bases along the IR 3/ Cambodian border. In addition, elements of the 5th and 9th Divisions have the mission of engaging strategic Cambodian outposts in an attempt to topple the Lon Nol government and return Sihanouk to power. Only in this manner can they re-establish a secure base of operations against IR 3.

3 Within the IR, enemy forces will generally refrain from extensive offensive activity in an attempt to conserve their remaining munitions. However, they will continue to engage in a series of low level harassing attacks against RF/PF and PSEF units which hold the key for continued success in the GVN Pacification Program. It is anticipated that activity within the CID will continue to be characterized by low level terrorism and periodic rocket attacks from the southeast.

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## d. Operations, Plans, and Training.

### (1) General.

(a) On 29 April, utilizing three combined arms task forces, III Corps conducted an attack into Cambodia. US support of these operations included gunship coordinators, gunships, GAC helicopters and artillery support. Task Force 225 attacked into Cambodia southwest of Tay Ninh city while Task Force 333 and 318 attacked from east to west on two axes astride and to the north of Cambodian highway 1. Task Force 318 and 333 have since terminated their operations and returned to South Vietnam. US operations in Cambodia began on 1 May when elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and ARVN Airborne Division made a combined mechanized-airmobile assault into the Fishhook region of Cambodia. On 4 May, an additional brigade of two battalions was air assaulted to the west of the Flat Iron Region. Three operations were initiated on 6 May: two by the US and one by ARVN forces. The 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division with 4 battalions moved into Base Area 354 south of the Dog's Head. The 9th ARVN Regiment moved two battalions from Loc Ninh into Base Area 350. The last operation on 6 May involved the 2d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division with 2 maneuver battalions air assaulting into Base Area 315 to the northwest of Bu Gia Mep. To complement operations in this base area, the 1st Bde of the 1st Cavalry Division was subsequently deployed to the northeast for operations in the vicinity of O'Range. On 7 May, the 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division moved into Base Area 707 and on 11 May, they moved to the east to target against command and control facilities. From this point until the end of cross-border operations ARVN and US forces conducted systematic pursuit of known enemy units within the targeted base areas and concentrated on exploitation of enemy arms, munitions and food cache sites in those areas. In accordance with detailed planning guidance issued by CG, II FFORDIV, withdrawal of forces from Cambodia was successfully completed by 291800H June 70. This detailed planning permitted ease of transition into the posture desired for the newly promulgated wet season strategy. Movement of US and ARVN forces into the Cambodian area of operation necessitated economy of force measures which were adopted with heavy reliance placed upon territorial forces for security within Military Region 3. Within Military Region 3, 1969 and 1970 saw steady progress in pacification and an erosion of the enemy's combat capability. The enemy has seen his main force capability fragmented, his supply lines interdicted, his Cambodian sanctuaries attacked, caches captured and local forces eroded. Effort will now be directed toward assisting RVNLF in assuming a full operational role in MR 3. This must be accomplished while Free

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World Forces are reduced in strength. Our forces will be required to conduct more mobile operations, increase sensitivity to the enemy's tactics and more precise targeting of his local force units while continuing to isolate his main force elements. Additionally, emphasis will be increased to bring territorial forces to full fruition so they can guarantee the security of pacified areas and contribute to continued progress in the consolidated zone, thus allowing the ARVN and FVMAF to concentrate on the tasks that lie in the clearing zone. More emphasis will be placed on FVMAF assuming responsibility for larger areas of independent operations. The concept of FVMAF overwatch will decrease as our forces are reduced. All commanders within III Corps are designating specific forces to target against main forces and local force units within their areas of responsibility. The task organization at the beginning of the period was as follows: 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (1st Brigade: 5-7th Cavalry; 2d Brigade: 1-8th Cavalry, 1-12th Cavalry, 2-12th Cavalry, 3-4th Cavalry (-); 3d Brigade: 1-7th Cavalry, 2-5th Cavalry, 2-7th Cavalry, 2-34th Armor (-), 2-47th Infantry (Mech); Company H (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 25th Infantry Division: (1st Brigade: 3-22d Infantry (-), 1-5th Infantry (Mech), 4-23d Infantry (Mech), 2-12th Infantry; 2d Brigade: 1-27th Infantry, 4-9th Infantry, D (-)/3-17th Cavalry; 3d Brigade: 2-27th Infantry, 2-22d Infantry (Mech), 2-14th Infantry (Mech); Company F (Ranger), 75th Infantry); 9th Infantry Division (3d Brigade: 6-31 Infantry, 2-60th Infantry, 3-60th Infantry; Company E (Ranger), 75th Infantry, B/3-17th Cavalry); 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1-11th Cavalry (-), 2-11th Cavalry, 3-11th Cavalry); 199th Infantry Brigade (2-3d Infantry, 4-12th Infantry, 3-12th Infantry, 3-7th Infantry, C/3-17th Cavalry, Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry); Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (1st Brigade: 1-1st Infantry, 2-1st Infantry, 3-1st Infantry; 2d Brigade: 1-2d Infantry, 2-2d Infantry, 3-2d Infantry; one armored cavalry squadron); 1st Australian Task Force (6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment/New Zealand (ANZAC); 7th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR); 8th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (RAR); B Squadron, 3d Cavalry Regiment; 3d Special Air Service Squadron).

(b) Result of Operations in MR 3 and Cambodia. Significant results of Free World Military Assistance Force (FVMAF) participation in Campaign Toan Thang, Phase IV, during May, June, and July were 488 FVMAF killed (452 US, 15 Australians, and 21 Thais); 3996 wounded (3,592 US, 132 Australians, and 272 Thais). In addition, the following enemy losses occurred:

	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Enemy KIA	1,438	3,649	5,087
PW	47	85	132

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APPENDIX

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	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Infantry	1,162	6,774	7,936
Artillery	5	1,015	1,020
Small Arms	270,410	11,215,975	11,486,385
Heavy Arms	2,072	30,441	32,513
Transport	20	17,179	17,200
Miner	1,071	1,723	2,794
Vehicles	13	357	370
Rice (tons)	12	3,760	3,772
Food Stuffs (tons)	225	68	293
Medical Supplies (tons)	0	28	28

## (2) Summary of combat operations.

(a) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). On 1 May the 1st Cavalry Division became the first major US unit to participate in the Cambodian operation with primary emphasis placed on the destruction of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Headquarters, denial of caches to the enemy, destruction of sanctuaries and neutralization of main force and rear service units. Following the close of the Cambodian operation on 30 June 1970, the 1st Cavalry Division deployed its brigades into their wet season areas of operation in Phuoc Long and northern Long Khanh Provinces. During the last month of the period, the 1st Cavalry Division's mission was centered on the interdiction of enemy lines of communication, location and evacuation of caches, support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program, coordinated operations with Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces, and the neutralization of main force and rear service units. During the Cambodian operation, the 1st Brigade conducted cross-border operations north of Fater (The Fishhook) in joint operations with the 2d ARVN ARI Brigade to locate and neutralize NVN/VC main force units and destroy base camps and training areas. After 20 June, the Brigade conducted operations in eastern Phuoc Long and the northern half of Long Khanh Provinces to interdict the enemy's Jolley Road and Adams Trail. The 2d Brigade operated in north central Phuoc Long Province in the vicinity of Base Area 101 and in Cambodia northeast of Bu Don,

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in joint operations with the 3-8th ARVN Infantry, to locate elements of the 5th VC Division and the 86th Rear Service Group, with emphasis placed on the execution of captured equipment and supplies. During late June the Brigade was deployed into central Phuoc Long Province to conduct operations in coordination with the 1-6th ARVN Infantry against enemy lines of communication and the Ho Chi Trail. The Brigade also provided security for Route Flow operation in Phuoc Long Province between Dong Thap and Long Be along HT-12. The 3d Brigade operated in the vicinity of Base Area 352 in Binh Long Province (south of the "Hot Iron") and in Cambodia northwest of Bu Dop to locate and neutralize GOCVN #2 and the 7th EVA Regiment. The Brigade was redeployed to eastern Binh Long and western Phuoc Long Province at the conclusion of the Cambodian operation to interdict movement of troops and supplies along the Serey Jungle Highway. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (GOCVN to the 1st Cavalry Division until 18 June) conducted coordinated operations with elements of the 5th ARVN Division in the vicinity of Base Areas 352 and 353 and in Cambodia near Snoul, north of the Fishhook, to interdict movement of troops and supplies and to destroy base areas and cache sites. The Regiment also provided security for tactical Route Flow cuts by the 96th and 60th Land Clearing Companies in the Fishhook area and provided convoy security from Quan Loi to Bu Dop. On 1 May at 1456H, B Troop, 1-9th Air Cavalry, engaged an enemy truck convoy, 15 km south of Snoul, Cambodia (XU54183), resulting in 23 EVA killed and two trucks destroyed. On 1 May elements of the 1-9th Air Cavalry Squadron, while engaged in heavy but scattered action south of Snoul, accounted for a total of 157 NVA killed. Also on 1 May, H Troop, 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, while operating 15 km northeast of Katun (XU55963) encountered a large enemy force resulting in 50 NVA killed and 2 US killed. On 4 May, B Troop 1-9th Cavalry discovered a 1 km by 3 km base area, 13 km southwest of Snoul, Cambodia (XU5222). This cache site later became known as "The City" because of the large number of bunkers and structures. Exploitation of this cache by the 1-5th Cavalry resulted in the capture of 1277 small arms, 199 crew served weapons, 2263 grenades, 4788 large caliber rounds, 2,345,870 small caliber rounds, and 39 tons of explosives along with numerous repair parts, test kits and clothing. While advancing into Snoul on 5 May, B Troop, 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, made contact (XU552346) with an unknown size enemy force at 1330H. Contact broke at 1400H with 30 EVA killed. At 1520H H Troop, 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, re-established contact in the same vicinity (XU55335). Contact broke 30 minutes later with 75 enemy killed and one captured. Also on 5 May, the Air Cavalry Troop from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment found 52.5 tons of rice destroyed by a previous air strike, 13 km northeast of Katun (XU520980). On 6 May, D Company, 2-12th Cavalry, discovered a large cache, 15 km north of Bu Dop in Cambodia (YU222122). Incidental

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"Black Island East" because of the variety and quantity of munitions, the discovery of the cache resulted in 780 individual weapons, 73 crew served weapons, 15,336 large caliber rounds, 2,374,000 small caliber rounds, and 1,734 grenades being captured. In another action on 8 May, 5-12th Infantry, Fire Support Base Brown (YUD66375), was attacked by an unknown size enemy force employing small arms, automatic weapons and rocket fire. The 5-12th Infantry supported by air and artillery, killed 50 NVA and captured one. On 14 May a major rice cache of 80.5 tons was discovered by HQ Troop, 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 10 km southeast of Snoul (XUB6504). On 26 May another major cache was found by C Company, 2-8th Cavalry, 18 km northeast of Bu Dop in Cambodia (XUB0256). Nicknamed "Plasticine East", the cache contained 6,219 large caliber rounds, 1,277,764 small caliber rounds, 12,750 pounds of explosives, 5,393 grenades, plus miscellaneous medical, automotive, and food supplies. On 31 May, exploitation of "Shaker's Hill" cache, 33 km northeast of Bu Dop (YU210517), initially found by B Company, 5-7th Cavalry, was continued by 5-60th Infantry. The total contents of this cache were 807 individual weapons, 180 crew served weapons, 6,509 large caliber rounds, 1,169,513 small caliber rounds, 14,434 grenades and numerous spare weapons parts. On 11 June, D Company, 5-12th Infantry, uncovered a weapons cache 20 km northeast of Bu Dop, in Cambodia (YU109440), consisting of 27,280 small caliber rounds. On 11 June A Company, 1-5th Cavalry, 10 km southwest of O Rang, in Cambodia (YU256567), found another weapons cache containing 1,719 large caliber rounds. While operating 19 km southwest of O Rang (YU214515) on 18 June, C Company, 5-7th Cavalry, found 61.8 tons of rice. Later, Company A, 2-8th Cavalry, while on ground reconnaissance 15 km northwest of Bu Dop (XUB11289), found 37,060 pounds of medical supplies. A cache containing 3,993 large caliber rounds, and 279,400 small caliber rounds was uncovered on 23 June by C Company, 2-5th Cavalry, while on ground reconnaissance 28 km northeast of Snoul (XU743467). On 24 June Company D, 2-5th Cavalry, while on ground reconnaissance 27 km northeast of Snoul (SU746450), discovered a large number of weapons and munitions which included 23 crew served weapons, 180 individual weapons, 6,406 large caliber rounds, 402,458 small caliber rounds, 5,555 grenades, explosives and demolition equipment, 52 field telephones, and 1,093 hand tools. On 26 June B Company, 2-8th Cavalry, found a weapons and munitions cache, 15 km northwest of Bu Dop (XUB24263). The items found included 49 individual weapons, 442 large caliber rounds, 549,760 small caliber rounds, 142 mortar fuzes, and assorted hand tools. On 10 July Company A, 1-8th Cavalry, while conducting operations 12 km northwest of Oia Nap (YU225434), uncovered a cache containing fifteen 57mm rounds and 358,000 small arms rounds. On 24 July, Company A, 2-7th Cavalry, 16 km northeast of Phuoc Vinh (YT272563), established contact with an unknown size enemy force. The engagement resulted in 20 enemy killed and one US killed.

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(b) 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Infantry Division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The Division had two brigades committed to the Cambodian operation with mission emphasis placed on interdiction of enemy infiltration routes, destruction of base camps and training areas, evacuation of caches, and neutralization of main force and rear service units. The 25th Infantry Division continued its operations in the Military Region 3 (MR 3) emphasizing small unit coordinated and combined operations with AFVN and Territorial Forces, airmobile and bushmaster operations, interdiction of enemy routes of supply and troop movements, security for routes LTB-5A, LTB-5B, LTB-5C, and LTB-5D, and neutralization of main force and support units. The 1st Brigade operated in the western section of War Zone C adjacent to the Cambodian border at the beginning of the period. On 6 May the Brigade was deployed into Cambodia, north of Katum, to interdict enemy lines of communication and to neutralize enemy main force and rear service units. On 14 June the 1st Brigade was redeployed into War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province, to conduct airmobile and bushmaster operations. At the beginning of the period, the 2d Brigade was OPCON to II FFORDV with an AO in southeastern Bien Hoa Province. On 7 May the brigade reverted OPCON to the division and on 18 May was committed to the Cambodian operation in the areas north of Base Area 707 and 353 (center of mass XUD01001 and XUD2002) and west of the Dog's Face to interdict enemy routes of supply and troop movements. During late June, the brigade deployed into its wet season AO in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh Provinces, to conduct small unit ground operations. Elements of the brigade also conducted combined operations with the RVN Navy along the Van Co Dong River. The 3d Brigade at the beginning of the period was located in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces in the vicinity of the Michelin Rubber plantation, conducting airmobile, bushmaster and small unit actions. Elements of the brigade operated with the RVN Navy in coordinated operations along the Saigon River. The 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (OPCON to the 25th Division) conducted operations in Mau Nghia and northeastern Long An Province. Elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry, also conducted coordinated operations with the RVN Navy along the Van Co Tay and Van Co Dong Rivers. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division from 19 June to 1 July) withdrew from Cambodia to War Zone C. During this period the regiment conducted cache evacuation and security operations. On 2 May, Company C, 2-14th Infantry, while conducting operations 8 km southwest of Co Dau Na (XT333207, XT315205, XT327174) received 75 ralliers. An additional 65 ralliers were received in the same vicinity on the following day. On 6 May, D Company, 3-4th Cavalry, operating 18 km west of Tien Hiep (XT 926740), engaged 30-40 enemy with automatic weapons resulting in 20 enemy killed. There were no US casualties. On 7 May, A Company 2-17th Air Cavalry, received small arms fire from unknown number of enemy located 28 km northwest of Tay Ninh. A Company returned with air and artillery support, resulting in 36 enemy killed; no US casualties were reported.

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Also on 7 May, A Company, 3-22d Infantry, located and evacuated 20 tons of rice, 17 km west of Thien Nhon (XT 7747). On 9 May, the 1-5th Infantry engaged an estimated enemy platoon with automatic weapons. The contact, located 23 km northwest of Thien Nhon (XU 951135), resulted in 17 enemy killed and 14 US wounded. Also on 9 May, D Troop, 3-4th Cavalry, while on a ground reconnaissance northwest of Thien Nhon (WT 995925) engaged an unknown size enemy force with automatic weapons resulting in 50 enemy killed. There were no US casualties. On 13 May at 1355H, C Company, 3-4th Cavalry, 29 km northwest of Katum (XU 10099), located 170 tons of rice. On 15 May at 1030H, the 3-4th Cavalry while operating 25 km northwest of Katum (XU 106135), located and evacuated 200 tons of rice. On 17 May, a rallier received by Company C, 1-7th Infantry, subsequently led them to a cache, 37 km north of Katum, containing 60 tons of rice. On the following day, another rallier led A Company, 3-4th Cavalry, and D Company, 4-9th Infantry, to a cache site located in the same vicinity. This cache contained 1,463 high explosive rounds, 163 rockets, and 75.6 tons of rice. While conducting operations 25 km northwest of Katum (XU 100007), on 23 May, Company A, 4-7th Infantry, located a cache containing 45 tons of rice. On 2 June, C Company, 4-7th Infantry, captured 58.3 tons of rice and destroyed an additional 5 tons, 15 km northwest of Katum. On 21 June, D Company, 3-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, while operating 24 km northeast of Katum, inside Cambodia (XU 51135), received small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire. D Company returned fire with organic weapons resulting in 20 enemy killed and three US wounded.

(c) 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate Light). The Brigade continued to participate in Campaign Tean Thang (Phase IV) conducting combined and coordinated operations with ARVN and Territorial Forces. The 2-3d Infantry in coordination with the 48th ARVN Regiment, conducted combined and coordinated platoon size ground reconnaissance and platoon and squad size ambushes in concurrent combat and upgrading training for Territorial Forces in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces, emphasizing the use of intelligence to locate enemy local force units and the 274th NVA Regiment. In addition, it participated in operation Tu Ho until its termination on 14 July. The 3-7th Infantry conducted operations, ground reconnaissance and airmobile operations. It also participated in combined operations with ARVN and Territorial Forces against MA-6 HQ. It emphasized platoon and squad size ambush and ground reconnaissance training with Territorial Forces in Binh Tuy Province. The 4-12th Infantry conducted small unit ambushes, ground reconnaissance and airmobile operations in western Binh Tuy and eastern Long Khanh Provinces. The 4-12th Infantry participated in joint operations with the 43d ARVN Regiment and 52d ARVN Ranger Battalion against the 33d NVA Regiment. The 5-12th Infantry participated in the Cambodian operations and was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division (AV) from 6 May to 24 Jun. It departed from Binh Tuy province on 24 and 25 June to conduct operations against 7-9. During the period, fighting was characterized by many sporadic contacts involving small numbers of enemy.

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On 29 May, at 0010H A Company, 3-7th Infantry, at Fire Support Base Sun, was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. The enemy fired mortars, RPG's, .51 caliber machine guns, and small arms at the US positions. Company A returned fire with support from artillery resulting in 37 enemy killed and 9 US wounded. On 12 June, Company C, 4-12th Infantry, engaged an enemy force, 15 km northwest of Tanh Linh (YT8671), at a distance of 50 meters with organic weapons resulting in 6 enemy killed. There were no US casualties. On 26 June, D Company, 17th Cavalry, and D Company, 4-12th Infantry, while conducting joint operations with the 758th AF Company and the 351st ARVN Infantry, 1 km northeast of Vo Dat (YT123) engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 RF killed, 5 RF wounded and 12 enemy killed (6 were credited to the 1st RF). There were no US casualties. On 29 June, D Company, 4-12th Infantry, near the previous day's contact, engaged an enemy force resulting in 12 enemy killed (6 were credited to 199th). There were no US casualties. On 8 July, the 3-7th Infantry, at Fire Support Base Guin, received four ralliers. Two of the ralliers led elements of the 3-7th Infantry to a point where 57 more ralliers were received. Thirty of the total 61 ralliers were children under 12 years of age. On 14 July, C Company, 3-7th Infantry, 15 km northeast of Ham Tan (ZS0695), captured 1.1 tons of wheat flour. The following day an additional 14.25 tons of flour were captured by C Company, 15 km northeast of Ham Tan (ZS051757). On 15 July, C Company, 3-7th Infantry, found 11.8 tons of flour, 15 km northeast of Ham Tan (ZS052957).

(d) The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The regiment was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AR) and the 25th Infantry Division during the first two months of the period. On 1 July the regiment became OPCON to II FFORCEV. Between 1 July and 11 July the regiment deployed into its wet season areas of operation. The eastern AO was established in eastern Bien Hoa and southwestern Long Khanh Provinces. The western AO was established in southern Binh Duong and northwestern Bien Hoa Province. The regiment emphasized ground reconnaissance, lines of communication security, interdiction of enemy supply routes and troop movements, and maintained a "ready" status as a mobile reaction force for II FFORCEV. The 1st Squadron conducted a maintenance standdown from 1 July until 21 July at Di An in Binh Hoa Province. On 22 July the squadron was deployed into Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces to conduct varied ground operations. The 2d Squadron was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division until 10 July. It was deployed on 11 July into its new AO in Binh Duong Province to establish Fire Support Base Victory (XT896317), and to provide security along critical lines of communication. The 3d Squadron was deployed into Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces on 5 July, to establish Fire Support Base Petrie (YT01125), and to conduct

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ground operations. Elements of the squadron provided security for Base Flow operations near Fire Support Base Petrie. On 24 July the squadron stooddown for maintenance at Da An, Bien Hoa Province. During the month of July operations were characterized by small and scattered contacts by the squadrons operating in various independent operations.

(e) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF) continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) in its assigned area of operations in Phuoc Tuy Province. The three battalions along with the armored and cavalry squadrons, conducted reconnaissance and ambush operations throughout the province with emphasis placed on key areas of enemy activity such as the Long Hai Mountains, along Route LTL-2, and the northwestern portion of Phuoc Tuy Province. The 1st ATF conducted combined operations with elements of the RTAVF and with Regional and Popular forces. The 6th Royal Australian Regiment/New Zealand (RAR/NZ) (ARZAC) returned to Australia and was replaced by the 2d RAR/NZ (ARZAC) in May. The 2d RAR/NZ continued small unit ground operations and ambushes in central Phuoc Tuy Province. The 7th RAR Bn (-) conducted operations in AC Ferry in Phuoc Tuy Province. The 5th RAR Bn (-) conducted operations near Dai Nhat, Phuoc Tuy Province. Squadron A, 1st Armored Regiment and B Squadron, 3d Cavalry Regiment continued to be OPCON to the Infantry Battalion and assisted in land clearing operations in Phuoc Tuy Province. The period was generally characterized by small and scattered contacts by the battalions operating in various independent areas of operations. On 14 May at 2350H, 5 km northeast of Phuoc Le (YS405624) the 7th Platoon, Company A, 6th RAR engaged an estimated 15 VC resulting in 7 VC killed and no Australian casualties. On 21 May at 1515H, 15 km northeast of Phuoc Le (YS41661), Company A, 7th RAR, 3d Troop, A Squadron, 1st Armored Regiment, and 2d Troop, B Squadron, 3d Cavalry, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 enemy killed and 3 prisoners taken. One Australian was killed and 14 were wounded.

(f) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) continued its participation during the period in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The force conducted ground operations against the 274th NVA Regiment which included: interdiction of enemy routes of supply and troop movements, search and clear operations, cordon and search operations; and participated in the pacification program. The 1st Brigade continued varied operations in its area of operations in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces. It participated in Operation Tu Ho until its termination 14 July. The 1-1st Infantry conducted airmobile operations in the area of Fire Support Base Petrie (YD17450). On 14 July the Battalion stooddown for Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) and redeployed to Thailand on 17 July. The new Battalion began in-country training on 17 July. The 1-2d Infantry conducted ground operations and company size

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ambushes in its area of operation in Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. The 1-3d Infantry conducted ambushes and ground reconnaissance until its standdown for FOM on 24 July for redeployment to Thailand. The 2-3d Infantry conducted small unit operations in Bien Hoa Province. The 3-3d Infantry conducted aerial and clear operations in its AO in southeastern Bien Hoa Province. The Armored Cavalry Squadron provided security for the 98th Land Clearing Company north of Binh Son Village. The period was characterized by small and scattered contacts and the discoveries of small caches. On 14 May, at 1410H 1 Company 1-1st Infantry, 20 km northwest of Phuoc Le (Y3257980), engaged an estimated VC platoon with organic weapons. The enemy returned fire with small arms. Contact broke at 1630H resulting in 9 enemy killed and 10 Thais wounded.

**(3) Air Operations.**

**(a) Resources:** The following non-divisional resources of the 12th Combat Aviation Group were under the control of II FFORCEV during the reporting period.

**1 Helicopters.**

10 assault helicopter companies with one company, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, attached to the Americal Division for 50 days effective 072400H Jul 70.

1 Aerial weapons company

3 Assault support helicopter companies (medium)

1 Assault support helicopter company and 1 platoon (heavy)

1 Aviation company (corps)

1 Air cavalry squadron (-) one air cavalry troop attached to

XXIV Corps on 31 Jul 70.

**2 Airplanes.**

1 Utility airplane company

2 Reconnaissance airplane companies

**(b) Flight of the ten assault helicopter companies continued to provide 2,700 hours of support time per month. Companies are allocated daily as follows:**

2 Companies of 12 slicks, 4 gunships, each. Special classified missions and general support missions.

1 Company of 12 slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assault plus 7 slicks for general support.

5 Companies of 1 C&C, 8 slicks, 4 gunships. Combat assaults plus 3 slicks for general support.

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(c) Request for UH-1 helicopters for airmobile operations and general support continued to exceed assets available. The continuing positive management of these assets provided maximum utilization consistent with operational resources.

(d) With the advent of new wet season AG's following the Cambodian operations the utilization of CH-47 assets decreased for all II FFORCEV units. This was due in part to the number of ARVN forces out of country and because of strong measures taken during Cambodian operations to reduce waste of blade time.

(4) Force Structure.

(a) Gains

1 2d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment on 17 May 1970.

2 The following assigned units were attached to HHC, II FFORCEV for rations, quarters and conduct of training on 29 June 1970:

a 517th Engineer Detachment

b 44th Army Postal Unit

c 7th Military History Detachment

d 16th Public Information Detachment

3 29th Chemical Detachment was attached to HHC, II FFORCEV for quarters and conduct of training and HHS, II FFORCEV Arty, for rations on 29 June 1970.

(b) Losses. 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment on 17 May 1970.

(5) Training.

(a) The emphasis on II FFORCEV training assistance to RVNAF continued to be on-the-job training for small units and individuals.

1 II FFORCEV Artillery continued to conduct programs to upgrade ARVN Artillery. The program included pairing of US and ARVN units and conducting combined training with heavy emphasis on practical exercises and on-the-job training. This program is being implemented by artillery units assigned to the Field Force as well as in the divisions and separate brigades.

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1 The 1st Australian Task Force continued to increase its military assistance to Regional Forces in Phuoc Tay Province in order to provide additional leadership training to Regional and Popular force units.

2 The 25th Infantry Division training center conducted two courses for the Binh Thuan Province RF/PF forces. More than 2,000 RF, PF, National Police and People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) personnel have gone through a two hour night firing course while 236 RF and PF junior officers and NCO's completed a 32 hour leadership course.

3 The 1st Cavalry Division continued on-the-job training program for graduates of the 5th ARVN Division's Platoon Leader Refresher Course, Company Commander Refresher Course, and MCC Academy. During the quarter 44 ARVN officers and 177 ARVN NCO's participated in the program.

4 On-the-job training has been conducted by II FFORCEV/OFCON units in many areas, including:

- 1 Artillery
- 2 Squad and platoon tactical operations
- 3 Airmobile operations
- 4 Squad and platoon tactical operations
- 5 Mechanical ambush techniques
- 6 Automotive mechanics
- 7 Mortar crew proficiency training
- 8 Preventive medicine and nurses training
- 9 Driver training

5 Reports indicate that the training assistance being provided has been beneficial to the students and that the RVNAF units have responded favorably to the programs.

(b) II FFORCEV continued to allocate quotas to the MACV Recondo School. During the reporting period 72 allocations were received, 57 students entered training and 42 successfully completed the course. The majority of allocations not used were during the month of June, when units were fully committed to operations in Cambodia. The RVNAF enrolled 15 students during the period with all 15 graduating.

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**e. Logistics.**

**(1) Programs and Projects.**

**(a) Logistics Readiness Program.**

1 The fourth quarter FY 70 Logistics Readiness Meeting for II FFG/2V assigned and attached units was held on 10 July. Topics discussed included the DL program, care and maintenance of Storage Batteries, Reports of Survey, Temporary Loans, Self-Service Supply Center allocations, the new MCM Net 750-4, pertaining to Weekly Command Deadline Reports, and Quarterly Internal Readiness Reports.

2 Roadside Spot Checks continue to identify a number of II FFG/2V vehicles operated in an unsatisfactory condition. Pre-dispatch procedures should be reviewed to preclude unsatisfactory scores.

3 The average II FFG/2V operational readiness (OR) rates for AH-1G and OH-67 helicopters experienced a noticeable decrease during the months of May and June. The major contributing factor was the extremely high utilization and the number of combat and operational losses associated with the Cambodian operation. The FFG teams fielded by 34th General Support Group units were largely responsible for keeping the OH-67 in the outstanding posture that was maintained. The availability of replacement OH-67's and the reduced utilization of both OH-67's and AH-1G's resulted in a steady increase in OR rates following the Cambodian operation.

4 Operational readiness rates for UH-1D/H's and LH's were not adversely affected by the Cambodian operation. Primary reasons were the moderate utilization and high unit fill levels for UH-1D/H's, and the ready availability of OH-67's that were infused to keep units at or above 100% LH fill levels.

5 The UH-1D gunship OR rates were not noticeably affected by the Cambodian operation. Keeping gunship OR above the DL standard continues to be a problem because of the age of the fleet and the fact that unit fill levels average around 65 percent. The gunship picture becomes more critical as combat losses are sustained, as the only replacements are those returned from closed loop overhaul.

**(2) Ammunition.**

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continued to be managed through the use of available supply rate (ASR) allocations to insure equitable

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Distribution of available ammunition to all II FPGCIV units. Expenditures of certain high cost, high tonnage items also continued to be controlled through the available supply rate system.

(b) During the quarter, the number of conventional munitions under available supply rate control was:

May 1970 - 8

Jun 1970 - 17

Jul 1970 - 37

## (3) Transportation.

(a) United States Air Force C-123/C-119/C-7 sorties flown from the Common Service Airlift System in support of II FPGCIV are summarized in inclosure 7.

(b) The MACV allocation of C-7A aircraft dedicated to II FPGCIV was cut to 10 aircraft during the reporting period. The total number of airlift requests increased over the previous quarter due to the heightened activity of the Cambodian Operation.

## (4) Base Transfers.

(a) During the quarter, emphasis continued on the transfer of excess US facilities to RVNAF in support of the Improvement and Modernization Program. A portion of Lai Khe and the entire Tay Ninh West Base Camp, Tan An Main Base Camp, Tan An Airfield and Camp Henton, made excess by tactical realignment, are in the process of being transferred.

1 Tactical realignment and internal relocation at Lai Khe Base Camp enabled 253 facilities at a cost of \$723,556 to be transferred to the 5th ARVN Division.

2 The transfer of Tay Ninh West Base Camp was initiated on 27 June 1970. A conceptual plan was submitted to MACV, proposing the transfer in three phases. ARVN forces occupied, in a tenant status, the eastern section of Tay Ninh on 7 July 1970 and the western sector on 25 July 1970.

3 The transfers of Tan An Main Base Camp, Tan An Airfield and Camp Henton were initiated in July 1970 as a result of tactical realignment. Headquarters, Military Region 3 has expressed an interest in acquiring these facilities for possible use as Provincial Installations.

(b) Several minor bases declared excess due to repositioning of US forces have also been transferred.

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1 FSB Gattysburg (KS355875), formerly named by members of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, was closed on 25 May 1970.

2 FSB Beall (KT217534), formerly occupied by the 25th Infantry Division, was transferred to the 315th AF Company on 6 July 1970.

3 FSB Baulings (KT217405) was occupied by the 25th Infantry Division until 6 July 1970, when it was transferred to the 315th AF Company.

4 FSB Jackson (KT21867) was occupied by the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, until closed on 30 June 1970.

5 FSB Devins (KT557173) was transferred from the 25th Infantry Division to the 25th ARVN Division on 11 July 1970.

6 FSB Libby (YTL2726) was transferred from the 199th LTB to the 10th ARVN Division on 21 June 1970.

7 Tan Tru Base Camp (KS651623) was transferred from the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division to the 25th ARVN Division on 30 July 1970.

8 FSB Hampton (YTL17278) was transferred from the 25th Infantry Division to the 25th ARVN Division on 11 June 1970.

#### F. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations: During the reporting period, II FFORCEV psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical operations, pacification and development, and special campaigns. The period was highlighted by:

(a) Support of the Cambodian operation from 1 May - 30 June. The main features of this support were:

1 Direct PSYOP support for tactical operations in Cambodia. This phase of activity reached its peak during the period 1-12 May 70, with approximately 90 percent of II FFORCEV PSYOP assets employed in direct support of committed tactical units. (The PSYOP objectives of this campaign were to reduce the overall combat effectiveness of the enemy units and to protect the civilian population from possible involvement in the hostilities.

2 Intensive PSYOP activities within MR 3 while maintaining support for operations in Cambodia. This program was required to counterbalance the temporary reduction of our capability within MR 3 caused by the initial concentration of tactical units and PSYOP resources in the Cambodian border

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2. **Summary.** II FFCVW targeted every unit and the civilian population within MR 3 with the objectives of influencing the civilian population of the Allied operations in Cambodia and exploiting the elimination of Communist sanctuaries and supply depots. To achieve these objectives, II FFCVW reallocated some of the PSYOP assets committed in Cambodia to MR 3, and reinforced ARVN and Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) programs in the region.

3. **Flexible allocation of resources in support of the two-fronted PSYOP program.** Maximum use of the PSYOP assets was accomplished as follows:

A. On initiation of Cambodian operations, II FFCVW allocated PSYOP resources to provide maximum support to the tactical units in Cambodia. The following were initially available to the committed divisions:

<u>Delta organic equipment</u>	<u>1st Cav Div</u>	<u>23rd Inf Div</u>
Balloons	40	38
Aerial Loudspeakers (SOCL)	13	14
Tape Recorders	12	12
Cameras	4	5
<u>9th SOF resources (sorties/day)</u>		
02B	2	2
C47	1	1
<u>6th PSYOP Bn resources</u>		
HQ Teams	1	1
HB Teams	5	6
HE Teams	2	2

**Printing**

Leaflets/day  
(or equivalent)

200,000

200,000

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a. Experience gained during the first week of the Cambodian operation revealed that redistribution of available resources was not sufficient to support border operations and concurrently maintain a high level of PSYOP activity within IR 3. As a result, additional PSYOP resources were obtained.

b. One Frantic Goat mission (G130) per week, with a 12.5 million leaflet capacity, was flown in general support of the Corps, with the initial mission being flown on 12 May 70.

c. Two G125 missions, with a total capacity of 5 million leaflets per day, were used in direct support of the two divisions as well as for back-up support of the Corps. The initial mission was flown on 11 May 70.

d. Back-up printing support, with a capacity of 10 million leaflets per week, was provided by the 4th PSYOP Gp. The initial leaflets were received on 7 May 70.

e. Three additional mobile loudspeaker teams (HB) were used in direct support of the committed divisions. One team from the I Corps area closed on 12 May 70 and two teams from the 7th PSYOP Gp, Chinam, closed on 18 May 70.

f. The following special support was provided by CORDE IR 3 in support of the Cambodian operation..

a. CORDE increased the circulation of its regional Vietnamese-language newspaper (Tin Tong Hiep) to provide additional coverage of the Cambodian situation for the civilian population, including refugees and detainees.

b. CORDE initiated a Cambodian-language edition of its regional newspaper for distribution to refugees and Cambodian civilians in the combat zone. Distribution of this publication was accomplished by tactical units.

c. CORDE and II FFORCEV jointly produced a daily leaflet-size mini-newspaper for air dissemination on selected D and E hamlets and enemy local forces.

(b) Implementation of the Wet Season Strategy. By 22 Jun 70 all PSYOP support in Cambodia had been terminated and II FFORCEV PSYOP agencies had begun to provide timely and appropriate support for the

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Wet Season Strategy. FVJCP objectives for the wet season include the maintenance of maximum psychological pressure on VC/INA forces and their supporters, neutralization of VUI, support of the Chieu Hoi program, and countering the effectiveness of terrorist activities. The FVJCP program was designed to drive a psychological wedge between the civilian population and the local enemy forces in order to deny the enemy the popular support essential to his survival. II FFUSMACV is implementing this program by intensifying the employment of FVJCP at all levels, developing and maintaining an accurate and up-to-date FVJCP intelligence base, and tailoring FVJCP programs and media to specific local situations.

## (2) Civil Affairs.

(a) Civil Affairs (CA) activities during the months of May and June centered primarily on supporting Cambodian operations. A major portion of the CA effort was diverted from the normal role of supporting provincial advisory teams to the direct support of tactical units operating in Cambodia. This support concentrated on assisting in the control of refugees and the management of captured food stores. Approximately 40,000 refugees were evacuated from Cambodia to IR 3 and approximately 1,100 tons of captured rice were used in support of refugee operations. Other CA efforts in Cambodia involved the distribution of PL-460 commodities, payment of solatium, and the supervision of MEDCAP which treated over 12,000 people.

(b) At the conclusion of operations in Cambodia, the CA effort was directed towards supporting the Wet Season Strategy. Close coordination among the subordinate units was required to insure that community relations and civic action projects continued or were terminated in an orderly manner as the units assumed new AO's.

(c) Provincial support CA teams, operating at reduced strength during May and June because of the Cambodian operation, continued to provide support for the Pacification and Development program. Although the pacification effort was at a low level when compared with previous reporting periods, CA projects and programs progressed towards completion and new ones were initiated. Emphasis was placed on encouraging RVNAF units and the local populace to participate actively in civic action projects. Increased efforts were made to induce individuals, groups, and institutional representatives to use Vietnamese district and province channels to request support, in order to exercise the GVN administrative structure and further Vietnamization. Project requests were monitored to insure that they were acted on expeditiously. Only when the requested assistance was beyond the capabilities of the Vietnamese officials would military civic action be considered.

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(d) For the first time, a civil affairs team from the 2d CA Company was deployed (in April) to Binh Tuy Province. Though limited to four members during May and June because of Cambodian operational requirements, the team made considerable progress in coordinating CA activities.

(e) Phuoc Tuy Province moved forward towards pacification and Vietnization through the efforts of the 1st Australian Task Force. For example, the hamlets and villages are beginning to submit their project requests to the proper GVN officials rather than directly to the Australians. The 1st Australian Civic Action Unit is conducting a PSYOP campaign to encourage greater use of the province hospital at Baria (Phuoc Le), which will reduce public reliance on MEDCAP. They are also training Vietnamese personnel to participate in construction projects and to maintain these projects after they are completed.

(f) The Community Relations Councils within the II FFORCEV area continued their normal functions even though the units were heavily committed to tactical operations.

## g. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

(1) Pacification and Development. Phase One of the 1970 Pacification and Development Campaign ended 30 June 1970. According to HES/70 figures, Phase I brought the MR 3 population living in A, B, and C hamlets to 3,332,500 (97%). This was an increase from the total ABC population as of 31 March 1970 of 3,329,100 (95.6%). A significant accomplishment as of 30 June was the disappearance of all "V" hamlets, those under VC control, in MR 3. More impressive, however, is the fact that 2,964,700 people (86.9%) in MR 3 enjoy A or B pacification status. The fact that this exceeds the Phase I goal by 3.9% is indicative of a dramatic improvement in the security situation which may be partially attributed to the Cambodian Campaign. A healthier climate for pacification has been established which provides a stable foundation from which to launch Phase II of the Special 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. Phase II began on 1 July with efforts directed toward attainment of goals of 96% AB population, and 100% ABC population. The pacification "AB" goal is within reach, but it seems unlikely that the optimistic goal of 100% ABC population will be attained.

## (2) Territorial Security.

(a) The second quarter of 1970 opened with the most intensive enemy highpoint of the year to date. Heavy combat was experienced by RF/FF units especially in the 31st DTA as a planned enemy nationwide attack

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was followed by the initiation of cross-border operations by ARVN forces. Contacts by territorial forces during the first half of the quarter were high with extremely favorable casualty ratios especially in the western provinces. During the last half of the quarter, mostly as a result of the Cambodian operations, contacts and ratios declined within IR 3. During the last month, the ratios for RF and PF dropped off to such a degree that the overall casualty ratio (5:1 RF/4.4:1 PF). Generally speaking, when operating on good intelligence or in an area where contact was expected, as in Cambodia, RF units performed extremely well with excellent results. When enemy presence diminished, however, RF units relaxed and performed lackadaisically in their routine security missions.

(b) During this period, Regional Forces were tested when the majority of regular forces were removed from IR 3 and subsequently deployed into Cambodia. Although a downward trend was realized in loss ratios, the RF/PF did succeed in maintaining territorial security in areas that had traditionally required regular force presence. Additionally, several Regional Force units from Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces were employed in Cambodia with extremely favorable results against main force VC/NVA units. With the current nature of the conflict being small-unit attacks against pacification as dictated by CCNV Resolutions 9 and 14, the Regional Forces can successfully continue to replace the regular forces in pacification support missions. That is not to say, however, that setbacks and regressions will not occur. The province mobile RF battalion concept, if fully implemented, should further enhance the ability of regional forces to permanently replace regular forces in pacification roles. Presently in IR 3, there are eight RF battalions; four in Gia Dinh Province, two in Long Binh Special Zone and one each in Long An and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. This headquarters has recommended redeployment of battalion headquarters to allow one mobile battalion in Long An, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Phuoc Tuy and LBZ. The maneuver elements of the three additional battalions in Gia Dinh and one in LBZ will remain and be commanded by RF inter-company group headquarters.

(c) During the quarter, a test of the province mobile RF battalion concept was conducted in Tay Ninh Province. The test utilized the battalion headquarters of the 58th RF Bn from Long Binh Special Zone and four RF companies organic to Tay Ninh. During the test the province employed the battalion in a mobile role against known VC/NVA battalion base areas both within the province and in Cambodia. IR 3 observers monitored the test and are presently assessing the results. Initial advisor observations conclude that the province mobile battalion concept is valid.

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(d) As the US forces drawdown continued, plans were formalized for the assumption of "overwatch" responsibility of territorial security by ARVN. Though this activity is far from complete, much of it already existed within the normal responsibilities of the DTA Commanders.

(e) During the quarter, territorial forces successfully completed Phase II of the force structure increase, resulting in an additional six RF companies and 112 PF platoons. All of these units have completed training and are currently employed in territorial security missions. Additionally, 12 RF companies were realized through the CIDG conversion program. Though these companies are well below desired strength levels, they are presently committed to territorial security missions. Two mobile RF battalions were organized and trained, and have been assigned to Long An and Phuoc Tuy Province. Phase III of the force structure increase commenced in late June. This will result in a net increase of eight RF companies and 51 PF platoons during the next quarter. Effects of the force structure increases will inevitably be favorable for the protection of national resources. As RF companies penetrate more deeply into the clearing zones, some initial reversals can be expected. Indications of lowering morale and an upward trend in RF desertions already attest to this responsibility for the denial of the enemy to natural resources in the clearing zones will continue to rest with regular forces.

(f) During the second quarter considerable progress was made in the organizational goals of People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF). The goal for combat members was achieved in May. The support goal which was raised during the first quarter to what was thought to be an unattainable objective was reached by the end of June. This success was made possible by the lowering of the minimum age for Support PSDF from thirteen to seven. Thousands of youngsters previously not eligible were organized and are currently being trained. The importance of PSDF is attested to by the priority which it continues to have in VC targeting. Incidents against PSDF can be expected to increase as the urgency of communist directives against the organization become translated into action. To date, VC countermeasures have had little observable effect in slowing the progress of the program. The organization of Key Inter-Team (KITs) made substantial progress in the second quarter after a poor first quarter which was plagued by recruiting and organizational problems. The training of KITs was slowed by administrative problems in the KIT leaders course. Only three courses were completed during the quarter. Problems have been corrected and a greater flow of KIT leaders should now be realized. Also, weapon issuance to KITs has been delayed by a shortage of M2 Carabines; however, more weapons are expected in-country in the near future.

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(3) War Victims and Refugees. During this period, the most significant activity was the influx of 45,000 refugees (primarily Vietnamese repatriates) from Cambodia into MR 3. Particularly impressive was the extremely competent manner with which these people were cared for by the GVN. The reception, and temporary assistance given these refugees in MR 3 was very effective. 25,000 of these people have already been settled throughout MR 3. Plans are now in process for resettling the remaining 20,000. This performance by the GVN during an emergency situation reflects great credit on the capability of the GVN at all levels.

(A) Chiou Noi

(a) Noi Chanh totalled 2,348 for this quarter (May-July), indicating an increase of 1,008 returnees from the previous quarter. The returnee classifications for this period were: Military - 1,171 (50%); Political - 430 (18%); Other Elements - 747 (32%). There were 39 NVN soldiers among the military ralliers. Tay Ninh received the largest number of returnees (805) during the period, Hau Nghia was second (711), and Long An was third (278). The large influx of returnees in the border provinces occurred primarily during the months of May and June and can be attributed to the Cambodian operations.

(b) A qualitative evaluation of Armed Propaganda Team (APT) performance was made in June. The assessment, which covered the period 1 December 1969 through 31 May 1970, indicated an improvement in the quality of APT performance. This improvement was attributed to the APT payope training which started during the end of the 1st quarter and was completed in June. The evaluation revealed problems of mediocre leadership and poor utilization of the APT.

(c) A political indoctrination was started on 21 May 1970 and completed in June for ninety-one FOU-turned-Noi Chanh. Another political indoctrination course was started 15 July 1970 and will be completed in August.

(d) An increase in the number of VC attacks on Chiou Noi installations was noted during this period. The attacks occurred primarily in Binh Tay, Hau Nghia, and Bien Hoa.

(e) Interrogation of Noi Chanh continued to provide valuable information to Allied military units. Discoveries of arms and ammunition caches and an increase in VCI elimination resulted.

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(f) The APT companies temporarily assigned to Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia during the Cambodian operations to assist in the imbucement of Noi Chanh performed exceptionally well.

## (5) Development

(a) All village council elections have been completed in 197 villages where council terms had expired. 500 Hamlet Chief elections programmed for completion by 30 June have been held in hamlets where the term of office has expired.

(b) During the reporting period (May - July), 2 technical schools were built and opened throughout III Corps. This will enable young people to be trained in technical skills and to fill responsible positions in industry and business.

(c) During this quarter, Rural Development (RD) Cadre have been employed in the following activities:

1 Seven, 30-man groups are being utilized in the Urban Cadre Program; four groups to Tay Ninh province and three groups to Bien Hoa Province.

2 Local Reform Cadre have been selected by each Province with each selected to receive training at the National Training Center where a new course is being organized.

3 Village Self-Development Cadre are now being selected by all provinces and will be trained at province level.

4 Both RD and Song Truong Revolutionary Development (STRD) Cadre were utilized to assist in the processing of refugees resulting from the Cambodian operations in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces.

(d) During May and June of this quarter, the Requisitioning Objectives (RO) supply management concept was severely tested. This concept is utilized throughout III Corps for the management of program commodity stock levels by province depots. The concept proved adequate and effective to the satisfaction of all concerned.

(e) Road upgrading programs in III Corps show varying degrees of progress as the construction season comes to an end. Primary lines of communication (LOC) reconstruction was 78% (RSC km) completed at the end of July. This program has shown steady progress, but the wet season has caused a

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tapering off of the rate of completion. The remaining portion of the LOC Program, however, should be completed by the end of the year. The II FFV Secondary Roads Program has continued to progress even though hampered by the diversion of some engineer battalions for two months to support the Cambodian operations. Approximately 11 (501 km) of the secondary road program was complete by the end of July. The Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) Roads and Bridges Reconstruction Program has exhibited a slow rate of progress over the past three months. At the end of July, 52% of the roads (86 km) and 33% of the bridges (256 m) are completed. Withdrawal of ARVN engineer units from 12 of the 62 projects has caused some delay in this program. Despite the renewed emphasis placed on the program by ONV, approximately 10-15% of the projects will probably not be completed in 1970.

(f) Attempts to improve the capability of the Provincial Public Works Departments have resulted in little progress during the past three months. All provinces are in approximately the same position regarding shortages of funds, trained manpower, and equipment. Public Works Departments throughout PR 3 suffer from a lack of sufficient funds to purchase materials or to contract for maintenance work. The Province Public Works receives funds for maintenance and repair of only the national highways and a portion of the more heavily traveled secondary roads. Therefore, the vast majority of the farm-to-market roads have little or no maintenance. Personnel shortages contribute to the inability of the Public Works Departments to adequately perform their mission. The most serious shortages exist in trained equipment operators and mechanics. This shortage is caused by the military draft and the fact that Public Works salaries are approximately one-half to one-third of that offered by private contractors. A recommendation by CG, III Corps and IR 3, to the Prime Minister to assign drafted Public Works employees to their former jobs has not been acted upon. The recent addition of 10 new dump trucks in PR 3 has relieved this portion of the equipment problem to a slight extent, but the lack of sufficient, operational road building equipment detracts from the Public Works effectiveness and remains one of its greatest problems.

## h. Artillery

(1) General. This reporting period was characterized by rapid repositioning of II FFVGEN Artillery units to areas along the Cambodian Border in order to bring maximum fire upon the enemy during the allied offensive. Continuing emphasis was placed on the improvement and training of ARVN and CIEG Artillery.

(2) Tactical Developments. Current locations of II FFVGEN Artillery units are listed in inclosure 10. Heavy artillery coverage of IR 3 is

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portrayed graphically in inclosure 11. Heavy artillery units supported units of II FFORCIN and combined task forces operating in Cambodia.

(a) Operation Toan Thang 42 (Rock Crusher) was initiated by the ANFV III Corps, attacking with three task forces into the Angel's Wing, and then south into the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia, as a part of a combined III-IV Corps operation. II FFORCIN Artillery supported the attack with heavy artillery, initially deployed to the north and east of the area of operations, so as to provide maximum support for the maneuver forces.

(b) On 7 May 70, two 8" tubes belonging to Btry A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, moved to Thunder II (XT781555) from FSB Colorado (YS315807). These two 8" tubes were converted to 175mm guns and both moved to Thunder III (XT768659) on 18 May 70. Mud Dat gained two 8" tubes which moved from Horseshoe (YS454621) to that location on 3 June 70. A platoon of 8" tubes from Btry A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, were located at FSB Tumbo (YS134922) on 22 June 70. Arriving at FSB Made (XU728087) from Thunder III (XT768659) were two 175mm guns belonging to Btry A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery. The two 8" tubes located at Mud Dat (YS429664) moved to Le Lai (YS454764) on 30 June 70 and then closed Mud Dat (YS429664) on 5 July 70. This platoon of 8" remained at Mud Dat (YS429664) overnight, moving to Horseshoe (YS454621) on 6 July 70. A 175mm platoon of Btry A, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, moved from FSB Made (XU728087) to FSB Echo (XT623155) on 12 July 70, and then to FSB Flower (ZS004984) on 14 July 70. The 8" platoon from Horseshoe (YS454621) conducted an artillery raid at YS505520 on 21 July 70 and closed Horseshoe later that same day. On 5 May, one 175mm platoon of Btry B, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, moved from Tay Ninh to FSB Randy (XT018439). On the same day two 8" tubes from the same unit moved from FSB Mat (ZT016053) to FSB Echo (XT025154). At FSB Echo on 5 May 70, two 175's of Btry C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, were changed to 8". The two 8" tubes at FSB Echo (XT025154) moved to FSB Blue (XT256289) on 6 May 70. These four 8" howitzers from Btry C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, made subsequent moves to different NIP's throughout Cambodia, during the period of 8-20 May 70. On 21 May 70, the two 8" platoons closed Tay Ninh. On 24 May 70, two 8" platoons of Btry C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, moved from Tay Ninh to WU917057. From this location both platoons conducted an artillery raid on 31 May 70, at coordinates XT028781, closing back into WU917057 the evening of that day. These four 8" howitzers returned to Tay Ninh on 3 June 70. On 5 June 70, two 8" platoons of Btry C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, moved to WT985321 from Tay Ninh. They remained at that location for a period of eight days firing support for operations in Cambodia,

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and closed Tay Ninh 15 June 70. The 8" platoon and one 175, all from Btry C, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, sent from Tay Ninh to Ben Soi (XT087472) on 28 June 70 and returned to Tay Ninh on 1 July 70. Completing the moves for the 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, were two 8" and two 175's from Btry C moving to Elephant (XT095781) from Tay Ninh on 1 July 70.

(c) In support of the 1st Air Cavalry, along the northern border of the 213, two 8" tubes of Btry A, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, moved from FSB Burrett (XT551073) to FSB Eagle 1 (XT095781) on 6 May 70. These same two 8" tubes moved from FSB Eagle 1 (XT095781) to FSB Wade (XU728087), continuing their support of 1st Air Cavalry operations. The reporting period found Btry B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, moving from Compton (YU53152) to Long Ba (YU14507) on 15 May 70. On 1 May 70, one platoon of 175mm from Btry C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, moved to FSB Jarrett (XT410123) to support 1st Air Cavalry division operations. Two tubes of 175mm from Btry C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, moved first to An Loc (XT755072) on 1 May 70, and then continued on to FSB Wade (XU728087) on 4 May 70. Moving from FSB Jarrett (XT410123) to Loi Khe (XT756371) on 5 May 70 were 2 tubes of 175mm belonging to Btry C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery. Btry C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, became intact when two tubes of 175mm moved to FSB Wade (XU728087) on 6 May 70. Btry C, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, remained at FSB Wade (XU728087) until 14 May 70, when both 175mm platoons moved north to Bu Dop (XU771286) to support infantry operations in that area.

(d) On 2 May 70, two 8" tubes of Btry A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved from FSB Hull (XT263380) to FSB Murray III (XT333150) to support operations in the Angel's Wing. On 10 May 70, there were two 8" tubes from Btry A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, at FSB Wood (XT049801) and one 175mm platoon at Tay Ninh (XT41521). One 8" platoon from Btry A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved from FSB Wood (XT049801) to Tay Ninh (XT41521) on 14 May 70 making the battery intact. On 15 May 70, the 175mm platoon moved to FSB St Barbara (XT276671), and the 8" platoon moved to FSB Oklahoma (XU26092). The battery was again intact on the 22d of May at FSB Oklahoma (XU26092). On 22 June 70 the battery split with the 175mm platoon moving to FSB Katun (XT333902), and the 8" platoon moving to FSB Korpey (XU357028). On 23 June 70, two 8" tubes moved from Korpey (XU357028) to Katun (XT333902). On 3 July 70, Btry A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved intact from Katun (XT333902) to Ben Soi (XT087472). One tube of 175mm moved to FSB Langard (XT075075) from Ben Soi (XT087472) on 20 July 70. On 6 May 70, one 8" platoon of Btry B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved from FSB Burrett (XT551073) to FSB Beverly (XT333902). One tube of 175mm moved from FSB Beverly (XT333902) to

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FSB Unit II (XTA779A) on 21 May 70, and then moved to FSB Lahn (XTY902) on 22 May 70. One 6" platoon out of FSB Lahn (XTY4212) and one 175mm platoon out of FSB Laurel (XT00045), both from C Btry, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, closed Tay Ninh on 5 May 1970. The one 6" platoon closed FSB Ann (XT087615) on 6 May 70, to be followed by the 175mm platoon on the 10th. Later the day of the 10th, the battery moved inland from FSB Ann (XT087615) to FSB Charn (XT04577). Btry C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, occupied FSB Hester (XT051157) on 20 May 70, remaining there until 11 June 70, when the battery moved to FSB Krel (XT000000). On 24 June 70, Btry C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved from Krel (XT000000) to FSB Langard (XT075015), as heavy artillery began to assume new supporting positions along the Cambodian border, at the close of the campaign.

(e) At the close of this reporting period, heavy artillery batteries were positioned in 6 battery locations, adjacent to the Cambodian border.

## (3) ARVN Artillery.

(a) Improvement of ARVN Artillery standards continued under the Artillery Dong Tien (Forward Together) Plan. This improvement resulted from close coordination on the mutual support projects of the plan.

(b) Overall training during the reporting period decreased slightly due to the emphasis placed upon expeditionary operations.

## d. Intelligence.

### (1) AM/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radar

(a) Operational Effectiveness. The continued program of evaluation and analysis of the effectiveness of AM/MPQ-4A GMR's employed throughout IR 3 for the months of May, June, and July, revealed the statistics discussed below. The overall effectiveness percentage was determined from the number of sightings acquired during all attacks by fire occurring within range of an AM/MPQ-4A GMR in IR 3. This figure does not include attacks which could not be observed due to mechanical downtime, and factors other than the sector of fire being observed at the time of the attack.

(b) Analysis of Operational Statistics. Of the 164 indirect fire attacks occurring within range of a countermortar radar, 12 attacks occurred during a period when the radar within range was inoperative, 26 attacks occurred during normal radar off time, 22 attacks occurred out of the radar sector of search, and 44 attacks occurred within the radar sector of search. In 24 instances acquisition was made, resulting in 24 weapons

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**Locations.** Inclosure 12 contains statistical data for respective counter-survey detachments in MR 3. (Notes: Data for the above analysis is taken from daily artillery SITREPS and the G2, II FFORCEV, Journal.)

(a) Location of AN/TPQ-4A Radars. See inclosure 13 for the location of AN/TPQ-4A CDR's as of 31 July. (II FFORCEV Artillery assets are indicated by hash marks.)

(2) AN/TPQ-25A Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR).

(a) Operational effectiveness. The AN/TPQ-25A Radar continued to be successfully employed in an offensive role throughout MR 3. During the period of 1 May to 31 July, 2116 sightings were reported. Of these, 1074 were engaged.

(b) Radar locations. During the reporting period there were nine relocations of the AN/TPQ-25A Radars for ground surveillance coverage of critical areas of MR 3 and portions of Cambodia. The locations of the seven AN/TPQ-25A GSR's in II FFORCEV as of 31 July, are depicted in Inclosure 14.

(3) Improvement of Radar Effectiveness.

(a) Radar Quality Control Inspection Team. In a continuing effort to upgrade the operational and maintenance standards of the radar detachments in MR 3, a radar quality control/inspection team consisting of a qualified radar Warrant Officer and a qualified radar maintenance technician, inspected 32 radar sites during the reporting period. Reports were submitted to the parent unit for corrective action.

(b) Radar Operator Training. During the months of May, June, and July, a total of 16 enlisted operators from divisional and II FFORCEV Artillery Radar Detachments received a three day course on operational and maintenance problems peculiar to the employment of radars in Vietnam.

(4) Survey.

(a) Extension of Survey Control. During the reporting period, 27 fourth order survey control points were established within MR 3. In support of Cambodian Operations, 14 fourth order survey control points were established in Cambodia.

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(b) **Control Point Recovery.** During the reporting period 10 points were successfully recovered, while five points could not be located or were found to be destroyed.

(c) **Survey Quality Control.** The II FFORCE Artillery Survey Quality Control Team visited all seven artillery battalions of II FFORCE Artillery and the 2d Bn, 40th Aty (199th LTB), in an effort to determine the capability of each battalion survey section to accomplish its mission. Reports were submitted to each battalion for information and appropriate corrective action.

## 1. Communications.

### (1) Radio Communications.

(a) During the Cambodian Operations in May and June 1970 additional radio communications support was provided to both US ground forces and III Corps Advisors.

(b) Special FM secure liaison nets were established to provide responsible reporting channels for II FFORCE Liaison Officers. One net utilized an NTL-3 retransmission station on Nui Ba Dan to provide secure voice communications between II FFORCE and Quan Loi in support of Task Force Shomaker. A second NTL-3 retransmission station was placed in operation at Cu Chi to provide secure communications to Cu Dau Ma and later to Tay Ninh East in support of Operation Rockcrasher.

(c) The NTL-3 retransmission station at Cu Chi was relocated to Nui Ba Dan and later placed in support of III Corps Advisors at Tay Ninh to provide FM secure communications to the Task Forces in Cambodia. A radio teletype terminal was provided to support the III Corps Forward Command Post at Cu Dau Ma and later at Tay Ninh. To provide radio communications at the extended ranges required as the forward units moved deeper into Cambodia, an AN/URC-106 single sideband radio team from the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate)(Light) was airlifted into Cambodia and provided vital voice communications back to III Corps Forward at Tay Ninh. Additionally, eight (8) AN/PNC-74 portable, single sideband radios were loaned to the ARVN forward elements for coordination of fire support.

(d) During May a program was initiated to reduce the number of FM stations on Nui Ba Dan. At one time as many as seventy-seven stations were operating at the summit of the mountain resulting in a severe mutual interference problem. After careful study of the situation, use of the mountain was reduced to less than fifty stations in order to minimize the interference.

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(e) There were several changes in SOI responsibility during this period. The 2d Bn 34th Armor became GPCOI to II FFORCEV for a 45 day period in May and June and II FFORCEV assumed SOI responsibility for them until they reverted GPCOI to 25th Infantry Division. On 11 May the III Corps Signal Advisor assumed responsibility for operation of the Long Binh Special Zone radio nets and for production of the associated SOI material.

(f) During the reporting period special FM nets were established in support of visits by a Presidential Investigating Committee, the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff.

(2) Communications Center/Communications Security

(a) Command emphasis has been continued on FM secure voice (HESTOR) utilization and other aspects of Communications Security (COMSEC), particularly the use of authorized codes. The COMSEC Manual Code, which replaced the KAC-2 codes, was received during June and implemented on 1 July 1970. Training was conducted throughout II FFORCEV for personnel who use this code. During the reporting period utilization of HESTOR equipment reached 73%.

(b) During the Cambodian operations teletype circuits were provided from II FFORCEV to Tay Ninh East and Quan Loi, the forward command posts for Operation Rockcrusher and Task Force Shoemaker.

(3) Wire Communications

(a) Radio Relay Systems. During the Cambodian operation a number of radio relay systems were installed and numerous terminals relocated to support both US and ARVN forces. A system was established from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh East to provide the circuits necessary to support the III Corps Forward Command Post. This system was later extended to Thien Nhon to support an ARVN task force operation along highway QL-22 in Cambodia. This system was deactivated in early June and later re-established when another ARVN task force moved into the Thien Nhon area.

(b) A radio relay system was established between Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi, the headquarters of Task Force Shoemaker until circuit paths could be provided over the Corps Area Communication System (CACS). Two radio relay terminals were provided to the 25th Infantry Division at Katun to support combat operations in the Fishhook area. This equipment was withdrawn when terminal equipment of the 25th Division became available.

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(c) When the forward headquarters of the 199th LTB relocated, a 12 channel radio relay system was installed from Hill 837 to PSB Mace to provide circuits from the 199th Forward to II FFORCEV HQ and the 199th Rear. In conjunction with the relocation of the 199th, the AUTO/EOCCM terminal at Xuan Loc was deactivated.

(d) With the change of responsibility for the operation of Long Binh Special Zone Command Post at the III Corps compound at Dien Hoa the radio system to II FFORCEV was deactivated. As the Tay Ninh West base camp was turned over from US to ARVN control in July the four channel radio relay system to PSB St. Barbara in support of the 2d Bn 32d Artillery was deactivated. Upon the conclusion of US operations in Cambodia, radio relay support of the III Corps Forward Command Post was phased out as the ARVN forces took over control of the operations and installed their own communications systems.

(e) Telephone and Wire Service. During May and June a program was initiated to reduce the ratio of Class "A" to Class "C" dial telephones to lessen the overloading of the tandem switching centers. A total of 63 Class "A" telephones off the Plantation Dial Telephone Exchange were converted to meet the criteria of new MACV directives.

## J. Information.

(1) During the reporting period, "The Hurricane" continued to emphasize pacification and Vietnamization in Military Region 3. The magazine issues for May, June, and July contained 26 feature articles ranging from infantry operations to children at Cholon playground in Saigon. Chieu Hoi centers were featured twice along with science in Vietnam, Van Hahn University, and Vietnamese industry.

(2) During the reporting period, two command topics were published on the Cambodian Operation. The reports gave background objectives, operations, refugees, and results. Distribution was made to company, battery level units of II Field Force Vietnam on 5 June 1970 and 26 July 1970. Also distributed were two Department of the Army topics, "Face Relations" and "You Can Help." The latter dealt with the necessity of leadership throughout the chain of command. This distribution was made to units adjacent to Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam.

(3) The Radio/TV section continued to produce the weekly radio program for AFVN, "Dateline III Corps." The 15 minute show is aired every Sunday at 1105 hours highlighting both US and ARVN operations. Also at the direction of the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, this

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section now prepares and delivers a nightly round-up of local, national and international news to the Commanding General and his staff during the evening briefing.

(4) Along with publishing a monthly magazine, the Public Information section continued to send press and hometown releases to all news media. Releases totalled 102 during this period.

(5) Civilian news media relations remained excellent during this reporting period. This office continued to conduct bi-monthly press update briefings held on the second and fourth Mondays of each month. The conference features a G2, G3, and CORDES update briefing of the Military Region 3 situation. The briefings are conducted by the regular G2, G3, and CORDES briefers and are received extremely well by the press. Attending the May, June, and July briefings were 105 press representatives. Also during the same period, 21 newsmen interviewed the Commanding General on the current tactical situation. The journalists represented ABC, NBC, AP, and UPI to name a few. A number of these interviews received national attention.

k. **Inspector General.** During the reporting period the Inspector General completed three inspections and conducted three investigations, inquiries.

1. **Staff Judge Advocate.**

(1) During the reporting period, personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate Section continued to make visits to the subordinate units in the field to process personnel claims, provide legal assistance, and advice on the handling of military justice matters. The constant increase in activity during the previous three quarters resulting from implementation of the Military Justice Act of 1968 has stabilized at the high level of the last quarter.

(2) Three (3) General courts-martial and eight (8) special courts-martial BCD trials were conducted during the reporting period.

(3) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

(4) Claims processing tripled during the quarter resulting in a significant increase over the high level experienced in the past.

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## 2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

### a. Personnel, Province Engineer Advisors.

(1) OBSERVATION. Province Engineer Advisors serving in HQ3 are US Army lieutenants and captains in the Corps of engineers. Two-thirds of these junior officers have no background in engineering or construction either by education or practical experience.

(2) EVALUATION. The primary requisite for a province engineer advisor is some experience in civil engineering or construction work. A civil engineering education can substitute to some extent for experience, but the majority of the junior officers assigned to the positions possess neither the education nor the experience. The junior officers assigned have worked energetically, but it is believed that an individual who has worked in public works engineering or construction could be more effective. The Province Public Works Chief is usually a man in his late 30s or early 40s and has attended a university in France or the United States. He, therefore, is obviously reluctant to listen to the advice of the US officer who does not have the formal education and experience that he has and who is 15 to 20 years his junior.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. Field grade officers with both civil engineering experience and a degree in civil engineering should be assigned this advisory task. Rather than accept an unqualified junior officer for each province, a competent field grade officer or civilian engineer advisor responsible for advising 2 or 3 provinces would be preferable.

### b. Intelligence

#### (1) Security Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a need for increased conscientiousness on the part of personnel involved with the disposal of unclassified official waste.

(b) EVALUATION. In one instance, waste discarded at a single trash point in one single day disclosed the times at which installation perimeter guards were changed throughout the night. This information would be useful to the enemy in planning a sapper attack. Performance characteristics, capabilities and vulnerabilities of the OV-10 aircraft used by FACs, and minimal take off and landing conditions for a nearby airfield were also disclosed. The itinerary of a primary staff officer who had

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access to highly sensitive information and was leaving the command were also found. The itinerary included a list of some of the places the officer would visit in the countries he was to visit. The itinerary was found four weeks in advance of the trip.

**(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1 That personnel be made aware of the fact that unclassified waste is valuable to the enemy.

2 That all official waste be burned.

**(2) Exploitation of Interrogation Reports:**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Statistics on exploitation of interrogation reports indicate that tactical unit commanders need to stress immediate exploitation of information gained from LMR and Hoi Chanh.

(b) **EVALUATION.** During the period, almost twice as many prisoners and Hoi Chanh were taken than during the previous period. In spite of the increase, the percentage of interrogations resulting in tactical responses dropped from about 23 percent to about 5 percent. This is an indication that these valuable sources of information are not being exploited or that prisoners and Hoi Chanh are not always given credit for cache finds and other successes resulting from interrogations.

**(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1 That prisoners be interrogated immediately after capture to ensure that exploitable information is obtained from the source while he is on familiar territory and while he is still suffering from the initial shock of finding himself a prisoner.

2 That Hoi Chanh be interrogated immediately after rallying to take advantage of the cooperative attitude resulting from the Hoi Chanh's decision to rally.

3 That forces be prepared to exploit information as soon as it is gained.

4 That successes resulting from interrogations be credited to their sources.

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### (3) Red Haze Flight Planning.

(a) OBSERVATION. By changing the target configuration for Red Haze coverage, a notable increase in time over the target area and a saving of fuel and film were achieved.

(b) EVALUATION. Prior to allied cross-border operations, the normal target configuration for Red Haze coverage was 20 km by 30 km. During operations into Cambodia, this configuration was changed to a strip 10 km by 100 km. By reducing the maneuvering required in turning, the new configuration provided a 400 square kilometer coverage increase per target and permitted a more efficient use of fuel and film.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That, when possible, a 10 km by 100 km target configuration be used for Red Haze coverage.

### (4) Duffel Bag/Tight Jaw.

(a) OBSERVATION. Information derived from airborne and unattended ground sensors can be more thoroughly analyzed at corps and division level when all elements charged with monitoring sensor work in a single section.

(b) EVALUATION. In the past, the Duffel Bag/Tight Jaw program of II Field Force was directed by the G2 Operations Division. The program was recently put under the direction of the G2 Air Division where results can be interpreted in light of indications from other type sensor. The current arrangement physically located the Duffel Bag monitoring personnel with those monitoring results from other sensor programs. A better coordinated effort using SLAR, Red Haze, photography and unattended ground sensors has resulted. This combined sensor effort affords a much greater basis for evaluation of information gained.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That a single staff division at corps and division level be responsible for integrating all sensor derived information.

### (5) Photographic Coverage.

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been and continues to be standard procedure for requesting units to accept priorities III and IV aerial photography only if 85% of the target was covered.

(b) EVALUATION. This practice is valid for most geographical areas, but not for areas having a tropical monsoon season. In some cases the

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aircraft starts to photograph an area in good weather but cannot complete it because bad weather sets in; the target is considered incompletely covered because the percentage of target area covered does not meet the 85% criteria. The target must then be rescheduled and reflight with a possible recurrence of the weather problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.

1 That the 85% criteria for completion be reduced to 50% with provisions that the initiating unit can reorder photography of that portion of the area which was not covered.

2 That a criteria for smaller target size be prescribed during monsoon seasons.

c. Operations

(1) Security of military outposts.

(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy is capable of capitalizing on outposts made vulnerable to attacks by the lack of competent leadership.

(b) EVALUATION. On 1 June 1970, a VC platoon under the cover of a mortar attack infiltrated an RF outpost. The VC were undetected as they disarmed claymore mines and booby traps. One claymore was located ten meters from a guard post. Once inside the outpost, the VC fired B40 rockets and threw satchel charges and grenades into the command bunker and perimeter fighting positions. The RF unit, assisted by artillery, managed to rout the VC. Although the RF lost one KIA to ten for the VC, the lack of early warning and an alert perimeter guard system allowed the VC to enter the outpost undetected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That continued emphasis, by both US and GVN, be given to the proper methods of maintaining perimeter security. Aggressive leadership demanding alert perimeter security would have prevented the undetected infiltration of this outpost.

(2) Automatic claymore mine in an economy of force role.

(a) OBSERVATION. Proper selection of ambush sites utilizing the automatic claymore provide early warning while reducing the manned ambush requirements. This weapon system is especially good for use by RF and PF forces.

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(b) EVALUATION. On 17 May 1970, an RF company commander acting on intelligence established 40 separate automatic claymore ambush positions along a suspected VC infiltration route. The first ambush was triggered at 0300 hours, 18 May, followed shortly by two more ambush detonations. Inspection of the ambush sites revealed 5 VC KIA without a friendly loss.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That emphasis be given to the use of the automatic claymore mine ambush, especially by Territorial Forces. This type ambush will provide excellent early warning of possible attacks while reducing the requirements for manned ambush.

## (3) Air Support

(a) COORDINATION. II FFORCEV has initiated several operations in which B-52 strikes, TAC air and high yield conventional munitions (Command Vault) followed by airborne assaults and low level helicopter visual reconnaissance have been used to destroy and exploit enemy base areas. The complexity of the air operation and integration of artillery fires require detailed planning and flexible centralized control to keep continuous pressure on the enemy forces. Approximately 48 hours lead time is required by Headquarters, II FFORCEV to obtain and coordinate the required support.

(b) EVALUATION. The sequence, timing, and amount of support varied with each operation, but through experience some general guidelines have been established.

1. Brigade level staffs generally lack the knowledge and experience to fully plan and coordinate this type operation and need assistance from the G3 Air and ALO staffs at division or corps level. The brigade is the lowest level at which the operation can be effectively controlled.

2. B-52 target clearance should be for large areas and over a period of several weeks for both security reasons and to give flexibility to the timing and precise location of the operation.

3. B-52 strike follow-up with TAC Air and cluster bomb units gives excellent effective coverage of the B-52 targets and deters movement out of the strike area. A flight of four A-1J's with CEU-25's making a single pass the length of the target area has proved very successful for this follow-up strike. A ceiling of 1500 feet and visibility of three miles are minimum weather conditions for the strike.

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4 Commando Vault system employment time is restricted by the controlling radar which also controls the B-52 strikes. Last B-52 strike TOT plus 50 minutes is about the soonest a Commando Vault target can be struck; a second target can be struck approximately 30 minutes later. Commando Vault targets should be planned on the periphery of the B-52 target boxes to preclude the target area from being cratered by the B-52 strike. When terrain permits, Commando Vault targets should allow inserted troops rapid access to that portion of the B-52 target area which appears most lucrative.

5 Artillery should be preplanned against hard targets and trails in the target area and must be closely coordinated with the air support. It can be fired during the Commando Vault employment since the delivery aircraft flies at 6000 to 10,000 feet. Deviations of up to 15 minutes from the planned TOT's of the air support can be expected and must be anticipated by artillery planners.

6 Two FAC aircraft may be advisable when following up more than one B-52 strike. FAC aircraft must have operational secure radios. A trained observer or second FAC in each aircraft is often useful.

7 Air traffic control particularly during the B-52 strike and the Commando Vault employment, both of which require a 10 nautical mile separation, is very important. A stray aircraft in the target area can cause a Commando Vault or B-52 strike abort. The fighter rendezvous must be outside the 10 nautical mile safety distance.

8 Sufficient flyable lift helicopters must be made available to rapidly exploit the strike results. In two operations, mechanical difficulties experienced by supporting lift helicopters delayed insertions by more than one hour.

9 The air cavalry troop is an excellent organization for conducting the low level visual reconnaissance of the target area. Its organic aero rifle platoon can often be used for rapid exploitation by insertion into small LZ's created by the B-52 strike. These insertions can normally be supported by troops and indirect fire from the large LZ's created by the Commando Vault employment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to standardizing this type of operation since it allows the flexible employment of massive firepower and ground follow-up against the most remote and heavily fortified base areas.

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(4) RVNAF Personnel in AASWCC's

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a need to incorporate RVNAF personnel in Artillery and Air Strike Warning Control Centers (AASWCC's).

(b) EVALUATION. Current and proposed withdrawals will greatly reduce the number of personnel available to operate AASWCC's in MR 3. The AASWCC's must continue to operate to provide the necessary safety precautions for aircraft. The inclusion of RVNAF personnel in the operations of the AASWCC's would alleviate the strain on US personnel resources, and insure the continued operation of AASWCC's after US troops have been withdrawn.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That RVNAF personnel be incorporated into AASWCC's.

d. Organization. None

e. Training. None

f. Logistics

(1) Disposal of Real Property Facilities

(a) OBSERVATION. Base camps which have property in excess of minor base requirements, yet not recorded on real property records, still require submission of a Proposed Property Transfer Plan (MACDC-13) to initiate disposal action.

(b) EVALUATION. Appendix 1 to USAFV Regulation 700-26 requires the submission of the MACDC-13, but contains no further guidance on the type of preparation of documentation necessary to transfer each structural facility.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a provision be added to USAFV Regulation 700-26 to permit transfers by means of a single document which would list all property transferred by type, date, gaining agency and intended use.

(2) Requisitioning Objective (RO) Supply Management Concept

(a) OBSERVATION. The decline of program commodity stock receipts, which began in early May, continued through June. Curtailed deliveries

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during May were attributable to utilization of available Central Logistics Agency transport equipment for deliveries to MR 1 for the care of refugees generated by operations in Cambodia. The Thu Duc warehouse complex labor strike, which started on 26 May and ended 30 June, prevented the issue and/or delivery of any commodities except small quantities stored elsewhere in Saigon. Thus Military Region 3 provincial supply depots sustained operations without significant supply receipt during a 60-day period. During late May, a few MR 3 province depots reached 15-day safety-levels of some commodity stocks, however, prudent belt-tightening by the GVN Province Accountable Officers prevented premature exhaustion of stocks.

(b) EVALUATION. This experience has served to graphically demonstrate to responsible GVN officials the adequacy of stock level management under the RO concept and to point out the need for close adherence to established operating procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

g. Communications. None

h. Material.

(1) Double Video

(a) OBSERVATION. Several radar sets incurred double video during normal operation, and no video or noise during ring time check.

(b) EVALUATION. This caused difficulty in detecting targets, and created excessive mechanical deadline rates.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. In troubleshooting on the AN/MPQ-4A GSR, check initially for defective IF amplifier.

(2) Double Sweep on A Scope of AN/TPS-25A GSR

(a) OBSERVATION. At minimum range, some radars obtained double sweep on the A scope and excessive static from loud speaker. As range was increased, the lower sweep compressed and moved to the right.

(b) EVALUATION. Double sweep and excessive noise created conditions which made description and location of targets impossible.

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AVFEC-RE

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** Check out modulator cable. Frequent cause of this malfunction is an open shield on (W2803) modulator cable.

(3) **Immovable Servos.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** None of the servos on AN/TPS-25A GSR will move.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Immovable servos were caused by plotting board tape shorted to 28 VAC line.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** This should cause F1005 to burn out. If the fuse is replaced two or three times, without sufficient time lapse, transformer T809 will burn out. The servos should be closely monitored to preclude excessive radar mechanical down time.

(4) **CPDC Road and Bridge Inspections**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** All CPDC road and bridge projects in MR 3 require inspection and approval in materials and construction before the Public Works or private contractor is issued the funds.

(b) **EVALUATION.** The inspection committee consists of representatives from MR 3, CGRDS Engineering, and the Northern District Engineer. The governing factors are specifications prepared and issued to the contractor for material quality control through field testing and inspection. It is of extreme importance to provide the best quality materials throughout all road and bridge construction projects. The methods of inspection are not sophisticated and are truly field expedient. Consideration should be given to provide certain laboratory controls in material. Many simple tests can be performed which can determine the suitability of laterite or rock from certain areas. Also, the CPDC council should, when allotting money for materials, project the possible increase in cost of material at the time of purchase and not on present prices. This increase in price hurts the contractor and possibly breeds dishonesty in material quality, quantity and job workmanship.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1 The increasing potential of Public Works and private contractors require strict and standard quality control. Laboratory and field inspection procedures are necessary to provide for higher quality and longer life roads and bridges.

2 A step to achieve better quality in materials is for CPDC to more strongly consider inflationary price rises when funding a project.

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AVFEC-RE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (32) (U)

1. Psychological Operations

(1) Decentralizing PSYOP capabilities.

(a) OBSERVATION. Limited planning time combined with tight security requirements made it difficult to anticipate the need for additional PSYOP resources to support operations in Cambodia, and to coordinate or pass these requirements to higher headquarters. Only the availability and maximum use of one press at the 1st Cav Div HQ made it possible to complete the preparation and printing of the initial leaflets, since the 6th PSYOP Bn's printing presses were being moved to a new location at the end of April.

(b) EVALUATION. The previous decision to move one press to the 1st Cav Div HQ was sound. It not only provided the division a quick-reaction capability but also served as a back-up for the main printing capability of the 6th PSYOP Bn.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The policy of maintaining a limited printing capability at division level should be continued.

(2) Intelligence on the enemy and the civilian populace for PSYOP

(a) OBSERVATION. The lack of information on the possible enemy reaction to the Cambodian operation led to a greater concentration of PSYOP effort in direct support of tactical operations than may have been necessary. Due to the lack of information on the civilian population, the initial leaflets in support of civil affairs were developed on a trial-and-error basis.

(b) EVALUATION. Effective PSYOP support depends upon timely and accurate intelligence. The lack of intelligence in connection with Cambodian operations hindered the PSYOP exploitation of the situation in Cambodia during the initial phase of the campaign.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. G5 elements should be brought into the planning cycle early enough to compile and analyze intelligence and background information upon which PSYOP action in support of the tactical plan could be based.

(3) Inadequacy of province PSYOP resources

(a) OBSERVATION. PSYOP machinery at the province level is inadequate to carry the PSYOP/Information load without back-up support from US or ARVN units.

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AVPBC-15

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RGS CSFGR - 65 (P2) (U)

(b) EVALUATION. With ARVN forces moving to the periphery of the Corps area and future redeployment of US troops planned, new efforts are required to strengthen province PSYOP/Information agencies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. US forces should make provisions to maintain back-up support while the Vietnamese capability is improved.

(4) Improper utilization of PSYOP resources

(a) OBSERVATION. In several instances units requested additional HB and HE teams without properly analyzing the actual need and method of employment for these teams.

(b) EVALUATION. Experience during the Cambodian operation points out that the employment and use of PSYOP field teams is not understood and appreciated at battalion and company level.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The proper use of PSYOP teams and organic PSYOP equipment at lower unit level should be given additional emphasis.

### 3. Civil Affairs

(1) Civil affairs guidance for operations in new areas

(a) OBSERVATION. Many problems arise during operations in new areas which could be avoided if civil affairs personnel participate in the initial planning.

(b) EVALUATION. The operations order should include a civil affairs annex to provide guidance on such topics as civil affairs unit employment, collection of demographic data, handling of refugees, solatium payments, medical care for civilians, and control and distribution of food.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That civil affairs personnel be included in the early stages of planning for operations which have a potential civil affairs impact.

(2) Control and accounting for local nationals evacuated through US medical facilities.

(a) OBSERVATION. Several instances occurred during the Cambodian operation in which families were separated in the rush to obtain adequate medical care for wounded indigenous personnel. Following initial emergency treatment at US facility, the patient would be moved to the nearest

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AVFBC-RD

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

GVN hospital. After the patient leaves US control it is difficult to maintain accountability, although there is an implicit responsibility to do so. Starting on an ad hoc basis to reunite certain family groups, US personnel gradually began a systematic check of hospitals.

(b) EVALUATION. MACV advisors and civil affairs personnel should assist in maintaining accountability for local nationals transferred from a US medical facility to a GVN hospital by making regular, periodic checks to identify patients; take their pictures, determine where they are from, names of their relatives, when they are to be released, and their desired destination following release from the hospital.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a system of controls be established during large operations which provides for periodic checks of GVN hospitals by province and district advisory personnel and civil affairs teams to assist in accounting for indigenous personnel who have been evacuated through US channels and subsequently placed in GVN hospitals.

(3) Priorities assigned to civil affairs operations

(a) OBSERVATION. Units operation in the field tend to place a low priority on civil affairs operations, especially those which require security or other support from operational units. This makes it difficult to organize any civil affairs operations other than MEDCAL.


(b) EVALUATION. Many tactical commanders are reluctant to provide operational support for civil affairs activities. More emphasis on civil affairs by commanders at each level of command would insure that civil affairs operations receive the attention appropriate to their importance in facilitating tactical operations and in realizing National objectives.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That civil affairs operations be actively supported by unit commanders at all levels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

15 Incl

1. II FFORCEV Order of Battle .
2. II FFORCEV Troop List
3. II FFORCEV Area of Operations

  
W.C. BARTEL, JR.  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVFBC-RE

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for  
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U)

4. Close Air Support
5. B-52 Strikes
6. Aviation Statistics
7. C130/C123/C7A Sorties
8. Enemy Organization in MR 3
9. Disposition of Enemy Forces
10. Location of Heavy Artillery Units
11. Heavy Artillery Coverage
12. AN/MPQ - 1A Countermortar Radar Effectiveness
13. Location of AN/MPQ - 1A Countermortar Radar
14. Location of AN/TFS - 25A Ground Surveillance Radar
15. II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report-Cambodian Operations

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ACofS, G5 II FFORCEV - 1  
DEFCORDS - 1  
CDC LHO - 6  
CO, 7th Hist Det - 2

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AVHCC-DST (14 Aug 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 1 SEP 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOD-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, II  
Field Force Vietnam.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Assignment of Field Grade Officers  
with a Civil Engineering Degree and Experience as Advisors," page 59,  
paragraph 2a: concur. While it is desirable to have advisors with the  
qualifications mentioned above, their availability to fill advisor positions  
is extremely limited. Action by DA is recommended.

b. The items concerning "Security Procedures," page 59, paragraph  
2b(1); "Exploitation of Interrogation Reports," page 60, paragraph  
2b(2); "Red Haze Flight Planning," page 61, paragraph 2b(3); "DUFFEL  
BAG/TIGHT JAW," page 61, paragraph 2b(4) and "Photographic Coverage"  
page 61, paragraph 2b(5) have been extracted and will be considered for  
possible inclusion in the next issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

c. Reference item concerning "Disposal of Real Property Facilities,"  
page 65, paragraph 2F(1): nonconcur. MACV Directive 735-3 and USARV  
Regulation 700-26 gives specific guidance on procedures to be used in  
transfer of facilities. The method used is to document disposal of  
real and related property (whether or not recorded on real property records)  
on DD Form 1354. This Form has a list of all real and related property  
to be transferred. To properly control and account for all real and  
related property transferred it must be documented on DD Form 1354. The  
DD Form 1354 can be used as a single document. When more than one DD  
Form 1354 is required they will be stapled together and numbered consecutively.  
Signature blocks will be removed from all but the last DD Form 1354,  
since it is the only one requiring a signature. There is no need to  
add the recommended provision to USARV Reg 700-26. Unit has been so  
advised.

d. Reference item concerning "Decentralization PSYOP Capabilities,"  
page 66, paragraph 1(1): concur. Authorization currently exists which  
provides the divisions this equipment. Unit has been so advised.

AWPC-BST (14 Aug 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65-(R2)(U)

e. Reference item concerning "Intelligence in the enemy and civilian populace for PSYOP," page 68, paragraph 1(2): concur. Policies and guidance are contained in DA Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. Application and coordination of this recommendation can be handled by local commanders. Unit has been so advised.

f. Reference item concerning "Inadequacy of province PSYOP resources," page 68, paragraph 1(3): concur. Provisions for supporting this recommendation are contained in existing plans. Unit has been so advised.

g. Reference item concerning "Improper utilization of PSYOP resources," page 69, paragraph 1(4): concur. The techniques and guidelines for employing PSYOP teams, are contained in DA Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. Application and coordination of this recommendation should be handled by local commanders. Unit has been so advised.

h. Reference item concerning "Civil affairs guidance for operations in new areas," page 69, paragraph 1(1): concur. Planning techniques and procedures are contained in FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Unit has been so advised.

i. Reference item concerning "Priorities assigned to civil affairs operations," page 70, paragraph 1(3): concur. Application of this recommendation should be handled by local commanders. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
II YFORCEV

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GPOR-DT (14 Aug 70) 2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force, Vietnam for Period  
Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96356 8 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comment: Reference paragraph 2a, page 59: Concur with Engineering Degree requirement as stated. However, with the current shortage of field grade engineer officers available for advisor assignments in the RVN, the above qualifications would be too restrictive to expect a reasonable "fill" ratio. It is felt instead, that a Corps of Engineers captain who has completed the Engineer Officer Advanced Course would have the necessary experience and training to effectively carry out the responsibilities of Province Engineer Advisor. These officers would generally have over four years of commissioned service and in most cases would have had a tour of duty with either a combat or a construction engineer battalion. Action by DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
L.D. CLINE  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

Cy furn:  
CG USARV

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UNIT	ORGANIZATION	SECTION	CODE	CONTINGENT NO.
II FORCES	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT051111	CONSPIRACY
1st Cav Div (AM)	BIEN HOA	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	II FORCES
1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT990130	1st Cav Div (AM)
1-5 Cav	LONG KHANH	NANCY	YT565384	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-12 Cav	LONG KHANH	ODIN	YT562515	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-7 Cav	LONG KHANH	GARY OWEN	YT205546	1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	PHUOC LONG	BUTTONS	YU140070	1st Cav Div (AM)
1-8 Cav	PHUOC LONG	BETTY	YU245288	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-12 Cav	PHUOC LONG	JEANNE	YU588178	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
5-7 Cav	PHUOC LONG	SHUFFY	YU337362	2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT820910	1st Cav Div (AM)
2-5 Cav	PHUOC LONG	FT. GRANITE	XU928082	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-8 Cav	PHUOC LONG	BO DUC	XU955268	3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT968490	1st Cav Div (AM)
1-7 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-19 Arty	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT990130	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
2-20 Arty (ARA)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT968490	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-21 Arty (105T)	BINH LONG	QUAN LOI	XT815905	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-30 Arty	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT972492	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-77 Arty (105T)	PHUOC LONG	BUTTONS	YU140070	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
E-82 Arty (AVN)	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT968490	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
1-9 Cav	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT967490	1st Cav Div (AM)
8th Engr	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT954488	1st Cav Div (AM)
11th Avn Gp	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	1st Cav Div (AM)
11th GS Co	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
227th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
228th Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT962500	11th Avn Gp
229th Avn Bn	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT158513	11th Avn Gp
13th Sig Bn	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT965486	1st Cav Div (AM)
Co H (RANGER) 75th Inf	BINH DUONG	PHUOC VINH	XT966492	1st Cav Div (AM)
11th ACR (Sep)(-)	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	II FFORCEV
1-11th ACR	BIEN HOA	HENDERSON	YT185126	11th ACR
2-11th ACR	BIEN DUONG	VICTORY	XT896317	11th ACR
3-11th ACR	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	11th ACR
Air Cav Trp	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	11th ACR
919th Engr Co	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	11th ACR
25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT65015	II FFORCEV
1st Bde, 25th Inf Div	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT165515	25th Inf Div
Provisional Co	TAY NINH	NUI BA DEN	XT283582	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-12 Inf	TAY NINH	WARRIOR	XT413664	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-22 Inf (Mech)	TAY NINH	DENNY	XT336894	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL Hq</u>
2-34 Armor (-)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT165515	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-60 Inf	TAY NINH	ELOISE	XT535813	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
4-9 Inf	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT165515	1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
2d Bde, 25th Inf Div	PHUOC TUY	LYNCH	YS460635	25th Inf Div
1-27 Inf	LONG KHANH	HOOTER	YS650912	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1-5 Inf (Mech)	LONG KHANH	SCHWARTZ	YS397994	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
4-23d Inf (Mech)	PHUOC TUY	LYNCH	YS447865	2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
3d Bde, 25th Inf Div	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	25th Inf Div
2-14 Inf	BIEN DUONG	DAU TIENG	XT490473	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
2-27 Inf	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650155	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
3-22 Inf	BINH DUONG	KIEN	XT521416	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
3-4 Cav	TAY NINH	WOOD	XT442345	3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
25th Inf Div Arty	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
1-8th Arty (105T)	LONG KHANH	CP LYNCH	YS457835	25th Inf Div Arty
7-11th Arty (105T)	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT158524	25th Inf Div Arty
3-13th Arty (155/8" SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650150	25th Inf Div Arty
2-77th Arty (105T)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT650150	25th Inf Div Arty
25th Avn Gp	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
65th Engr	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
125th Sig	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
Co F (RANGER) 75th Inf	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	25th Inf Div
3d Bde, 9th Inf Div	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS552640	25th Inf Div
2-47 Inf	BIEN HOA	NHON TRACH	YS112828	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
5-60 Inf	LONG AN	BIEN PHUOC	XS609552	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
6-31st Inf	LONG AN	CP KEATON	XS635766	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
2-4th Arty (105T)	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS550653	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
B-Trp, 3-17th ACS	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
Co E (RANGER) 75th Inf	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS550653	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
571st Engr Co	LONG AN	TAN AN	XS527655	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
199th Inf Bde (3cp)	LONG KHANH	GIA RAY	YT626115	II FFORCEV
2-3 Inf	LONG KHANH	GIA RAY	YT626115	199th Inf Bde
3-7 Inf	BINH TUY	RIVERA	YS990838	199th Inf Bde
4-12 Inf	BINH TUY	DAT	YT732340	199th Inf Bde
5-12 Inf	BINH TUY	DEEBLE	YT950263	199th Inf Bde
D-17 Cav	LONG KHANH	GIA RAY	YT626115	199th Inf Bde
2-40th Arty (105T)	LONG KHANH	GIA RAY	YT626115	199th Inf Bde
Co M (RANGER) 75th Inf	LONG KHANH	GIA RAY	YT626115	199th Inf Bde
87th Engr Co	LONG KHANH	GIA RAY	YT626115	199th Inf Bde
HQ, II FFORCEV Arty	BIEN HAO	LONG BINH	YT051112	II FFORCEV

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
5-2d Arty (40mm AWSP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	II FFORCEV Arty
D-71st Arty (MG)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty
I-29th Arty (SLT)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT128114	5-2d Arty
7-3th Arty (8"/175 SP)	BIEN HOA	ECHO	YT024154	II FFORCEV Arty
6-27th Arty (8"/175 SP)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT850150	II FFORCEV Arty
2-32d Arty (8"/175 SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	II FFORCEV Arty
Hq, 23d Arty Gp	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT867162	II FFORCEV Arty
2-12th Arty (155T)	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	23d Arty Gp
1-27th Arty (155 SP)	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT655150	23d Arty Gp
2-35th Arty (155 SP)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT093127	23d Arty Gp
5-42d Arty (155T)	BIEN HOA	CAMP PRICE	YT047118	23d Arty Gp
213th Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
12th Cbt Avn Gp	BIEN HOA	LONG BIEN	YT059118	II FFORCEV
11th Cbt Avn Bn	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860158	12th Cbt Avn Gp
128th Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
173d Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	LAI KHE	XT780380	11th Cbt Avn Bn
205th Aslt Spt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT860159	11th Cbt Avn An
145th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT995102	12th Cbt Avn Gp
68th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT988129	145th Cbt Avn Bn

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL NO</u>
113th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	XT390128	145th Cbt Avn Bn
130th Aslt Hel Co	BINH DUONG	BIEN HOA	XT390128	145th Cbt Avn Bn
334th Armd Hel Co	BIEN HOA	PHU LOI	XT360159	145th Cbt Avn Bn
210th Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	12th Cbt Avn Gp
25th Avn Co (Corps)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050105	210th Cbt Avn Bn
54th Util Apl Co	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	210th Cbt Avn Bn
73d Surv Apl Co	BIEN HOA	LONG THANH	YS147990	165th Avn Gp
74th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT865155	210th Cbt Avn Bn
134th Recon Apl Co	BINH DUONG	PHU LOI	XT862160	210th Cbt Avn Bn
222d Cbt Avn Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YS145982	12th Cbt Avn Gp
117th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT068113	222d Cbt Avn Bn
195th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	222d Cbt Avn Bn
240th Aslt Hel Co	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YS145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
273d Aslt Hel Co (Hvy)	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT065112	222d Cbt Avn Bn
269th Cbt Avn Bn	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT656157	12th Cbt Avn Gp
187th Aslt Hel Co	TAY NINH	TAY NINH	XT178521	269th Cbt Avn Bn
242d Aslt Spt Hel Co	HAU NGHIA	CU CHI	XT662152	269th Cbt Avn Gp
3d Sqdn 17th Air Air Cav	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	12th Cbt Avn Gp
A Trp, 3-17th ACS	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	DFAC
D Trp, 3-17th ACS	BIEN HOA	DI AN	XT905065	3-17th ACS
53d Sig Bn	BIEN HOA	LONG BINH	YT050110	II FFORGEV

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
Co A, 5th SFGA	BIEN HOA	BIEN HOA	YT007123	II FFORCEV
CMAT	CIA DINH	SAIGON	XS847915	II FFORCEV
RTAVF HQ	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	II FFORCEV
1st Bde HQ	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	RTAVF
1/1 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	GREY	YS208933	1st Bde RTAVF
1/2 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	1st Bde RTAVF
1/3 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	RTAVF
2d Bde HQ	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	RTAVF
2/1 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	PIONEER	YS272861	2d Bde, RTAVF
2/2 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	EXODUS	YS213850	2d Bde, RTAVF
2/3 Inf Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165005	RTAVF
RTAVF Div Arty	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165000	RTAVF
1st 105mm Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT167007	Div Arty RTAVF
2d 105mm Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT166002	Div Arty RTAVF
4th 155mm Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT166005	Div Arty RTAVF
Cav Sqdn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT165007	RTAVF
Sig Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT162998	RTAVF
Engr Bn	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT161006	RTAVF
Lt Avn Co	BIEN HOA	BEARCAT	YT154015	RTAVF
HQ 1st ATF (Sep)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	II FFORCEV
2d RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	HQ 1st ATF
7th RAR	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	HQ 1st ATF

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>SECTION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
8th Bn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433667	HQ 1st ATF
1st SAS Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS436676	HQ 1st ATF
A Sqdn 1st Arm Bn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS445664	HQ 1st ATF
B Sqdn 3d Cav Bn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS429669	HQ 1st ATF
1st FD Bn RAA (105 FK)	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
1st FD Sqdn RAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS437665	HQ 1st ATF
17 Const Sqdn RAE	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433680	HQ 1st ATF
104 Sig Sqdn	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS433668	HQ 1st ATF
161 (Indep) Recce FLT	PHUOC TUY	NUI DAT	YS443682	HQ 1st ATF

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As of 31 July 1970

OPCOM UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1st Cav Div. (AM)	26 Oct 68	Phuoc Vinh
25th Inf Div	22 Mar 66	Cu Chi
CMAT	25 Mar 70	Saigon
3d Bde, 9th Inf Div	26 Jul 69	Tan An
199th Inf Bde (SEP) (LT)	10 Dec 66	Cp Frenzell-Jones
1st ATP	24 May 66	Kui Dat
RTAVF	22 Jul 68	Beacat
12th Avn Co	15 Mar 66	Long Binh
6th PSYOP Bn	6 Dec 66	Bien Hoa
Co A, 5th SFG	17 Jan 66	Bien Hoa
3d Sqdn, 17th Air Cav	1 Dec 69	Di An

TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	Long Binh
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ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	Long Binh
HHC, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	Long Binh
HHC, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	Long Binh
2d Co Co	7 Dec 66	Long Binh
5th Bn, 2d Arty (AWSP)	5 Feb 70	Long Binh
7th Mil Hist Det	1 Jun 66	Long Binh
9th Trans Co (CAR)	23 Aug 66	Long Binh
16th PI Det	4 Jun 66	Long Binh
16th Sig Det	18 May 66	Long Binh
23d Arty GP	5 Feb 70	Phu Loi
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	Long Binh
44th APU	1 Oct 66	Long Binh
53d Sig Bn (CORPS)	4 Jun 66	Long Binh
D Btry, 71st Arty (AW)	5 Feb 70	Long Binh
219th MI Det	20 May 66	Long Binh
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	Long Binh
552d MP Co	23 Sep 66	Long Binh
I Btry, 29th Arty (SLT)	27 Mar 67	Long Binh
7th Bn, 8th Arty	17 Oct 69	Bien Hoa
2d Bn, 32d Arty	17 Oct 69	Cu Chi
6th Bn, 27th Arty	17 Oct 69	Phu Loi

ATTACHED UNITS

11th ACR	20 Jun 68	Di An
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	Long Binh
303d MR Bn	8 Jun 66	Long Binh
101st MR Co	1 Apr 70	Long Binh

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**STATISTICAL SUMMARY**  
**CLOSE AIR SUPPORT**  
 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1970

1. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in III MR and adjacent Cambodia by:

	Subtotal	Total
USAF/RAAF	8387	
VNAF	2763	11,150

2. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of III MR Forces by:

USAF/RAAF	1164	
VNAF	2700	3864

3. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of II FFG/CEV OP ON Units by:

USAF/RAAF	7223	
VNAF	63	7286

4. (C) Distribution of FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of:

III MR Forces	3864	
25th Inf Div	2673	
1st Cav Div (AM)	2694	
RTAFV	196	
1st ATF	354	
199th LTB	372	
3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div	386	
11th ACR	611	11,150

5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat Sky Spot) Sorties in Support of:

III MR Forces:	32	
25th Inf Div	55	
1st Cav Div (AM)	159	
1st ATF	13	
199th LTB	12	
11th ACR	3	274

6. (C) Results (As Reported by USAF FAC's to III MACS)

KBA (Body Count)	708
KBA (Estimated)	349
Structures (Destroyed)	2930
Structures (Damaged)	448
Bunkers (Destroyed)	7707
Bunkers (Damaged)	2137
Sampans (Destroyed)	6
Sampans (Damaged)	0

Close Air Support was fully adequate for the period 1 May - 31 July 1970.

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2-52 STRIPS IN III PR

1 May - 31 Jul 70

UNIT	DIEM HOI	DIEM DUONG	DIEM LONG	DIEM TAY	GIA DINH	HAU NGHIA	LONG AN	HONG KHANH	PHUOC LONG	PHUOC TUY	TAY NINH	QUANG NGU	CHAMROA	Total
1st Cav Div							1	12	4	1	17			37
25th Inf Div										15		82		97
199th Inf Bde							2							2
RNAV	1						1							2
1st ATB														0
III Corps												12		12
5th SFG														0
RACV												24		24
II 7FORCEV														0
TOTAL	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	12	0	19	1	237	274

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AVIATION STATISTICS

	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>
<u>ROTARY WING</u>			
HOURS	42,835	40,421	37,219
TROOPS LIFTED	174,250	170,106	151,919
TONS OF CARGO	31,173	26,247	15,730
<u>FIXED WING</u>			
HOURS	4,331	4,403	5,272
TROOPS LIFTED	3,043	3,350	3,694
TONS OF CARGO	154	177	189
<u>PERSONNEL</u>			
CREWMEMBERS MIA	20	14	31
CREWMEMBERS KIA	5	3	8
VC KBA	498	157	77

ROTARY WING TOTALS

HOURS	120,475
TROOPS LIFTED	496,265
TONS OF CARGO	73,150

FIXED WING TOTALS

HOURS	14,006
TROOPS LIFTED	10,087
TONS OF CARGO	519

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
USAF C130/C123/C7A SORTIES  
1 MAY 70 - 31 JUL 70


UNIT	TACTICAL EMERGENCY	EMERGENCY RESUPPLY	COMBAT ESSENTIAL	PRIORITY #1	TOTAL
1st Cav Div (AMBL)	97	71	1016	2164	3348
25th Inf Div	0	51	136	91	278
II FFORCEV Arty	0	23	111	580	714
5th SF GP	0	0	21	21	42
199th LIB	0	27	15	493	535
3rd MR	3	6	0	0	9
222nd Avn Bn	0	1	0	0	1
2nd CA Co	0	0	0	4	4
3/17th Air Cav Sqdn	0	0	1	12	13
31st Engr Bn	0	0	11	14	25
TOTAL	100	179	1311	3379	4969
TOTAL SHORT TONS:	41,710				
TOTAL PASSENGERS:	31,553				

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
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APPENDIX I (ORGANIZATION OF ENEMY COMBAT  
UNITS IN III MR) TO ANNEX A (STRENGTHS AND  
DISPOSITIONS) TO II FORCEV PENINTREP NO 31-70




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# II F FORCEV ORDER OF BATTLE



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LOCATION OF II FORCEV ARTILLERY UNITS AS OF 31 JULY 1970

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
II FORCEV Arty	Long Binh	YT 051111
HQ Btry, 7th Bn, 8th Arty	Bien Hoa	YT 023152
Btry A, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (2 tubes - 8")	FSB Horseshoe	YS 454621
(2 tubes - 175)	FSB Flower	IS 004984
Btry B, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (2 tubes - 8")	FSB Blue	XT 256289
(2 tubes - 175)	FSB Blue	XT 256289
Btry C, 7th Bn, 8th Arty (2 tubes - 8")	Blackhorse	YS 443978
(2 tubes - 175)	Blackhorse	YS 443978
HQ Btry, 6th Bn, 27th Arty	Phu Loi	XT 848190
Btry A, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (2 tubes - 8")	FSB Wade	XU 728087
(2 tubes - 175)	FSB Wade	XU 728087
Btry B, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (2 tubes - 8")	FSB Jeanne	YU 955178
(2 tubes - 175)	FSB Jeanne	YU 955178
Btry C, 6th Bn, 27th Arty (4 tubes - 175)	Bu Dap	XU 971288
HQ Btry, 2d Bn, 32d Arty	Cu Chi	XT 107157
Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (2 tubes - 8") (1 tube - 175)	Ben Soi	XT 087172
(1 tube - 175)	Lanyard	XT 075895
Btry B, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (2 tubes - 8")	FSB Beverly	XT 333902
(2 tubes - 175)	FSB Beverly	XT 333902
Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (2 tubes - 8")	Lanyard	XT 075895
(2 tubes - 175)	Lanyard	XT 075895

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11. EFFORTS TO ENLARGE AREA OF OPERATION;

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**DASHED LINES - 8" HOW**  
**SOLID LINES - 175 MM**

AL/ASG-11 OR EFFECTIVENESS (U)

UNIT	MONTH	TOTAL ATTACHES	TOTAL SIGHT	% OF SIGHT	ATPS OUT OF SECTOR	ATPS DURING OFF TIME	ATPS DURING MSTZ COMMENTS	TOTAL SIGHT	% OF SIGHT
1st CAV DIV	May	31	0	0.0%	11	0	1	13	0.0%
	Jun	16	2	12.5%	10	0	4	2	100%
	Jul	130	1	7.6%	12	0	0	1	100%
25th INF DIV	May	30	11	36.7%	11	4	1	17	44.7%
	Jun	19	1	5.2%	9	5	4	1	100%
	Jul	15	1	6.6%	10	2	1	2	100%
199th LIB	May	1	0	0.0%	1	0	0	0	N/A
	Jun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Jul	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1BSZ	May	4	0	0.0%	4	0	0	0	N/A
	Jun	5	1	20.0%	1	3	0	1	100%
	Jul	4	0	0.0%	2	2	0	0	N/A
234 GP	May	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Jun	8	1	12.5%	3	4	0	1	100%
	Jul	18	6	33.3%	8	3	1	1	100%

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
|| FORCE V || CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS

Location of "NIGHT" Club:

**CAMBODIA**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96206

AVFBC

31 July 1970

SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)

Commander  
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
APO 96222

1. (C) INTRODUCTION:

a. This report provides a summary of the "Cambodian Campaign" conducted by HQ, II FFORCEV, in conjunction with HQ, III Corps, during the period 29 April to 30 June 1970.

b. Operational Area:

(1) The area of operation extended from the Parrot's Beak, vicinity of the III and IV Military Region\* boundaries (XS3194), north along the Cambodian-GVN frontier, to the boundary between III and II Military Regions (YU4160).

(2) III Corps operations were conducted initially in the Angel's Wing (BA706) - Parrot's Beak (BA367) area and were later expanded to the west in the vicinity of Phnom Penh (VT7890), and to the northwest near Kompang Cham (WU5126).

(3) US operations were targeted against enemy base areas along the northwestern and northern tier of the Corps from Base Area 354 (WT9775), south of the Dog's Head, to the vicinity of O Rang (YU3464).

(4) Sketch map at Appendix 12 to Annex A graphically portrays US and GVN operational areas.

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\*Military Region - formerly Corps Tactical Zone.

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**AVFBC**

**SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations: (U)**

c. The abrupt change in the political posture of the Cambodian government, stemming from the removal of Prince Sihanouk as Head of State, and the announced plans of the new government to eliminate the Communist/NVA presence in Cambodia established the framework that permitted the GVN to conduct operations against enemy base areas which had long provided the enemy with a safe haven from which to launch offensive operations and to resupply his forces in the III Military Region.

d. In early March, the enemy gave every indication that he was being hard pressed to accomplish his basic objectives within III Military Region despite the recent withdrawal of the 1st Infantry Division from the Corps area. US forces were disposed throughout the Military Region participating in Dong Tien\* programs, upgrading territorial forces and conducting ground combat operations against enemy local and main force units primarily in the interior of the corps. Only minimal forces were deployed in the border areas.

e. At the time directives to initiate planning for operations in Cambodia were received, US and GVN forces were deploying in an effort to isolate and destroy the remaining enemy force elements and eliminate his infrastructure. US/GVN units had to be re-oriented, task organizations realigned and units displaced over considerable distances during a short period of intense preparation. The successful repositioning of major maneuver forces and control elements was facilitated by the improved combat capability of territorial forces to control key areas, with nominal assistance by regular ARVN reaction forces.

f. During the period 14-17 April, CG, III Corps, conducted a highly successful operation against enemy sanctuaries in the Angel's Wing in Cambodia.† A second operation of major proportion was initiated in the same general area on 29 April employing a sizeable combined arms force of cavalry, infantry, and rangers.

\*Dong Tien (Progress Together) - Program of close association of designated RVNAF forces with designated US/FWMAF forces on a continuing basis in specific areas.

†Operation Toan Thang 41

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**SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

g. In late March a staff representative discussed the feasibility of US and GVN combat operations in Cambodia at MACV headquarters. Two general areas were selected as the proposed operational objective areas: the Angel's Wing - Parrot's Beak Area of Cambodia (Base Areas 367 and 706) and the Fishhook (Base Area 352). Initial thinking visualized an operation of 14 to 30 days duration, with the possibility of staying longer in the event developments warranted further exploitation. A concept was proposed for forces from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), ARVN Abn Division, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to enter the Fishhook and elements of III Corps' newly formed mobile task forces to operate against the Angel's Wing - Parrot's Beak Area. 25th Infantry Division forces were proposed for operations in this latter area as an alternative plan.

h. On 24 April, CG, II FFORCEV, received instructions to be prepared to conduct military operations in Cambodia against base areas in the Fishhook. The attack in Cambodia was proposed to be launched within 72 hours following the decision. This was later shortened to 48 hours after permission was received to extend the planning down to brigade level. The original date for initiation of operations was 30 April. By direction from Washington, the attack was delayed 24 hours and US forces crossed the border on 1 May.

i. CG, III Corps, completed plans on 27 April to conduct operations in the Angel's Wing - Parrot's Beak area. This coordinated operation, Toan Thang 42, involved forces from III and IV Military Regions and commenced on 29 April.

j. The main objective of the US attack into Cambodia was to be the destruction of enemy facilities and the capture or destruction of enemy material. Additional enemy base areas were selected for attack: 350, north of Loc Ninh; 351, north of Bu Dop; 354, west of Trai Bi; and 707, north of Thien Ngon.

k. With the commitment of major forces to cross-border operations, force levels in the interior of the Corps Zone were considerably reduced. An economy of force concept was adopted with heavy reliance placed on territorial forces for security. The weakened condition of enemy forces

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**SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

throughout the III Military Region and the disruption of the enemy's command and control apparatus by the Cambodian operations contributed to his inability to mount significant attacks or threaten pacification.

l. The close hold nature of the initial plan for operations in Cambodia had the advantage of reducing the risk of compromise but at the same time precluded advanced coordination. Detailed plans were releasable only to key staff officers in the early stages of planning. Consequently, the execution phase initially required extensive, continuing command attention and coordination.

m. On 6 June, CG, II FFORCEV, issued planning guidance for accomplishment of withdrawal of US forces from Cambodia. This planning guidance provided for a transition phase into a posture desired for US forces in accordance with the newly promulgated wet season strategy. The withdrawal was successfully completed in accordance with the plan by 291800 June 1970. A special feature of withdrawal planning was the integrated air cavalry, artillery and tactical air offensive against enemy units and storage areas in the Fishhook. Air cavalry operations were launched on 25 June in coordination with planned and on-call tac air strikes and artillery concentrations against known and acquired enemy targets. Additionally, four to six B-52 strikes were flown daily in support of this destruction campaign.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

The enemy level of activity was low to moderate during the months preceding allied operations in Cambodia, with enemy forces within the corps area concentrating their efforts on countering pacification and the enemy divisions on the corps border engaging in sporadic attacks by fire against allied FSBs. 1 April marked a high point in enemy activity in the interior of the corps area as the enemy initiated phase one of Campaign "X". During the night of 31 March - 1 April, there were 56 enemy initiated ground incidents reported including ground probes and several heavy attacks by fire. This high point was followed during the month by other attacks by fire on allied installations and an increase in terrorist incidents in Saigon and other areas.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****AVFBC****SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

b. Prior to allied operations in Cambodia, three enemy divisions were deployed around the northern and northwestern border of the corps area. Early in April, the 9th VC Div moved south into an area that extended from the Dog's Neck to the Angel's Wing, and included the western portion of Tay Ninh (P). The apparent mission of the division was to conduct attacks against ARVN and US forces operating near the border. It appeared also that some elements of the division were targeted against Cambodian units to the west of the Angel's Wing. With the shift of the 9th VC Div, the 7th NVA Div moved from its old area in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces westward to the Fishhook area, presumably to take over the mission of the 9th VC Div. This westward shift of the 7th NVA Div and the 9th VC Div increased the area of operation of the 5th VC Div which then extended from the Binh Long/Phuoc Long boundary to the II Corps border. The mission of the division was to provide security for the 8th Rear Service Group and its base area along the Cambodian border, and to attack allied installations in Phuoc Long.

c. Immediately prior to cross-border operations, enemy activity in III Military Region increased as phase one of Campaign "X" was initiated. Campaign "X" was the enemy's primary task for 1970, and was a revitalized effort to achieve the goals of COSVN Resolution 9. This resolution emphasized psychological rather than military victories through attempts to discredit GVN control and pacification efforts, and cause increased political pressures for a US withdrawal from the war. The campaign was intended to create a significant change in the war, hopefully with violent and uninterrupted attacks as extensive and intense as those of the 1968 TET Offensive. A further discussion of the enemy situation in Cambodia to include an analysis of weather and terrain is contained in Annex B (Intelligence).

3. (C) MISSION: The mission assigned to US and GVN forces for the Cambodian Campaign was as follows: II FFORCEV, in conjunction with III Corps, conducts offensive operations in Cambodia to destroy VC/NVA installations and destroy and/or capture enemy equipment and supplies in Base Areas 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 367, 706, and 707 and adjacent areas; continue current operations and programs in remainder of III Military Region with available forces.

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**SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

**4. (C) EXECUTION:**

a. A resume of US and GVN combat operations conducted in Cambodia during the period 29 April through 30 June is included at Annex A. To provide a more complete understanding of the evaluation, Annex A should be read after completion of the basic report.

b. Annexes C through N provide a narrative summary of support provided by supporting forces and the various general staff sections.

c. Statistical results of each operation are outlined in Annexes O through S with a total US/GVN results tabulation at Annex T.

**d. Command and Control:**

(1) Liaison Teams. To insure timely processing of information, II FFORCEV established a liaison team with each major control headquarters: 1st Cavalry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and HQ II Corps Forward. Additionally, during the early stages of joint operations between III and IV Corps, US liaison was established at HQ, IV Corps. Liaison teams within III Corps were provided dedicated VHF and secure voice radio communication direct to the II FFORCEV TOC. A liaison officer from this HQ was also stationed at HQ, MAGV.

(2) Reporting of Information. Special reports were established to standardize and expedite processing of operational information. Two reports were required daily as of 0800 and 1600 hrs with a weekly wrap-up for each border operation submitted every Saturday. Units reporting were: 1st Cavalry Division, 25th Infantry Div, DSA, III Corps; Senior Advisor, ARVN Airborne Division; and Senior Advisor, 5th ARVN Division. Information reported included changes in task organization, number of GVN and US troops in Cambodia and RVN, narrative summary of the day's combat activity, statistical results for the period, cumulative totals for the operation, US support provided to RVNAF (tactical air, artillery, resupply, medical evacuation, and vehicle recovery), plans for the next 24-hours, and material denied the enemy.

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SUBJECT: II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodia Operations (U)

(3) II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center. To accommodate the heavy influx of data, additional officers were assigned as TOC desk officers for each of the reporting headquarters. These officers were responsible for processing spot reports, collating input data, preparing ledger sheets of operational results, reviewing future plans summaries, and assisting in preparation of the MACV operations summary report.

(4) Combat Areas in Specific Areas. II FFORCEV rules of engagement authorized an operational area to a maximum depth of 30 kilometers into Cambodia. Within this area, three zones were established for the conduct of specified combat activity.

(a) Area of Operation (AO) was the area assigned by CG, II FFORCEV, in which commanders would conduct the full range of combat operations. The amount of area allocated was varied to focus the efforts of the divisions in the border base areas. As area search progressed, AO's were expanded to provide for search of additional areas.

(b) Combat Reconnaissance Zone was the area adjacent to the AO in which commanders were authorized to employ air cavalry and observed or planned fires. However, division commanders were required to request permission to employ ground forces within this zone.

(c) Visual Reconnaissance Zone was the area extending beyond the Combat Reconnaissance Zone to the 30 kilometer limit. This area was intended primarily for early warning and for the conduct of visual reconnaissance and surveillance. This zone was designated to assure sufficient reaction to enemy activity. Late in the campaign, commanders were permitted to employ forces in this zone, subject to prior notification and approval of CG, II FFORCEV. (see Appendix 13 to Annex A)

(5) Support of GVN Operations in Cambodia.

(a) US advisory support was provided to ARVN units while they remained within the 30 kilometer limit. As their forces penetrated beyond this distance, US advisors were withdrawn.

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(b) US Army aircraft operating in the III Corps Cambodian AO were not permitted to cross the 30 kilometer limit, unless approved by CG, II FFORCEV, for cases of emergency. There were no cases in which this authority was required to be exercised and at no time did US Army aircraft exceed the 30 kilometer limit. With the exception of those aircraft committed to direct support missions of III Corps operations, all aircraft entering the III Corps AO were required to obtain permission from DSA, III Corps prior to crossing the Cambodian/RVN border.

(c) US artillery and engineer units committed to support of GVN Cambodian operations were restricted to operations within the 30 kilometer limit. Impact zones of artillery and other weapons systems were required to be within the 30 kilometer area.

**5. (C) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION:**

a. Vietnamese operations. General Tri's operations into the Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak area on 29 April 1970, came as no surprise to the enemy, insofar as anticipation of the attack was concerned. However, the enemy was taken by surprise by the depth and rapidity of the ARVN thrust and its sustained momentum. These operations demonstrated that ARVN commanders possess the professional skills and leadership qualities required to conduct aggressive combat independently. Their tactics were generally sound; however, problems developed in combined arms coordination, employment of mechanized and armored forces, use of supporting artillery and other fire support means, and first and second echelon maintenance. More effective use of resources was noted as the combined arms teams gained combat experience. US advisors contributed significantly to increased effectiveness of ARVN tactical units, although it should be noted that ARVN units operated successfully beyond the 30 kilometer limit.

**b. US Operations:**

(1) Commitment of US forces into Cambodia was a complete tactical surprise to the enemy. There was no initial resistance and US aircraft were able to move freely over the battlefield. It was not until about 14 May that the enemy was capable of demonstrating a semblance of organized

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resistance. However, strategic surprise was not achieved. Following the overthrow of Sihanouk, the enemy had acted to safeguard his base areas and supplies. As a consequence, an estimated 400-600 tons of supplies, mostly small arms and B-40 Rocket ammunition were removed from the border area.

(2) The enemy's strength in rear service areas had been grossly underestimated. It had been thought that in the contiguous base areas opposite III Military Region, the enemy had approximately 27,000 headquarters, administrative, and logistical personnel. Conservative estimates, based on captured documents, now reveal that the rear area strength was as high as 63,000.

(3) Additionally, US forces were not prepared for the difficulty experienced in locating enemy storage areas. Most cache sites were actually hidden in underground bunkers, deep in triple canopy jungle. There was no pattern to the location of depots and service activities. Some storage sites were adjacent to high-speed roads while others were situated in isolated jungle areas, accessible only by foot or bicycle paths. Many finds were made by using electronic/magnetic aids such as mine sweepers and probes. Also used effectively was a Navy-developed magnetic anomaly detector. This device was helicopter mounted and could detect small metal objects at an altitude of 250 feet. Approximately 10% of its sensings turned out to be caches.

### c. Overall Assessment:

(1) There has been considerable discussion about whether US operations in Cambodia provoked the Communist into wider operations of their own in that country. In May the Communists, through their propaganda, attempted to create the illusion that their activities in Cambodia were caused by our cross-border operations. Intelligence reports revealed that in late March and early April the VC/NVA initiated planning for operations to assert control in much larger areas of Cambodia, if not to induce the actual overthrow of the Lon Nol government. Prior to 1 May, elements of the 5th and 9th VC Divisions had already moved from their traditional base areas to new locations from which to threaten Cambodian population centers.

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(2) An assessment of the overall results of US and Vietnamese operations must be categorized into three principal areas.

(a) Quantitative evaluation. The vast amounts of weapons and tonnages of rice and ammunition may be totaled and compared to the number of enemy regiments or battalions that could be sustained. This, however, does not relate the true significance of the damage done to the enemy. The value of this impact must be measured in terms of the amount of resources, personnel, money and energy required to replace the material and equipment lost. Accordingly, as the enemy attempts to reconstruct this logistical foundation, there will be an operational pause of some degree in III Military Region. Deprived of resupply, those VC/NVA forces deployed in III MR will have difficulty sustaining an effective insurgency for the next 4 to 5 months.

(b) Command and control. The enemy command and control system has been placed under severe strain, his communications-liaison routes have been disrupted, and his base areas pre-empted. To regain tactical direction and control, he must relocate travel routes for resupply and infiltration and rebuild his base storage areas. Additionally, hospitals must be reestablished, headquarters installations constructed, and rest and training areas rebuilt. To accomplish these tasks while prosecuting operational objectives in Cambodia will require a concentration of resources and personnel that he probably can not afford.

(c) Psychological assessment. The Allied cross-border campaign created a psychological turmoil within the enemy's organizational structure. The number of Hoi Chanh substantially increased. Increasingly large numbers of political cadre rallied, some of high positions such as the deputy commander of SR-2 and various staff section chiefs at the VC sub-region and province level. There are reports that some NVA soldiers refused to fight and were sent to rear service units. Some tactical units avoided contact or lacked aggressiveness.

(3) The psychological effects of these cross-border operations impacted on the GVN at the highest levels, and on the RVNAF, the territorial forces and the people at the hamlet level. It is too soon for a

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complete evaluation, but significant consequences at all levels within Vietnam can be expected. The most immediate impact will probably occur among the people of hamlets located in the border provinces.

(4) Although the performance of ARVN was by no means of uniform excellence during the campaign, there was clear evidence of favorable progress. Regional and popular forces had to assume crucial responsibility for security of the people during the absence of a high percentage of US and ARVN maneuver forces. While these forces were not completely rested during this period, for the most part they reacted above expectations.

d. Outlook. A set of conditions has been created now that should not have been viewed as probable on 1 April. The major aim at this point is to take advantage of the opportunity to assure the success of the Vietnamization Program and guarantee the withdrawal of US forces in accordance with the President's timetable. US and GVN forces have gained an advantage over the enemy for the moment which must be thoroughly and aggressively exploited.

FOR THE COMMANDER.

  
GEORGE K. WEBB  
Colonel, GS  
Acting Chief of Staff

Annexes:

A - Summary of Operations	K - Air Force
B - Intelligence	L - Naval Operations
C - Personnel	M - III Corps Advisors Critique
D - Logistics	N - DEPCORDS
E - Civil Affairs/Civic Action	O - Results - Toan Thang 42
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**ANNEX A (Summary of Operations) to II FFORCEV Commander's  
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**1. (C) Toan Thang 42 (29 April - 22 July)**

a. On 29 April 1970, ARVN forces staging from Tay Ninh City and the vicinity of Co Dau Ha initiated Phase I of Toan Thang 42 in Cambodia, northwest of the Angel's Wing. (See Appendix 1). TF 318 attacked south from Tay Ninh concurrent with two task forces attacking from the vicinity of Co Dau Ha. TF 225 and TF 333 initially encountered heavy resistance while TF 318 along HWY 1 experienced light and sporadic enemy contact. US support during this phase included gunship coordinators, gunships, command and control helicopters and artillery support.

b. During the period 2 - 6 May, III MR forces launched Phase II of Operation Toan Thang 42 in the Parrot's Beak of Cambodia in concert with three Combined Arms Teams from IV MR. (See Appendix 2). TF 225 and TF 333 attacked to the south from positions along HWY 1 while TF 318 secured HWY 1. Both task forces made heavy contact with enemy forces in newly prepared bunkers. On 3 May, TF 318 deployed forces to the west of Svay Rieng to assist Cambodian forces in the area. On 4 May, all elements began to reposition for a two-day maintenance standdown in preparation for the initiation of Phase III. On 5 May, three CIDG companies from Duc Hue and Tra Gu Special Forces Camps were deployed in the Parrot's Beak. During Phase II and subsequently until 30 June US support consisted of advisors, gunships, medevac, emergency resupply, and artillery. No support was rendered beyond the 30 kilometer limit.

c. Phase III began on 7 May with TF 225 attacking from Ben Soi, RVN, west along Highway 13 while TF 318 and TF 333 attacked to the north from the vicinity of Prasot and Chipu. (See Appendix 3). By midday, TF 225 engaged and overran enemy forces several kilometers inside Cambodia while TF 333 encountered only light resistance. TF 318 encountered heavy opposition initially which resulted in slow progress. There were over 150 enemy killed in this contact. On 9 May, TF 225 discovered a field hospital complex containing 200 beds, an operating room, and a considerable amount of medical supplies. During this phase, CIDG elements and three companies from 6th Battalion, 31 Infantry, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, were committed in the area of Parrot's Beak to prevent enemy reoccupation, to destroy remaining enemy forces and to search for enemy caches. The discovery of numerous caches in the area prompted the CG of III Corps to return one of his task forces to this area as part of Phase IV.

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d. Phase IV, 13-22 May, began when TF 318 initiated operations to the west along HWY 1. (See Appendix 4). Forces moving astride HWY 1 linked up with the elements of IV Corps at Trabek, thus opening a land LOC from RVN to the Mekong River. On 14 May, TF 333 had a significant contact that resulted in 48 enemy killed and 56 enemy captured. Interrogation identified the D-1 LF Battalion of Tay Ninh Province. On 17 May, TF 225 operating south of HWY 1 in the Parrot's Beak as mentioned above, made contact with a large enemy force with 26 enemy killed and 20 prisoners. Interrogation identified this enemy unit as the 3d Bn, 1st NVA Regiment. Two RF later-Company Groups assumed responsibility for securing HWY 1 between the border and Svay Rieng, releasing additional III Corps forces for mobile operations. On 20 May, elements of TF 333 made a heavy contact resulting in 9 enemy killed and 26 prisoners. Interrogation identified the 2d Bn, 271st Regt, 9th VC Division. TF 225 continued operations in the area south of HWY 1 and on 21 May, a contact resulted in 12 enemy KIA and 15 captured. One of the prisoners was subsequently identified as the Deputy Commander of the Forward Supply Council of SR-3.

e. On the morning of 23 May, Phase V of Toan Thang 42 operations was initiated against enemy forces in the Chup Rubber plantation area. (See Appendix 5). TF 333 moved west from Krek on Highway 7 against stiff resistance. A heavy contact with the 1st Bn, 272d Regiment resulted in 26 enemy KIA and 16 PW's, one of whom was identified as the Battalion Executive Officer. On 27 May, to the west of the Angel's Wing, the 216th RF Company engaged an enemy force from the 308th and D-16 Bns of SR-2, resulting in 31 enemy killed and 25 enemy captured. On 31 May, elements of the 706th RF Company operating in the southern portion of BA-706 killed 6 enemy and captured 14. In another contact on the 31st, elements of TF 225 operating west of the Angel's Wing killed 34 enemy and captured 2. Both prisoners were from the 308th Bn of SR-2. On 12 June, TF 318 moved to the vicinity of Krek, replacing a brigade of the 25th Inf Div. On the following day, TF 333 withdrew from Cambodia for standdown in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa Provinces. On 20 June TF 333 moved to Thien Ngan for subsequent deployment into Cambodia to assume the mission of TF 318 in the Krek area, releasing TF 318 to move west to conduct operations in the vicinity of the Chup Rubber Plantation. On 24 June, TF 318, reinforced with an additional combined arms team from TF 333, attacked south along Highway 15, with the mission of relieving enemy pressure around Prey Veng.

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1. Operation Toan Thang 42 continued into July after US support and advisors were withdrawn from Cambodia on 29 June. Phase V was terminated 30 June and Phase VI of Toan Thang 42 began on the following day.

2. (C) Toan Thang 43 (1 May - 30 June)

a. On 1 May, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) initiated operation Toan Thang 43 in the southern Fishhook area comprising portions of Base Areas 352 and 353. The attacking forces consisted of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (2/34 Armor and 2/47 Inf (Mech) from 25th Inf Div attached), 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 3d Brigade, ARVN Airborne Division. (See Appendix 6). The attack was preceded by B-52 strikes, followed by intensive tactical air strikes and an artillery preparation. Task Force Shoemaker was established on 30 April at Quan Loi as the control headquarters for the initial US cross-border operation. The 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division initially attacked to the northeast with two mechanized task forces as the 11th ACR attacked north into Base Area 352 with two squadrons. The 3d Airborne Brigade committed three battalions into Base Area 352 by heliborne air assault while the 1st ARVN ACR moved west from the vicinity of An Loc to attack into the Fishhook across the Tonle Cham River. On 2 May the 1st ARVN ACR linked up with the eastern-most airborne battalion. 3d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division, air assaulted an additional battalion to block along Route 79 and establish FSB X-Ray (XII 3501). Late in the afternoon of the 2d, elements of the mechanized task force operating on the west flank cut Highway 7 east of Mimot.

b. The scope of operation was expanded as an additional airmobile battalion was air assaulted into the area west of the Flat Iron to exploit a cache site and to establish FSB North. On 5 May, Task Force Shoemaker was dissolved and 1st Cav Div HQ assumed direct control of the operation utilizing its 1st and 3d Brigades, the 1st ARVN Abn Brigade, and the 11th ACR to control 13 committed maneuver battalions. On this date, the 11th ACR with two squadrons attacked north to Snuol, seizing the town after a series of sharp skirmishes that resulted in 150 enemy killed. In the first five days of the operation, numerous enemy caches containing weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and food-stuffs were seized. At this point over 600 enemy soldiers had been eliminated and several large storage and training areas had been located. The period 6-9 May was marked by the exploitation of many cache sites to include a major enemy storage area

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(XU5321) directly west of the Flat Iron which was promptly dubbed, "The City." Supporting engineers constructed a connecting road from Highway 13 to this area to facilitate overland evacuation of large quantities of weapons, material, and rice.

c. On 9 May the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, with three battalions, attacked into Base Area 707 southwest of Mimot against light and scattered resistance. This attack was extended on 11 May to exploit six B-52 strikes against elements of COSVN headquarters in a suspected location northwest of Mimot, vicinity XU1515. (See Appendix 7). The 11th ACR moved south of Snuol to provide security of Route 13 and provide flank protection for the 9th ARVN Regiment operating in Base Area 350 as part of operation Toan Thang 46 (paragraph 5 below). Enemy contacts were generally light with some enemy attacks against fire bases and night defensive positions. The number of attacks by fire rose as the enemy showed signs of reorganization. Beginning in mid-May, enemy resistance stiffened north of Highway 7 and in the Fishhook area. On 14 May a battalion of the 1st Cav Div was withdrawn from the operations to reinforce operations in Base Area 351. On 14 May the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division relieved the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cav Div in the area west of the Fishhook. The ARVN Airborne Division assumed control of operations in the Fishhook committing two additional battalions and a brigade HQ. (See Appendix 8). Enemy reaction to reconnaissance intensified at this time and attacks by fire increased in intensity against the ARVN Airborne Division.

d. On 21 May the 1st Cav Div deployed a brigade HQ and one infantry battalion to the vicinity of O Rang, north of Bu Dop. Also on 21 May, a squadron of the 11th ACR returned to regimental control as the 25th Inf Div inserted an additional battalion in the vicinity of Mimot. On 27 May, the 1st Cav Div withdrew its remaining battalion from Base Area 352 and committed it north of Bu Dop. ARVN Airborne units continued to encounter stiff enemy resistance throughout their AO. Meanwhile, the 25th Inf Div discovered numerous small weapons and ammunition caches, plus several large rice caches north and west of the Mimot area. On 10 June the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, began repositioning forces in RVN east of Base Area 354. Concurrently, ARVN III Corps units occupied the area west of Mimot and assumed a portion of the 25th Inf Div AO. On 14 June, the cavalry squadron of the 25th Infantry Division was placed in direct support of the ARVN Airborne Division as the division further expanded its area of operation into the area vacated by the 25th

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Infantry Division. The remaining elements of the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, moved back into RVN on 19 June. Concurrently, the 11th ACR (-) was placed OPCON to the division and tasked to secure land clearing operations.

e. On 4 June the 60th Land Clearing Company began tactical operations, clearing in the Fishhook region in conjunction with the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. On 14 June the 984th Land Clearing Company moved into an area south of the 50th. These two companies cleared 1,694 acres of heavy jungle and destroyed more than 800 heavily reinforced bunkers during the period through 26 June. Both companies encountered heavy enemy resistance, making 56 separate contacts during the time they were in the Fishhook.

f. Beginning 21 June, the ARVN Airborne Division began withdrawing elements of its 1st Brigade from the Fishhook area. Land clearing companies operating in the Fishhook terminated tactical cuts and completed withdrawal on 25 June. With the withdrawal of ground units from the Fishhook area, the 25th Infantry Division employed tactical air, B-52 strikes, air cavalry, and II FFV Artillery in an intensive effort to destroy enemy personnel, supplies, and facilities remaining in the area. Also during this period, CS-2 drops were conducted within Base Area 352 to temporarily deny enemy use of/or reoccupation of four key base complexes.

3. (C) Toan Thang 44 (6 May - 14 May) (See Appendix 9)

a. This operation was initiated on 6 May by the 1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division, employing four battalions in Base Area 354. The attack was preceded by tactical air strikes and an artillery preparation. One infantry battalion was combat assaulted into the center of the base area while one company of the battalion was inserted to secure a bridge site over the Rach Beng Go River (vic 968751). Two Commando Vault\* devices were employed to prepare landing zones for those two assaults. Air Cavalry elements screened to the west and ranged throughout the objective area. Initial enemy contacts were light and scattered. A float bridge was installed to permit two mechanized battalions to attack into the interior of the base area. One mechanized battalion attacked to the west, linked up and passed through the airhead of the infantry battalion, vicinity WT9275. The second mechanized force crossed the bridge and swept south along the west bank of the Rach Beng Go River. Extensive search operations were then initiated in the area.

\*Commando Vault - A USAF weapons system consisting of a 10,000 or 15,000 pound bomb, designed to create helicopter landing zones in dense jungle.

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b. Enemy contacts remained generally light and scattered. Enemy resistance was encountered only in the vicinity of cache sites and enemy base camps. Air cavalry elements had moderate success in finding and engaging small groups of the enemy in the open. The most significant ground contact occurred on the morning of 9 May when mechanized elements made contact with an estimated enemy platoon and killed 17.

c. All elements continued search activities until 14 May when the brigade was withdrawn east of the river. The operation was terminated late on the 14th and the brigade deployed to the north to assume a new AO in Base Area 353.

4. (C) Toan Thang 45 (6 May - 30 June) (See Appendix 10)

a. On 6 May the 1st Cav Div (AM) initiated its second cross-border operation. The 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div, air assaulted two battalions into Base Area 351 northeast of Bu Dop. At the outset, enemy resistance was light and scattered. An early evening contact on 7 May led to the initial discovery on 8 May of a very large ammunition and weapons storage area which became known as "Rock Island East." Supporting engineers had to open Route 14 so that overland evacuation of the captured material could be accomplished. Exploitation of this cache site required nine days. On 11 May an additional battalion of the 2d Bde was inserted to the northwest of Bu Gia Mang vicinity YU1352. Tactical air and air cavalry elements were employed against small convoys of vehicles and daylight troop movements to the north of Base Area 351. A fourth infantry battalion, 5-12 Inf (199th LIB), was committed to the operation on 12 May, occupying FSB Brown (YU0737), which had been vacated on 11 May by 5-7 Cav. That night FSB Brown was attacked by a large enemy force. A ground sweep the following day found 50 enemy dead while US forces suffered one killed and four wounded. At this point the 1st Cav Div had seven maneuver battalions committed to the operation. On 20 May the 1st Brigade air assaulted a battalion in the vicinity of O Rang (YU3663). Contacts throughout the 1st Cav Div AO continued to be light although numerous small weapons and munitions caches were found. During the third week in May, over 600 tons of rice were captured.

b. Division elements reacting to intelligence provided by Cambodian Army officers discovered several more cache sites. As ground elements approached these suspected sites, enemy resistance stiffened. The defenders were identified as elements of the 86th Rear Service Group. Late on the 24th, after several small contacts, ground reconnaissance

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elements once again reported finds of enemy material. During the next few days the units reported large quantities of enemy material ranging from buttons to complete vehicles in operable condition. The division committed its eighth battalion northwest of Bu Dop on 27 May. On 29 May every battalion committed to Operation Toan Thang 43 reported contact with enemy forces. Enemy cache discoveries had grown in number faster than the committed units could evacuate or destroy their contents.

c. On 31 May the 1st Cav Div was provided another infantry battalion in an effort to increase the ground reconnaissance capability within the AO and on 5 June the Division committed its last remaining organic maneuver battalion to this operation. A large hospital complex complete with an operating room and laboratories was uncovered northwest of Bu Dop at this time. Also, a Navy-developed detection device, Magnetic Anomaly Detector, mounted in a helicopter was employed during this period to locate suspected enemy cache sites in the heavy jungle. At one site located in this manner, tactical air was employed with outstanding results. Subsequent BDA by air cavalry elements revealed a truck park with five 2 1/2 ton trucks and several structures. Vehicle machine shop equipment, vehicle spare parts, and large quantities of munitions, as well as medical equipment and supplies, were added to the list of cache discoveries. At one time there were more than 260 tons of rice under US control in the field awaiting evacuation.

d. In the second week of June, elements of the 3d Brigade uncovered large quantities of communications equipment and repair parts in the vicinity of FSB Gonder, 18 kilometers northwest of Bu Dop. From documents captured in the area, this site is believed to have been COSVN's major signal depot. The third week of June was characterized by increased enemy reaction to the US search activities. The enemy's reaction was highlighted by an early morning ground attack against FSB David in the vicinity of O Rang. Results of this action were 28 enemy killed and the area around the fire base littered with enemy equipment, weapons, and munitions. 29 US personnel were wounded. Throughout the objective area, ground to air fire increased and maneuver units were constantly harried by small groups of enemy. Also, attacks by fire increased in frequency and intensity. Air cavalry and tactical air found lucrative personnel and material targets as the enemy forces attempted to delay or forestall search operations throughout the area.

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c. On 20 June the 1st Cav Div started a phased withdrawal from Cambodia. Battalion command posts and artillery fire support bases were repositioned in the RVN near the border. On 27 June the last fire base in Cambodia was closed. During this complex critical withdrawal phase, enemy resistance remained surprisingly light. Full advantage was taken of B-52 strikes to keep the enemy from hindering the US withdrawal as well as to destroy facilities located but not fully searched. The last US ground elements withdrew from Cambodia on 29 June.

5. (C) Toan Thang 46 (6 May - 30 June) (See Appendix 11)

a. The 9th Regt, 5th ARVN Division, initiated Cambodian operations on 6 May in conjunction with Operation Toan Thang 45. Two battalions were air assaulted into Base 350 utilizing US air assets. Initial enemy resistance was minimal as ARVN forces were built up in the vicinity of the two landing zones. During the first few days, contacts were light and scattered as the enemy withdrew before aggressive ground reconnaissance forces supported by US tactical air and air cavalry elements. Contacts initially made with cache security forces were followed by sweeps of the contact area which invariably revealed material storage sites. Unlike other storage sites, these caches were normally comprised of weapons, ammunition, and rice. To bolster troop density and security, the 1st ARVN ACR was added to the operation on 11 May.

b. On 21 May, significant enemy resistance to search activities was encountered following which installations and caches were found by all elements. The most important discovery was a bunkered hospital complex with an estimated capacity of 500 patients, captured complete with equipment and supplies. On 26 May, having apparently exhausted major possibilities in the southern portion of the objective area, operations were extended to the north. These expanded search operations met stiff reaction. The enemy made several concerted night ground attacks against ARVN night defensive positions in an effort to prevent or discourage discoveries of additional enemy facilities and supplies. ARVN elements successfully defended their positions while exacting a heavy toll on the attacking enemy forces. During the next two weeks, many light contacts occurred as ARVN forces uncovered more enemy facilities and supplies. The majority of these were medical.

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
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c. In mid-June enemy resistance to ARVN operations stiffened again and troops in ground reconnaissance were continually harried by small enemy groups. The net effect of these contacts was negligible, but slowed search operations and caused ARVN elements to conduct reconnaissance activities in larger groups. On 20 June, with the initiation of US withdrawal operations, ARVN elements began moving southwest to the vicinity of the RVN border along Highway 13. Enroute units had numerous sharp contacts with enemy forces. Additional base camps and small storage cache sites were uncovered and exploited. By late afternoon on 27 June, all subordinate units had established night defensive positions within RVN. Elements of the 4th ARVN Regiment continued ground reconnaissance in the vicinity of the border until 30 June, at which time the unit returned to its home station near Chon Thanh.

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
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Appendix 1 (Phase I - Toan Thang 42) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.



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
Appendix 2 (Phase II - Tonk Thang 42) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




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Appendix 3 (Phase III - Toan Trang 42) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




Appendix 4 (Phase IV - Yenn Thang 42) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Command's  
Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




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Appendix 5 (Phase V - Tonkang 42) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




Appendix B (This Page 4) - 1st Cavalry Division) to Annex A (Summary of Operations)  
to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




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Appendix 7 (Task Force 45 - 25th Infantry Division) to Annex 5 (Summary of Operations)  
to Commander's Evaluation Report - Operation Operations.




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


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Appendix 9 (Toan Thang 44) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's  
Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.



Appendix 10 (Toan Thang 45) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's  
Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




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


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Appendix 11 (Toan Thang 46) Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's  
Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.



Appendix 12 (US and CVN Operational Area) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.




**LEGEND**

AREA A - III Corps Operational Area  
 AREA B - US Operational Area  
 BA 367 - Parrot's Beak  
 BA 706 - Angel's Wing  
 BA 707 - Dog's Head  
 BA 352 - Fish Hook

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1343. Appendix 13 (US Area of Operation) to Annex A (Summary of Operations) to Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations.



**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX B (Intelligence) to II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)****1. (C) Enemy Situation During Operations in Cambodia:**

a. Documents captured in late May suggested that Campaign "X" plans entailed the movement of the 5 VC Div toward subregional areas northeast of Saigon, while elements of the 9th VC Div moved into an area northwest of the capital city in a coordinated attack. The execution of this plan was partially prevented by the capture of a large munitions cache at RANG RANG by the 3d MSF two months prior to the beginning of the offensive. The coup in Cambodia and allied cross-border operations further disrupted the enemy's plans, and the enemy's divisions withdrew deeper into Cambodia. The major elements of the 9th VC Div left the III MR border area and deployed westward toward the MEKONG River in Cambodia, probably to conduct operations against Cambodian forces in that vicinity. A PW captured on 7 May revealed that the 271st Regiment, 9th VC Division captured CHAK and then turned it over to Cambodian Communist forces, while the 272 Regt was located south of the MEKONG in the vicinity of KAMPONG CHAM with an apparent intention of crossing the river. The 95C Regt was identified along Highway 7 and was apparently tasked with an interdiction mission along this LOC. After allied operations in Cambodia began, the major elements of the 7 NVA Div remained generally in the FISHHOOK with the apparent mission of protecting cache sites and attacking allied FSBs in the area. However, identification of the 141 Regt, 7 NVA Div in the immediate vicinity of SNUOL supported the contention that the 141 Regt was the enemy unit that occupied that city during the last week of April. On 7 June, 10 km southwest of SNUOL, a Hoi Chanh identified the 2 Bn, 141 Regt and stated that the mission of the regiment was to protect the SNUOL-MIMOT area. Allied operations into enemy Base Areas 350 and 351 revealed the weakness of the 5 VC Division's elongated area of operation, as contact with the division's regiments during these operations was light. The 5 VC Div had provided security for the 86 Rear Service Group and its base areas in past operations, but seemed primarily concerned with relocating rear service facilities to more secure areas.

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b. Enemy forces were apparently surprised by the speed of the allied operations across the border, probably accounting for the fact that reaction to these operations was minimal during the first weeks, and enemy activity throughout the subregions was light in intensity and low in volume. It is significant that the enemy within the corps area did not increase activity in an attempt to relieve pressure on his Cambodian base areas. However, the loss of his supplies and the disruption of his command control along with the increased requirement for enemy operations within Cambodia probably overtaxed his capabilities.

c. Documents captured in June indicated that the 33 Regt had been removed from the operational control of the 5 VC Div and had been re-subordinated to the headquarters of MR-7. The division's re-organization included the formation of a new regiment, designated the E6 Regt, and the expansion of the 275 Regt into two regimental sized units. The cadre forming the core of the new regiment was taken from within the 5 VC Div, but the troops probably came from several battalion sized infiltration groups just entering the war from the north. The division could have employed another regiment, since the westward shift of the other divisions created such a large area of operation for the 5 VC Division, and allied operations into the area revealed the weakness of its elongated AO. Allied operations into Cambodia also uncovered the existence of three recovery and replacement regiments, the 90, 92, and 94 Recovery and Replacement Regt. The mission of these regiments was to process, equip, and assign newly arrived infiltrators, stragglers and recovered patients to the various enemy units within the corps area and to care for sick and wounded personnel. The cadre strength of these regiments was estimated at 4,550 and the regiments were apparently capable of processing over 14,000 transients and patients at one time. Intelligence gathered in Cambodia also revealed that allied intelligence had greatly underestimated the strengths of COSVN and SVNLA Headquarters. As a result of operations in Cambodia, estimated strengths of COSVN and SVNLA Headquarters were increased from 2,000 to approximately 22,000 persons.

## 2. (C) Results of Operations in Cambodia:

a. Allied operations in Cambodia were primarily directed against the enemy base areas along the northern and western borders of the corps area. The total number of enemy killed was significant; however, since most main force enemy units avoided contact, a large portion of the losses were suffered by rear service elements. The total number of enemy eliminated was 8,836, including 7,807 enemy KIA, 909 PW

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captured and 120 Hoi Chanh. Enemy logistic losses were more significant: 10,353 individual weapons, 1,786 crew-served weapons, 1,534.8 tons of munitions, and 5,873.6 tons of rice were captured in Cambodia. Some of the caches, such as SHAKEY'S HILL, ROCK ISLAND EAST, and the CITY, were so extensive that they should be considered as enemy logistic depots rather than cache sites. In addition, great quantities of salt, medical supplies and other items such as uniforms, vehicles and communications equipment were uncovered. It is anticipated that the enemy within the III MR, whom these supplies were meant to support, will begin to feel the effects of these logistical losses during the coming months and there should be a continued decrease in the enemy's offensive activities.

b. Subregion 2 was the most seriously hurt by operations in Cambodia. Toward the end of May, tactical and rear elements of SR-2, SR-3, and SR-6 in SVAY RIENG (P) suffered heavy losses and were fragmented and dispersed by elements of ARVN operation TOAN THANG 42; however, losses suffered by SR-2 elements had the greatest impact in the area of command and control as reports indicated that both headquarters and rear service elements had been widely dispersed and scattered in eastern Cambodia and many key personnel were lost. In the beginning of June, an upsurge of enemy action throughout other areas of South Vietnam marked the initiation of the third phase of Campaign "X", but the pattern of enemy activity in III MR followed the same low profile noted during May, indicating the enemy's inability to mount a coordinated high point, due to the allies' extensive disruption of his planning and control. The enemy's preoccupation with securing his strategic foothold in Cambodia, however, was also a probable factor in the low level of enemy activity during these months. Captured documents showed evidence of serious enemy morale problems within the corps area, as well as ammunition and food shortages. Documents captured in the PARROT'S BEAK stated that due to numerous difficulties faced by the VC/NVA forces, the subordinate districts of SR-2 would have to supply their own provisions after May 1970. It was also reported that in late March, approximately 30% of the NVA assigned to SR-2 began to agitate openly about returning home. In a report submitted to COSVN in April, SR-2 HQ stated that some 700 men refused to fight, including six battalion commanders and four company commanders. Prior to 19 May, the battalion commander of the 2642 Bn and eight NVA cadre at battalion and company level deserted, stating that they would return to North Vietnam. It is estimated

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that continuing ARVN operations in the PARROT'S BEAK/ANGEL'S WING area and in SR-2 will further degrade the enemy's morale and offensive capability.

c. The three enemy divisions were less affected by the impact of allied operations in Cambodia. Their rear areas were disrupted and they suffered many casualties, but their command and control, and combat elements generally remained intact. The overall effect in III MR was a reduction in the enemy threat as the 9 VC Div withdrew to the west and the 5 VC Div divided its interest between the northern border area and western Cambodia. At the end of allied operations in Cambodia, of the divisional combat elements, only the 7 NVA Div and two regiments of the 5 VC Div still posed a threat to III MR. The realization that their base areas are no longer safe havens will probably have the most far reaching effect on future enemy logistics organization. The fact that the RVNAF can operate in Cambodian base areas and will probably return will greatly affect the enemy's planning and future methods of operation.

3. (C) Enemy Losses: The following table lists enemy personnel and material losses resulting from various allied operations in Cambodia:

TOAN	En	Indiv	CS	Ammo	Rice
THANG Opn	Elim	Wpn	Wpn	(tons)	(tons)
TT 41	420	74	53	1.0	254.0
TT 42	3,588	1,891	478	380.6	1,041.6
TT 43	3,190	4,693	731	338.4	2,698.0
TT 44	302	297	34	4.0	217.0
TT 45	1,257	3,073	449	791.1	1,584.0
TT 46	79	325	41	19.7	79.0
TOTAL	8,836	10,353	1,786	1,534.8	5,877.6

4. (C) Unit Identifications: The following is a recapitulation of major enemy units identified during allied operations in Cambodia:

174, 275 and E6 Regiments, 5 VC Div  
141, 165 and 209 Regiments, 7 NVA Div  
95C, 271 and 272 Regiments, 9 VC Div  
Sapper High Command, COSVN  
7, 9 and 10 Sapper Battalions, Sapper High Command  
96 and 208 Artillery Regiments, 69 Artillery Command

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J3 Signal Regiment, COSVN  
 90, 92 and 94 Recovery and Replacement Regiments  
 50, 70, 82, 86 and 100 Rear Service Groups  
 88 NVA Regt (IV MR)  
 95 Sapper Bn  
 22 Arty Bn, 7 NVA Div  
 22 Arty Bn, 9 VC Div  
 24 AA Bn, 7 VC Div  
 24 AA Bn, 9 VC Div  
 27 Recon Bn

Subregional units:

SR-1: TRANG BANG LF Bn, 268 Regt  
 SR-2: 6 Bn, D-16 Bn, 128 Arty Bn, 267 Bn, 269 Bn, 308 Bn, 2642 Bn  
 SR-3: 506 Bn, DONG PHU Bn  
 SR-6: N-10 Sapper Bn

In addition, 32 local force and rear service elements of company size or smaller were identified during operations in Cambodia.

5. (U) Terrain and Weather:

a. Terrain.

(1) Relief - The area west of the PARROT'S BEAK and south of Route 1 is generally flat, although there are small areas of higher ground scattered throughout. Normal elevations are between 1 and 3 meters with slopes generally less than 1 percent. The northern lowlands are designated as that area generally north of Cambodian National Route 1. Elevations are somewhat higher in this area: 3 to 6 meters. From the DOG'S HEAD to the FISHHOOK the topography is gently to moderately rolling with the local relief varying from 10 to 25 meters and slopes generally averaging three to five percent. The relief does, however, become increasingly more rugged east of the city of SNUOL. This area begins as a relatively smooth, flat plain with an average elevation of 70 meters and increases in elevation to the mountains of the DU MUONG Plateau that give rise to heights of 650 and 700 meters.

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(2) Drainage - Throughout the area south and north of Route 1, the drainage is generally poor and large portions of the area are inundated for a large part of the year. With the increase in relief throughout the northern lowlands, the drainage improves considerably. In the FISHHOOK area there are two major streams, the CHHLONG and CHAM. Each of these streams are fed by numerous intermittent and a few perennial tributaries. All other streams radiate from topographic highs and are generally intermittent near their source and become perennial out on the flatland.

(3) Vegetation - The area south of Route 1 is a combination of rice cultivation and swamps with a few patches of brushwoods. Widely scattered palms are sometimes encountered on the dikes of rice fields and small canals. In the northern lowlands, the major vegetation categories are single canopy, light undergrowth forest and rice fields. There are also some small areas of brushwoods and open grassy fields. Starting in the area of the DOG'S HEAD and extending to the DU MUONG Plateau, the vegetation is extremely diverse and of a complicated growth pattern. The predominant vegetation is single canopy, light undergrowth forest; however, there are numerous patches of multi-canopy, dense undergrowth forest scattered throughout the area. There are large plantation complexes (primarily rubber) and also extensive rice cultivation (vic XT 3593, vic XU 3615 and vic XU 4814). In general, trafficability is directly related to the amount and frequency of precipitation.

(4) Lines of Communication - There are only two roads (Route 1 and 7) that have an all weather classification and two routes (Route 24 and 109) that are partially all weather roads. Routes 13, 78, 131, 254, 701, 1010 and 1011 are limited all weather roads and are motorable throughout the year; therefore, they are considered primary lines of communication. The other designated routes (70, 79, 109, 154, 155, 241, 242, 243, 244, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1091, and 1543) are considered to be fair weather routes; therefore, they are primary lines of communication only during the dry season.

**b. Weather.**

(1) General - During April and May, Southeast Asia is in the transition period between the northeast and the southwest monsoons. The southwest monsoon begins by the end of May. During this time period the low level winds shift from the east-southeast, swinging around to the southwest, bringing on the warm moist flow of air from the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Thailand. By the first of June, the southwest monsoon is well established. The arrival of the moist air brings a dramatic increase in cloud cover, thunderstorms, and

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amount of rain, and a decrease in average temperatures. Stratus and fog frequently occur in the mountain valleys during the early morning hours.

(2) Cloudiness, Visibility, and Precipitation - During May 1970, the weather conditions were generally better than is usually expected in Southeast Asia. A light southeasterly to southerly flow persisted throughout the area until mid-month. After 22 May, the flow gradually shifted to a more southwesterly direction and conditions began to be more representative of those normally expected. By the end of the month, low level cloudiness, rainshower, and thunderstorm activity began to increase in frequency, with cloud bases at 1500-2500 ft in the morning and 2500 ft or higher in the afternoon. Surface visibility was unrestricted in most areas, with the exception of patchy fog in the mountain valleys and swampy areas that restricted visibilities to 3-5 miles between 0500 - 0900 hours. Precipitation ranged from 3.25 inches at TAN SON NHUT to 12.64 inches at SONG BE with most areas along the border and in Cambodia receiving 6-8 inches. QUAN LOI received a record 5.10 inches of rain during a single thunderstorm. The southwest monsoon officially began on the 28th of May, eleven days after the average starting date. During the first half of June 1970, better than normal conditions continued to exist. In northern III-MR and Cambodian border areas, patchy stratus reduced ceilings to 500-1000 ft with visibilities 1 - 3 miles in ground fog and haze during the hours from 0400 - 1000. Elsewhere over III MR, morning cloud bases were at 6000+ ft with unlimited visibilities. Afternoon and evening cloud bases in all areas were 2500-3000 ft with isolated to scattered rainshowers and thunderstorms. Outside of precipitation areas, visibility was unlimited. During the last half of June, ceilings and visibilities followed the same general diurnal pattern as during the first half of the month, cloud bases were from 300-500 ft lower and rainshower and thunderstorm activity increased. Rainfall varied from 6.35 inches at TAN AN to 19.62 inches at QUAN LOI. Most Cambodian border areas received 12-18 inches of rain, with the largest portion occurring during the last half of the month.

(3) Temperatures - The May daily maximum ranged from 88 - 102 degrees; minimums ranged from 75 - 80 degrees, with the average approximately 95 degrees. The June daily maximum varied from 87 - 101 degrees; minimums varied from 74 - 81 degrees with the average approximately 92 degrees.

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7. (U) PSYOP Intelligence: The enemy in the Cambodian border area presented a harder psychological target than is normally encountered in the III MR. The target was composed primarily of hard core NVA/VC units, including COSVN HQ and the 5, 7, and 9 Div. Therefore, the usual Chieu Hoi propaganda appeals based on family ties and hardships were not as effective as they had been with guerrilla type units. The North Vietnamese proved particularly reluctant to accept the standard Chieu Hoi message. It was recognized at a very early stage that quick-reaction was the key to the successful PSYOP exploitation of hard-core targets. The enemy had assured his troops that the political situation in the United States would not permit US forces to operate in Cambodia. Thus President Nixon's decision to send US forces into Cambodia provided a means for attacking the credibility of the enemy's internal propaganda. The psychological impact of the decision was exploited by attacking other internal enemy propaganda themes using the same general phraseology of COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****ANNEX C (Personnel) To II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation  
Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. (C) There were a total of 216 US killed in action during the month of May 1970; of these, 189 were killed in Cambodia. This monthly total of 216 KIA was the highest since June 1969 (308 KIA) and almost twice the monthly average for the first four months of 1970 (116 KIA). During June 1970, There were 132 US KIA, 95 of which occurred in Cambodia. This was a decrease of almost 50% from May. June's total was only slightly higher than the 116 KIA average for the first four months of 1970.

2. (C) US casualties for the Cambodian operation appear below:

TOTAL US CASUALTIES  
CAMBODIAN OPERATION

	KIA		WIA		DOW		MIA	
	May	Jun	May	Jun	May	Jun	May	Jun
1st Cav Div (AM)	88	34	527	417	5	5	3	3
25th Inf Div	62	31	461	281	4	3	5	1
3/9th Inf Div	17	3	62	65	1	2		
199th LIB	7	7	62	17	0	0		
11th ACR	9	18	148	174	5	0		1
12th CAG	2	2	16	3	0	3		
II FFV Arty	3	0	85	6	0	0		
II FFV	0	0	0	0	0	0		
III Corps	1	0	15	0	1	0		
Total by Month	189	95	1376	963	16	13	8	5
Total Operation	284		2339		29		13	

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**ANNEX D (Logistics) To II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. (U) GENERAL: It was apparent during the initial planning for the operation that the supply system required a reorientation to meet the demands of an offensive operation. The requirements for extensive moves by both road and air, and a more demanding rate of resupply and retrograde required rapid readjustment in procedures and movement of cargo. Problems involved in reorienting the systems to offensive combat were rapidly overcome, adjustments were made and in the main, no serious deficiencies existed in supply or services operations.

2. (C) SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE:

a. Logistical support agencies responded immediately to the requirements submitted by tactical units. Shortages of supplies, equipment and repair parts were identified, requested and issued, either against valid requisitions or on temporary loans to units. The immediate requirements were for cargo nets and slings, communications and associated electronic equipment, replacement combat vehicles, fire support base kits and combat support vehicles, particularly recovery and bridging equipment. The support rendered by USARV G4, Saigon Support Command and the Long Binh Depot was outstanding in the expeditious issue against requests.

b. A special effort was made to augment maintenance personnel and repair parts in tactical units in preparation for overland moves to across the border locations. Special contact teams with equipment and repair parts were made available by the 29th General Support Group and moved by road and rotary wing aircraft to the necessary locations. The response by the 29th General Support Group was rapid and in a minimum of 12 hours after notification, all teams had been deployed.

c. Resupply during the operation was accomplished by Saigon Support Command through two Main Support Bases at Quan Loi and Tay Ninh with through-put or transfer of selected classes of supply to Forward Support Bases at Thieu Ngon, Katum, Bu Dop, Tonle Cham, and Loc Ninh. By judicious scheduling, constant planning and supervision, the resupply operations by Saigon Support Command were conducted in an outstanding manner.

3. (C) AIRLIFT:

a. The demand for fixed wing Air Force aircraft (C7A, C123, C130) far exceeded that which the system normally requires for day to day

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resupply and movement of troops. This, coupled with the fact that the 834th Air Division was not provided sufficient notice of the operational planning, initially created a demand that exceeded the capability. This was overcome by rescheduling efforts, additional aircraft being made available, and by improved management of resources by the requesting units.

b. An additional problem encountered was the condition of airfields at Katum, Thien Ngon, Loc Ninh, Bu Dop and Bu Gia Map. By concerted engineer effort, the airfields were upgraded and maintained to a level capable of supporting airlift requirements. Proper management of ground operations increased efficiency in loading, unloading and movement of cargo from the airfields.

#### 4. (C) RETROGRADE OF MATERIEL

a. Initially, the reporting and retrograde of captured enemy materiel (CEM) was unsatisfactory. Reports were inaccurate; CEM was not being retrograded at a rate required to keep ahead of continuing new finds.

b. To avoid confusion, identify required items and avoid duplicating items, a report format was developed by HQ, USARV and a daily reporting system established for each twenty-four hour period. A sample of the report form is attached as inclosure.

c. The retrograde of CEM was accomplished by the use of all available means of ground transportation and rotary wing aircraft from the cache sites to forward collecting points established at forward support bases. From these bases, CEM was airlifted by fixed wing and ground transportation to Tay Ninh, Quan Loi and to other designated collection points as established by HQ, USARV. Airlift evacuation was accomplished by special mission airlift requests (SMAR), opportune flights and by units through use of their dedicated C7A airlift capabilities and rotary wing aircraft.

#### 5. (C) LOGISTICS SUPPORT TO ARVN:

a. Support to ARVN during the 60 day US Cambodian Operation was minimal. It consisted primarily of maintenance assistance. Initially, a three-man US maintenance contact team was formed, consisting of one officer, one EM and one civilian Tech Rep. The team conducted a survey in three Armored Cavalry Regiments, determined what parts were

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**Appendix 1 (Whiskey Report) to Annex D (Logistics) to Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations.**

Submit 1500 hours daily as of 1200 hours.

The Min. Gun lot only include those weapons on hand: 4th to 7th ground  
company.

**A. 277th Bn. The Min:**

1. a. Number of AK-47's on hand: \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Amount of AK-47 ammo on hand: \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Number of AK-47 magazines on hand: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Number of small arms (other than AK-47's): \_\_\_\_\_
3. Tons of small arms ammo (other than AK-47's): \_\_\_\_\_
4. Number of crew served weapons: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Tons of crew served ammo: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Number of vehicles: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Tons of medical supplies: \_\_\_\_\_

**2. 3rd Bn:**

1. a. Number of AK-47's on hand: \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Amount of AK-47 ammo on hand: \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Number of AK-47 magazines on hand: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Number of small arms (other than AK-47's): \_\_\_\_\_
3. Tons of small arms ammo (other than AK-47's): \_\_\_\_\_
4. Number of crew served weapons: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Tons of crew served ammo: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Number of vehicles: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Tons of medical supplies: \_\_\_\_\_

**3. 91st Bn (El An)**

- |  | <u>TOTAL**</u> | <u>Stc</u> | <u>_____</u> |
|--|----------------|------------|--------------|
|--|----------------|------------|--------------|

(\*\*) Include in total those items for which a quantity has not been determined, i.e., total need not equal sum of serviceable and non-serviceable until completion of the operation.

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required and what level of mechanic assistance was required. The primary effort went to replacement of M41 Engines, M113A1 transmissions and fuel and electrical system repairs. Post D-day maintenance in ARVN units created no serious problems involving US support and the ARVN repair parts system was responsive to the requirements.

b. Supply to ARVN consisted only of cargo nets, slings and 500,000 rounds of 50-caliber ammunition.

6. (U) Special mention should be made of the efforts of the USARV G4 Section, the Saigon Support Command, the 29th General Support Group and the 834th Air Division. The rapidity with which they responded to the changing tactical situations, and the flexibility required to adjust operations to conform to the tactical posture contributed immeasurably to the success of the operation.

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**ANNEX E (Civil Affairs/Civic Action) to II FFORCEV Commander's  
Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. The basic objectives of civil affairs support of tactical operations in Cambodia were to preclude civilian interference with military operations, to control and care for refugees, and to minimize the disruption of civilian life by the military operations.
2. As US forces began operations in Cambodia, elements of the 2d Civil Affairs Company were repositioned and task-organized to provide direct support to the tactical units and to augment the CA platoons already in support of the provincial advisory teams in the border provinces. CA teams supporting the tactical units were provided on the basis of one per brigade/regiment plus a control/liaison element and back-up team with each division headquarters. In effect, CA resources were shifted from a civic action role in support of Province Senior Advisors to a civil affairs role in support of tactical commanders. Some CA personnel were retained in each province, though at reduced strength, in order to continue pacification and development functions.
3. The greatest portion of the effort expended in civil affairs activities was directed towards assisting GVN officials in the operation of temporary refugee centers and towards managing the evacuation, storage, and distribution of captured rice. These activities were directly related, in that the bulk of captured rice evacuated to the RVN was distributed to the refugee centers, which processed over 30,000 persons by 30 Jun 70. Captured rice evacuated to the RVN totaled 1500 tons of which 844 tons were distributed to refugees or other eligible recipients in III MR, 280 tons in IV MR for refugee support, 182 tons to VNAF units, and 194 tons were lost or destroyed due to spillage and spoilage.
4. Other significant activities or operations in the civil affairs area of interest were:
  - a. Locating Cambodian-speaking interpreters to assist tactical units and refugee centers in their contacts with Cambodian civilians. The principal source for these interpreters was the Son Thon cadre (Montagnard rural development specialists) obtained from Binh Long and Phouc Long Provinces.
  - b. Repatriating 805 ethnic Cambodians from the refugee center at An Loc, Binh Long (P) to Mimot, Cambodia.
  - c. Providing materials to rebuild the community of Xa Om, Cambodia, which was destroyed during tactical operations.

d. Providing medical assistance to sick and injured civilians.

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5. The basic objectives of civil affairs support were accomplished with minimum impact on the tactical operations. The contributions by the 2d Civil Affairs Company were invaluable, both in assisting the tactical commanders and in supporting the GVN officials.

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**ANNEX F (Psychological Operations) to II FFORCEV Commander's  
Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

**1. II FFORCEV PSYOP in support of Cambodian operations can be grouped in two broad phases:**

**a. An initial surge, with immediate reallocation of available PSYOP resources and priorities to provide maximum support of tactical units.**

**b. A gradual return to equilibrium, with close management of PSYOP resources to maintain adequate support of combat operations across the border and, at the same time, to intensify PSYOP activities directed at enemy forces and the civilian population within III MR.**

**2. The initial thrust of II FFORCEV psychological operations was aimed at enemy main force units in Cambodia. Our main effort focused on exploiting the psychological impact of President Nixon's decision to attack Cambodian base areas, lowering the enemy's morale and will to fight, and challenging the credibility of his propaganda and indoctrination programs. Our secondary effort concentrated on population control, to minimize interference with tactical operations and insure the safety of the civilian population in the combat area. The peak of PSYOP activities in support of tactical operations was reached during the period 5-12 May, with approximately 90 per cent of PSYOP assets in direct support of committed tactical units.**

**3. Two problem areas became apparent at that time:**

**a. The lack of intelligence concerning how the enemy in Cambodia might react and the absence of information on the magnitude of civilian control problems had led us to concentrate a greater PSYOP effort in support of tactical operations than may have been necessary.**

**b. Available PSYOP resources were inadequate for mounting a concentrated campaign in Cambodia while maintaining a high level of PSYOP/Information activities in the Corps Zone.**

**4. To alleviate these problems we requested and received additional PSYOP assets from MACV and simultaneously shifted emphasis of operations back to our area in Vietnam. By 1 Jun 70 approximately 55 per cent of our total effort centered on the enemy units and the civilian population within III MR. The main objectives here were to inform local enemy units and the civilian population of Allied successes in Cambodia and to provide maximum PSYOP/Information support to province agencies and territorial forces.**

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5. Overall PSYOP support of Cambodian operations during the period 1 May to 30 June included 575 aircraft sorties flown with 577 broadcast hours and 156,221,000 leaflets dropped. A total of 27,400,000 leaflets were printed by assets under II FFORCEV control with 95 leaflets and 119 tapes specifically developed for exploitation of Cambodian operations. These statistics reflect direct support to the US units involved in the Cambodian campaign. They represent about two-thirds of the total US PSYOP program in III MR for the period.

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**ANNEX G (Artillery) To II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. II FFORCEV Artillery supported Operation Toan Thang 42 with six batteries of medium and heavy artillery, initially deployed to the north and east of the area of operations to provide maximum support for the maneuver units. Liaison was established with all ARVN Task Forces, III Corps, and IV Corps to further insure timely support. All US Artillery fires in Toan Thang 42 were coordinated and controlled by a forward element of the 23d Artillery Group, which was colocated with the ARVN III Corps TOC at Go Dau Ha and later at Tay Ninh. During later phases of this operation, two medium and two heavy batteries displaced into Cambodia to keep pace with the rapidly moving ARVN forces. These batteries provided close and continuous support to the maneuver elements, but were not allowed to displace west of Svay Rieng. As the operation progressed, two of the task force continued to operate north of the Dog's Head, while the remaining task force continued to operate in the Parrot's Beak. Each of these operations was supported by a medium and heavy battery.
2. In Operation Toan Thang 43, II FFORCEV Artillery units were initially positioned to support the airlifted elements of the 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade occupying blocking positions across the border, as well as the 11th ACR and other units attacking overland. Three batteries of medium artillery and six platoons of heavy artillery were deployed forward, utilizing fixed and rotary wing aircraft and road convoy, to seven firing positions in remote areas to the south and east of the Fishhook. Position areas were selected to provide maximum fire support to the maneuver elements upon initiation of the attack. Over 5,500 rounds were fired by II FFORCEV Artillery units in support of Task Force Shoemaker during the first week of operation. Fires of all available artillery were massed on known and suspected enemy locations, paving the way for exploitation by maneuver forces.
3. Aggressive use of artillery early in Operations Toan Thang 42 and 43 placed both medium and heavy elements well forward and centrally positioned to support the commitment of additional maneuver units when operations were expanded into Base Areas 350, 351, 354 and 707 in support of the Toan Thang operations except for a few batteries located in other critical areas of III MR, virtually all units of II FFORCEV Artillery were moved to the Cambodian Border, or across it. Heavy artillery platoons were consolidated for employment as batteries wherever possible. During one three-day period, a total of 32 artillery moves were conducted to place the firing elements in the

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best positions in support of operations in Cambodia. A total of 198  
moves were made in response to the needs of maneuver commanders.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****Annex H (Engineer) To II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. (U) General. With the initiation of combat operations in Cambodia, engineer requirements in the northern portion of the Military Region were planned to accommodate the movement of US and GVN ground forces with attention focused on overland resupply routes and airfield improvement. Sizeable construction projects and route maintenance requirements were envisioned and necessary steps were taken to provide the required engineer units and heavy equipment to accomplish the tasks.

2. (C) Engineer Support. Two non-divisional platoons reinforced with earth moving assets were positioned in Tonle Cham and Katum. Thirteen demolition teams were provided to assist in the destruction of bunker complexes. As sizeable cache complexes were located, additional non-divisional engineer assets were required.

a. The 31st Engineer Battalion (combat) (Army), reinforced by a light equipment company, established a forward CP at Quan Loi to support operations in the eastern portion of the cross border AO. Primary efforts consisted of opening QL-13 from Loc Ninh into Cambodia to Snoul. Additionally, a 45 foot dry gap span was installed on QL-13 and bomb craters along the route filled. This route was opened to wheel and tracked vehicles within 48 hours after receiving this mission. Another priority mission was to open approximately 22 kilometers of trail from QL-13 into a large cache site known as "the City". This project was accomplished within 48 hours and assisted in the successful evacuation of large tonnages of captured enemy materiel. Extensive repair to Loc Ninh airfield was required due to heavy traffic. Two taxiways to the existing ramp were constructed to include the installation of a "Hook-out" resupply pad. In addition to repair of existing taxiways, a 500 foot by 250 foot ramp was constructed.

b. The 588th Engineer Battalion (combat) (Army) established a forward CP at Katum to support the western portion of the border AO. Their primary task was the extensive maintenance required to the Katum airfield. Working at night, the unit installed over 600 feet of M8A1 matting at each end of the runway. Additionally, the 588th maintained LTL-4 from Prek Klok to Katum, constructed an all weather back haul road from Katum north to Route 7 in Cambodia and constructed logistical facilities at Katum.

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c. To support the 25th Inf Div operations, the 92d Engineer Battalion (Construction) established a forward CP at Tay Ninh and conducted operations with two organic companies and one platoon from the 362d Light Equipment Company. This battalion opened and upgraded QL-22 from Tay Ninh to the Cambodian border, completed the upgrade of the Thien Ngon airfield, constructed resupply pads for helicopter operations and constructed by-pass roads to the west and east of the airfield. Overall, the following projects were accomplished during the Cambodian campaign:

- Opened 163 km of roads
- Maintained 263 kms of road
- Constructed or reinforced 15 bridges
- Maintained 7 forward airfields.

3. (C) Land Clearing. Two companies of the 62d Land Clearing Battalion were deployed into the Fishhook area to support combat operations. A platoon of Rome Plows from the 984th LCC was provided to support engineer operations in opening QL-22 north from Thien Ngon. Rome Plows also supported elements of the 31st Engineer Battalion in opening QL-14A from Bu Dop north to various cache sites in Cambodia. During the period of combat operations, the 60th LCC and 984th LCC cleared a total of 1694 acres. Of particular significance is the role the Rome Plow played in uncovering large quantities of enemy supplies.

4. (U) Priorities. The Engineer Brigade Commander maintained continuous liaison with supported units throughout the period of operation. This continual monitoring of the engineer support effort provided the control necessary to accomplish priority tasks. HQ II FFORCEV assisted the supported units by establishing engineer priorities based on tactical requirements of the situation.

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**ANNEX I (Army Aviation) To II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. (U) General. The 12th Aviation Group (Combat) provided direct and general support to II FFORCEV and III MR units participating in the Cambodian Campaign. The support to ARVN III Corps was coordinated by the 12th Aviation Group, using a provisional Army Aviation Element (AAE) located with III Corps Forward CP at Go Dau Ha and later at Tay Ninh. The AAE at II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center coordinated support provided to US units.

2. (C) Aviation Support to III MR.

a. The 334th Aviation Company (Attack Helicopter) was tasked to provide four Light Fire Teams (LFT) for aerial fire support to ARVN units in contact, escort of US medical evacuation aircraft, escort of VNAF helicopters on combat assaults and escort of US CH-47 resupply aircraft. The basic aviation support allocation consisted of seven command and control helicopters provided daily to the task force commanders and III MR staff. CH-47 helicopters were provided only for emergency resupply and evacuation as required.

b. To assist in positive identification of friendly units during aerial fire missions, the CO 12th Aviation Group established Aerial Aviation Control Teams (AACT). These teams consisted of one UH-1D/H command and control helicopter flown by US personnel carrying a US advisor and an ARVN representative. Through continuous communication with the maneuver forces on the ground and with the III Corps Forward CP, this team provided the necessary control to permit reliable and responsive aerial fire support.

c. A Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry provided lift support for the ARVN ready reaction force to secure downed aircraft. This force consisted of a 21-man aero rifle platoon and was used in lieu of US personnel. Additionally, a chase aircraft was included in this force for support and personnel recovery tasks.

d. Two companies of the 11th Aviation Battalion, the 205th ASHC and the 213th ASHC, were tasked to support the ARVN Airborne Division in closing out three fire support bases in the Fishhook during the final stages of the campaign. To insure close coordination, liaison teams from the 11th Aviation Battalion and 12th CAU were stationed with the headquarters of the Airborne Division at Tay Ninh. The 334th Aviation Company supported the three ARVN combined arms task forces in Phase I of Toan Thang 42, accounting for 365 enemy killed.

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e. The forward AAE collocated with III Corps Forward consisted of three officers and three enlisted personnel. This element was situated with the G3 Advisor section in the TOC and provided 24-hour support to CG, III MR. This team provided advice to the Deputy Senior Advisor, III MR on Army Aviation matters and coordinated employment of light fire teams and CH-47 recovery missions inside Cambodia. As a secondary mission, the team controlled all US Army aircraft crossing into Cambodia in support of Tonk Thang 42. Authority to commit LFT, CH-47, or aircraft recovery missions across the border was at the discretion of the CG, II FFORCEV, while the authority to commit US command and control aircraft into Cambodia was reserved to DSA, III MR.

3. (C) Aviation Support to US Operations.

a. The 210th Aviation Battalion, employing fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, supported Cambodian operations with visual reconnaissance, adjustment of artillery fire, command and staff transportation, radio relay and light cargo transport. In a five day period, five U-1A (Otter) aircraft of the 54th Utility Airplane Company, 210th Aviation Battalion, transported 976 Cambodian refugees and 25 tons of personal belongings from Hoa Quan in the vicinity of An Loc, RVN, to a refugee processing point established at Mimot, Cambodia.

b. The 222d Aviation Battalion employing three assault helicopter companies provided aircraft lift support for liaison, resupply, medical evacuation, command and control, visual reconnaissance, cache evacuation, and combat assaults. Additionally, the 273d Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) provided heavy lift assistance to the 1st Cavalry Division. This support consisted of transporting light engineer equipment, artillery weapons and vehicles.

c. The 269th Aviation Battalion employed two assault helicopter companies in support of 25th Infantry Division operations in Base Areas 354 and 707. In addition to this support, the 242d Aviation Battalion (Heavy Helicopter) conducted medium lift support on an as required basis.

d. During the period 6-13 May, the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, with two air cavalry troops, was placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division to conduct screening missions in Cambodia. One of these troops was placed in support of III MR forces operating in the vicinity of the Angel's Wing. When the 25th Infantry Division returned to RVN on 14 May, the squadron was placed OPCON to the division and tasked to continue air cavalry operations in Base Areas 354 and 707. This mission continued until 22 June when the squadron was given an additional AO which encompassed Base Areas 352 and 353 and extended into Cambodia to the 30 kilometer limit. Primarily, the squadron conducted screening operations

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while remaining immediately responsive to mission requests by the 11th ACR operating in the Fiechbeck. On 27 June, the squadron assumed OPCON of the 11th ACR's aircavalry troop and began an intensive low level reconnaissance operation in the Fiechbeck area in support of a comprehensive interdiction campaign directed by the 25th Infantry Division. These operations were conducted in conjunction with a massive destruction program employing tactical air, B-52 strikes, artillery fires and aircavalry to inflict maximum damage to remaining unexploited cache sites and base areas.

4. (C) Summary. A statistical summary of support provided and unit and enemy losses is shown below. The composition of each unit is displayed at Appendix 1.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>TON OF CARGO</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>A/C LOST</u>
145th Avn Bn	4216	26,710	3909	166	0
3/17 Cav	8829	N/A	N/A	382	5
269th Avn Bn	13055	35,358	15714	38	0
222d Avn Bn	2530	1,703	1,703	0	0
11th Avn Bn	15973	99,316	34,185	0	0
210th Avn Bn	2248	1,162	25	15	1

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**Appendix I (Task Organization) to ANNEX I (Army Aviation) To II FFORCEV  
Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. 11th Aviation Battalion (Combat)  
128th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
173d Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
285th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter)  
213th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter)
2. 145th Aviation Battalion (Combat)  
68th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
118th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
190th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
334th Aviation Company (Attack Helicopter)
3. 210th Aviation Battalion (Combat)  
25th Corps Aviation Company  
74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company  
184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company  
54th Utility Airplane Company
4. 222d Aviation Battalion (Combat)  
117th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
195th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
240th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
273d Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter)
5. 269th Aviation Battalion (Combat)  
116th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
187th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)  
242d Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter)
6. 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (-)  
A Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry  
B Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry

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**ANNEX J (Signal) to II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. (U) General. Signal communication support of the Cambodian operation was directed toward a rapid expansion and extension of the Telephone, Communication Center and FM radio network between all major headquarters and their forward command posts or task force headquarters.
2. (C) Communications Support of III Corps Advisors. Initial support prior to execution of Toan Thang 42 consisted of providing both ARVN III Corps Headquarters and their US advisors with eight (8) AN/PRC-74 AM manpack radios. These radios were used to improve the communication capability of ARVN and US advisors over extensive distances. The radio teams were highly effective, using the AM capability with its greater range and fewer interference problems than with FM radios. Expansion of communications support of III Corps operations consisted of establishing a III Corps Forward Command Post Signal Center. Direct telephone, teletype and FM radio links were provided by the 53d Signal Battalion between II FFORCEV TOC and the III Corps Forward TOC. The Signal Center established initially at Go Dau Ha and then at Tay Ninh East provided the Deputy Senior Advisor III Corps with multiple telephone and teletype links to III Corps Headquarters as well as links to the II FFORCEV Headquarters. Additionally, AM RATT and FM radio relays provided communications between the III Corps Forward Command Post and the ARVN task forces in Cambodia.
3. (C) Communications Support of US Ground Forces. Signal support of Task Force Shoemaker consisted of providing an additional multi-channel VHF system between Quan Loi basecamp, Phuoc Vinh and II FFORCEV Headquarters. In addition, 53d Signal Battalion established a signal center at Quan Loi in support of the II FFORCEV LNO. To insure reliable, secure FM communications between II FFORCEV Headquarters and Task Force Shoemaker, an FM retransmission station was established on Nui Ba Ra Mountain utilizing the new HYL-3 automatic secure retrans device. A total of 17 of the HYL-3's were issued to II FFORCEV OPCON units to provide the required extensions of their FM secure radio nets. Two (2) multi-channel VHF systems were established between Katum, Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh in direct support of 25th Infantry Division forward elements. Again, personnel and equipment were furnished by the 53d Signal Battalion. By augmenting organic signal units with assets from 53d Signal Battalion, US combat units were assured of sufficient personnel and equipment to extend their communications support forward into Cambodia as required. To support the withdrawal from Cambodia, key communications systems and FM relays were established to provide for continuous, reliable communications.

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**ANNEX K (Air Force) to II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

**I. (C) CLOSE AIR SUPPORT:**

a. Tactical air support of the Cambodian Operations was provided by the 3d, 12th, 31st and 55th Tactical Fighter Wings. These wings flew a total of 6,017 FAC directed sorties and 175 radar directed sorties in support of the Cambodian operations. The results of these airstrikes included 520 enemy confirmed killed, 270 estimated killed, 507 secondary explosions observed, and destruction of 4,571 fortifications, 52 vehicles, 30 bridges and an estimated 268 tons of rice.

b. Night support of Cambodian operations was provided by A-1H gunships and C-123 and C-130 flare ships under control of the 14th Special Operations Wing. Gunships expended more than 1,500,000 rounds in support of ground operations while more than 8,200 flares were dropped. During the initial phase of the operation, maneuver units received support from as many as eight gun mounted aircraft and three flare ships per night.

c. The Commando Vault system employing the 15,000 pound bomb was used 21 times to clear landing zones for heliborne assault forces and create areas in dense jungle regions for construction of fire support bases. Pre-dawn deliveries of the Commando Vault supported initial penetrations of 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division (AM) into Cambodia.

d. Tactical airpower was used initially to assist ground forces in their penetrations into Cambodia and to destroy known enemy base camps and cache sites. Subsequent strikes neutralized helicopter landing zones and destroyed other enemy field fortifications protecting adjacent base camps and cache sites. The jet fighter-bombers together with the night gunships and flare ships assisted in dominating the battlefield and in isolating it to deter enemy evacuation of caches. Generally good weather allowed the employment of an average of 98 sorties daily and permitted gunship cover throughout the night.

**e. Summary of Tactical Air Support:**

**(1) Close air support sorties:**

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AVERAGE PER DAY</u>
Preplanned	4913	168
Immediate	1104	42

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**CONFIDENTIAL****(2) Close air support BDA:**

KBA (Confirmed)	520
KBA (Estimated)	270
Road cuts	37
Trail cuts	16
Secondary Explosions	562
Structures Destroyed	2440 Damaged 407
Bunkers Destroyed	3852 Damaged 776
Fighting Positions Destroyed	719 Damaged 222
Vehicles Destroyed	52 Damaged 19
Bridges Destroyed	30 Damaged 22
AA Positions Destroyed	35 Damaged 7
Rice (Estimated Tons)	268
Corn (Estimated Tons)	1
Ammunition (Estimated Tons)	1

**(3) Night Support:**

AG-119 Gunship - 1,556,800 rounds and 1742 flares

C130/C123 Flareship - 6,567 flares

**Combat Sky Spots:**

1st Cav Div	119
25th Inf Div	56

**Commando Vault (15,000lb bomb) expenditures:**

1st Cav Div	19
25th Inf Div	

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**2. (C) B-52 BOMBER SUPPORT:**

a. A total of 186 B-52 Bomber strikes supported operations in Cambodia during the period 24 April through 30 June 1970. Initial strikes in Cambodia were targeted against suspected base camps, transshipment points and staging areas and were designed to assist penetration of the border areas and facilitate rapid advancement to initial objectives. A total of 36 strikes were employed in this role in the Fishhook area and Base Areas 350, 351 and 353.

b. As consolidation of the initial objectives occurred, targeting emphasis was shifted to support operations designed to destroy enemy troop concentrations, disrupt command control facilities, and destroy rice and munitions caches which could not be fully exploited. The most significant BDA reported was 151 confirmed KBA from a series of six strikes on 11 May west of Mimot. This exploitation phase of the operation was supported with a total of 89 strikes.

c. Withdrawal operations were supported by 36 strikes concentrated in the Fishhook and north of Base Area 351. The objective of these strikes was to assist in the extraction of US and ARVN units by interdicting known and suspected enemy troop concentration. Midway through the withdrawal phase, troop extraction had successfully progressed to the extent that Arc Light emphasis was shifted to known and suspected arms and rice caches.

**d. Summary of Arc Light support:**

**(1) Strikes employed:**

Tactical targets	186
Full six aircraft strikes	61
Three aircraft strikes	125

**(2) Strikes by supported unit/operations:**

	TT43	TT45	TT46
1st Cav Div	49	69	
25th Inf Div	46		
ARVN Abn Div	13		9
5th ARVN Div			
TOTAL	108	69	9

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**CONFIDENTIAL****Results - Bomb Damage Assessment:**

<b>Enemy Killed</b>	<b>239</b>
<b>Secondary Explosions</b>	<b>329</b>
<b>Bunkers Destroyed,</b>	<b>2259</b>
<b>Tunnel Complexes Destroyed</b>	<b>826</b>
<b>Trench Line Destroyed</b>	<b>2176</b>
<b>Fighting Positions Destroyed</b>	<b>660</b>
<b>AA/AW Positions Destroyed</b>	<b>39</b>

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**ANNEX L (Naval Operations) to II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation  
Report - Cambodian Operations (U)**

1. (U) **GENERAL:** USN and VNN Riverine elements under command of task unit (CTU) 214.1.4 participated in Phase III of Operation Toan Thang 42, 6 - 12 May 1970. Although the commander of the naval task force was a Vietnamese officer, and the majority of the river craft were manned by Vietnamese naval personnel, US Navy boats served under the task force commander and USN Advisors accompanied the CP and each VNN boat.
2. (C) **MISSION:** The mission of TU 214.1.4 was to interdict enemy traffic on the Kompong Spean River from 6 May through 12 May. This operation was conducted in coordination with 25th Inf Div on the north and III Corps Task Forces 225 and 318 on the south. TU 214.1.4 had an area of operation extending 1 kilometer out from either side of the river.
3. (C) **ORGANIZATION:** Initially, the TU was composed of VNN PBR's, light, speedy, unarmored boats with extensive fire power and mobility. These craft were ideal for reconnaissance of water ways and enemy positions. Strong reactions from well entrenched enemy forces required replacement of the PBR's with heavily armored Riverine boats.
4. (C) **COMMAND AND CONTROL:** The CTU controlled the operation from Ben Keo Naval Base (XT2345) on the Co Dong River. A forward CP was maintained inside the RVN border on an armored command and control boat. US advisors maintained their area communication nets and were responsible for control and employment of US air and artillery support. USN Seawolf gunships from Ben Luc were temporarily based at Tay Ninh West to provide gunship support to Riverine Operations.
5. (U) **SUMMARY:** Continuous Naval patrolling and effective employment of "Waterborne Guard Posts" successfully terminated enemy water traffic during the operational period. The net result was to confuse the enemy and inhibit his mobility as US/GVN forces converged on the river from north and south.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****3. (C) ARVN Airborne Division.**

a. The ARVN Airborne Division was deployed in the Fishhook area, generally in dense jungle terrain. Although all battalions displayed aggressiveness initially, the enemy was able to take advantage of the jungle to employ ambushes and harassing tactics to cause delay and inflict casualties on airborne units. Heavy reliance on helicopter gunships created unnecessary delays in exploiting enemy contacts. The failure to employ artillery initially in contacts often resulted in additional friendly casualties, with the enemy withdrawing before gunship support arrived.

b. There was a tendency to violate unit integrity among airborne units. Often companies from adjacent battalions would participate jointly in operations without designating an overall commander. Coordination between adjacent units was also noted to be a weakness.

c. Other noticeable weaknesses in airborne unit operations were reluctance to aggressively exploit and evacuate cache sites. Upon discovery of a cache, units did not conduct comprehensive searches for other cache sites in the general area and failed to outpost cache discoveries adequately to prevent enemy harassment. In this regard, combat patrols and stay behind ambushes were not used as frequently or aggressively as needed.

**4. (C) 5th ARVN Division.**

a. The 9th Regiment was deployed in Base Area 350 in terrain characterized by rolling hills and single canopy vegetation. Ground operations were generally limited to company and battalion size reconnaissance-in-force operations with little tactical direction from the regiment. Battalion commanders were assigned areas of operations and deployed their forces independently within these areas. Generally, the efforts of the battalions were not coordinated by regiment to insure a coordinated, controlled search.

b. Gunships were usually the first type of fire support requested when contacts were made with enemy forces. While units showed proficiency in the use of ARA, often the tactical situation was best served by immediate employment of direct support artillery. There was also a reluctance to use close air support. Except for the initial air assaults into Cambodia, pre-planned air strikes were not used. Immediate air strikes were used only when a unit became heavily engaged and was still far enough from the enemy to permit its use without suffering friendly casualties.

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c. As cache sites were found, units focused attention on evacuating the contents of the cache rather than searching for other caches. Consequently, search efforts were less than complete. Moreover, security became lax when ARVN units discovered supply caches. On several occasions, the enemy was permitted to get within small arms and R-60 range of the interior of the battalion because of lack of adequate outposts and ambush patrols.

5. (C) Summary. ARVN initiated and controlled operations during the Cambodian campaign have had a severe impact on the enemy. The success of Vietnamese units in locating and evacuating captured material and destroying base camp complexes had a profound effect on both sides. The enemy lost a significant number of personnel, to include destruction of several units, and larger quantities of supplies and equipment. For the III MR, the campaign was a series of missions which, in spite of the shortcomings noted above, earned it high marks and imbued it with confidence and esprit.

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### ANNEX N (DEPCORDS) to II FFORCEV Commander's Evaluation Report - Cambodian Operations. (U)

1. (U) General. The influence of the Cambodian operations on the majority of CORDS area of interest was primarily an intensification of pacification and development activities within III MR. More directly, there were operations conducted in the Angel's Wing area by RF/PF units from Tay Ninh. These operations were distinct contributions to the success of the cross border operations. Significant effects also encountered were the large number of refugees generated by military operations within Cambodia.

#### 2. (C) Significant Highlights.

a. Territorial Forces. The most noteworthy RF/PF operations were conducted by territorial forces from Tay Ninh Province. Seven RF companies, commanded by two inter-company group headquarters, and the 58th RF Battalion were augmented by various RF platoons and the Provincial Reconnaissance Platoon. These forces were given their own areas of operation and were responsible to the subsector commander. Their mission was to locate enemy units and caches that had not been uncovered by the fast moving armor and mechanized regular force sweeps in and around the Angel's Wing. During this period the RF/PF conducted a total of five operations in Cambodia resulting in ten days of actual combat. The terrain in which they operated was characterized by rice fields, tree lines and wooded area. Most of the uncultivated areas were occupied by enemy forces in well fortified positions. Initially, engagements with the enemy revealed them to be confused, disorganized, and obviously without adequate command and control. Where resistance was offered, it was generally token in nature, resulting in 150 enemy captured and 64 killed. By late May, resistance during contacts stiffened as the enemy was able to reestablish command and control. Despite this increased resistance, the enemy RF/PF loss ratio was over 30:1.

b. Refugees. 36,000 refugees from Cambodia sought refuge in III MR, either directly or indirectly due to the Cambodian operations. The refugees were received, processed and cared for by the Vietnamese Government in an outstanding manner. 922 tons of captured rice were backhauled from enemy caches and distributed to refugees in III and IV MRs. The refugee relief operation was a positive example of successful Vietnamization. No major problem area was encountered.

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Annex O (Results - Ton Thang 42) To Commander's Evaluation Report-  
Cambodian Operations (U)

	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EN KIA	128	2621	2749
PW	10	751	761
HOI CHANH	-	78	78
END WPNS	33	1858	1891
C/S WPNS	1	477	478
RICE (T)	.15	1041.5	1041.6
BUNKERS	-	1065	1065
FRDLY KIA	9	288	295
FRDLY WIA	65	1349	1387
VEHICLES	0	29	29
SALT (T)	.5	-	.5
FOOD STUFFS (T)	.5	-	.5
MED SUPPLIES (T)	-	1.5	1.5
MUNITIONS CAPTURED:			
B40/41	4	15999	16003
60mm	4	9215	9219
81mm	-	2252	2252
82mm	-	16804	16804
120mm	-	884	884
57mm RR	-	1636	1636
75mm RR	3	1321	1324
50cal	-	28250	28250
51cal	-	1030100	1030100

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	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
12.7mm	-	42600	42600
7.72 AK	-	1323100	1323100
SKS	-	620000	620000
30 cal	1000	1250	2250
107mm rkt	-	83	83
122mm rkt	-	77	77
240mm rkt	-	10	10
GRENADES	263	11731	11994
AT Mines	-	687	687
CLAYMORES	100	25	125
BANGALORE TORPEDOS	-	11	11
7.62 (M60 MG)	-	163540	163540
3.5" RL	-	105	105
AP Mines	-	412	412

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Annex P (Results- Team Thang 43) To Commander's Evaluation Report-  
Cambodian Operations (U)

	United States			
	<u>1st Cav</u>	<u>25th Div</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EN KIA	1336	664	1005	3005
PW	18	32	26	76
HOI CHANH	12	14	3	29
IND WPNS	3009	382	1302	4693
C/S WPNS	425	96	210	731
RICE (T)	659	1320	718.95	2697.95
BUNKERS	1413	3855	1023	6291
FR KIA	50	91	149	290
FR W/A	161	701	693	1518
FR MIA	7	2	-	9
VEHICLES	167	54	3	224
SALT (T)	8.1	2.4	40	50.5
MED SUPPLIES (T)	9.8	0	11.1	20.9
FOOD STUFFS (T)	17.4	17.5	7.33	42.2
MUNITIONS CAPTURED:				
B40/41	303	300	6184	6787
60mm	1002	1287	36	2325
81mm	-	50	84	134
82mm	1597	800	2936	5327
120mm	169	80	3	252
57mm RR	3588	153	2645	6386

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	United States			
	<u>1st Cav</u>	<u>25th Div</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
75mm RR	166	13	1343	1522
50 cal	10000	200	-	10200
45 cal	42	132	-	174
14.5mm	25200	-	-	25200
12.7mm	361297	32528	27840	361083
7.62 AK	1779720	17316	414800	2211836
7.62 (RUSSIAN)	140	-	-	140
30 cal	402500	26000	2000	430500
107mm rkt	14	14	27	55
122 mm rkt	30	120	601	751
240 mm rkt	2	-	33	35
<u>GRENADES</u>	2630	1040	360	4230
RIFLE GRENADES	-	558	0	558
AT MINES	-	-	16	16
CLAYMORES	-	-	435	435
BANGALORE TORPEDOS	446	250	-	690
7.62 (NATO)	1200	7821	-	9021
3.5" RL	1	37	-	38
AP MINES	252	195	-	447
7.92mm	-	2295	-	2295
89mm	20	-	-	20
28mm	2	-	-	2

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	United States			
	<u>1st Cav</u>	<u>25th Div</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
9mm	500	159	-	659
7.5mm	46670	-	-	46670
38 cal	-	146000	-	146000
5.56mm	1400	-	-	1400
22 cal	-	12	-	12
UNCLAS SA rds	484955	-	-	484955

**ANNEX Q (Results - Toan Thang 44) To Commander's Evaluation Report -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

EN KIA	283
PW	12
HOI CHANH	7
IND WPNS	297
C/S WPNS	34
RICE (T)	217
BUNKERS	1202
FRDLY KIA	21
FRDLY WIA	174
VEHICLES	1

**MUNITIONS CAPTURED:**

Assorted Small Arms Ammo	4877 rds
Assorted HE Ammo	1516 rds

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ANNEX R (Results - Toan Thang 45) To Commander's Evaluation -  
Cambodian Operations (U)

EN KIA	1238
PW	13
HOI CHANH	6
IND WPNS	4073
C/S WPNS	449
RICE (T)	14
BUNKERS	160
FR KIA	128
FR WIA	332
FR MIA	4
VEHICLES	1.5
SALT (T)	34.7
FOOD STUFFS (T)	32.6
MED SUPPLIES (T)	18.5
MUNITIONS	
B40/41	12800
60mm	7117
81mm	68
82mm	10058
120mm	2027
57mm RR	10350

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75mm RR	2176
122mm rkt	685
107mm rkt	53
37mm	42
40mm	130
85mm	47
2.36 rkt	13
14.5mm	177207
12.7mm	252273
30 cal	35140
50 cal	80
9mm	3
7.92mm	99370
7.62 (NATO)	37725
7.62 (AK)	382230
7.62 (PISTOL)	97100
7.62 (RUSSIAN)	111000
5.56mm	100
GRENADES	42715
MINES	321
BANGALORE TORPEDOS	165
CLAYMORES	472

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**ANNEX S (Results - Toan Thang 46) To Commander's Evaluation -  
Cambodian Operations (U)**

EN KIA	70
PW	9
HOI CHANHS	0
IND WPNS	325
C/S WPNS	41
RICE (T)	79
BUNKERS	490
FR KIA	27
FR WLA	147
VEHICLES	2
SALT (T)	26.8
MED SUPPLIES (T)	11
FOOD STUFFS (T)	2.5
MUNITIONS CAPTURED:	
B40/41	596
60mm	1427
82mm	595
57mm RR	1035
75mm RR	90
7.62 AK	6000
122mm rkt	2

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GRENADERS	135
RIFLE GRENADERS	277
AT MINES	144
BANGALORE TORPEDOS	23

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Annex T (US/GVN Total Results) To Commander's Evaluation -  
Cambodian Operations (U)

	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EN KIA	3649	4158	7807
PW	85	824	909
HOI CHANHIS	39	81	120
END WPNS	6794	3559	10353
C/S WPNS	1065	781	1786
RICE (T)	3750	2093.6	5843.6
BUNKERS	7630	2978	10608
FR KIA	284	472	761
FR WLA	1444	2256	3700
FR MLA	13	33	46
VEHICLES	347	34	391
SALT (T)	44.7	68.5	114.2
MED SUPPLIES (T)	2.3	28.6	56.9
FOOD STUFFS (T)		...	11.0
MUNITIONS CAPTURED:			
B40/41	13407	22970	36377
60mm	9410	10678	20088
81mm	118	2336	2454
82mm	12455	20335	32790
4.2"	104	-	104
120mm	2276	887	3163
57mm	14091	5316	19407

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	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
75mm	2358	2804	5162
UNK RR	2500	-	2500
50 cal	11000	28250	39250
51 cal	0	1030100	1030100
12.7mm	2916558	70440	2986998
14.5mm	202407	0	202407
7.62 AK	5619396	1738140	7357536
SKS	0	628000	628000
30 cal	464540	3250	467790
107mm rkt	81	110	191
122mm rkt	835	680	1515
240mm rkt	2	43	45
GRENADES	46621	12578	59199
RIFLE GRENADES	558	277	835
AT MISSILES	768	851	1619
CLAYMORES	960	460	1420
BANGALORE TORPEDOS	855	34	889
7.62 (M60 MG)	0	163540	163540
3.5" RL	0	105	105
AP MINES	0	412	412
7.92mm	995865	-	995865
7.62 (NATO)	46746	0	46746
7.62 (RUSSIAN)	115620	-	115620

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	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
37mm	9642	0	9642
85mm	1967	0	1967
7.62 (PISTOL)	97729	0	97729
40mm	130	0	130
45 cal	174	0	174
UNCLAS SA	550620	472222	1022842
20mm	2	0	2
7.5mm	46670	0	46670
9mm	1159	0	1159
3.5" rkt	38	0	38
38 cal	146000	0	146000
22 cal	12	0	12
2.36 rkt	13	0	13
5.56mm	1480	0	1480
B20 rkt	8	0	8
UNK RKT	1	-	1

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